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I, Posthuman: Embodying Entangled Subjectivities in 
Gaming 
 
We live in an era where the fundamental principles of what it means to be human are 
being reconsidered and reconceptualised, and we are moving towards a more entangled 
and relational understanding of the human’s ontology. The “boundaries” of what 
constitute a human as separate from both its surroundings and human and non-human 
others are being problematised. How do you separate “the human” from its contexts? In 
an age where advanced technology often constitutes these contexts, how can you 
separate the human from technology? Whilst we have always been entangled, today this 
occurs in a context that is more technologically driven, and this has provoked further 
debate on the status of the “posthuman”. 
This PhD thesis is concerned with what it means and how feels to be 
posthuman, by exploring how posthuman subjectivities are enabled and embodied. 
What we are capable of doing emerges contextually: it is profoundly dependent on our 
environments. In my view of the posthuman, the stable “human” self is disrupted, 
giving way to a subjectivity where our interactions in the world are more intra-active. 
But how might we consider the emergence of posthuman subjectivities in more depth? I 
suggest using a particular example of posthuman subjectivity, the MMORPG avatar-
gamer, to demonstrate how the humanistically separated entities of “avatar” and 
“gamer” can provide a context to explore how “other” and “self” are not ontologically 
distinct. In doing so, I ask: what specific practices enable or provoke this ontological 
entanglement? Engaging in an autoethnographic inquiry, I use my intra-action with my 
avatar Etyme in the MMORPG World of Warcraft as one example of posthuman 
subjectivity. This methodology in itself is intriguing to explore the multiplicity of selves 
we experience, and negotiates the humanistic overthrows of “selfhood” whilst 
experiencing the self as entangled.  
Through my construct of the posthuman, where the human cannot be 
meaningfully separated from its environment, we are nevertheless still drawn to speak 
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of an “I” and have a desire to understand ourselves as independent agents. However, the 
fieldnotes analysed in this thesis disrupt the “I”, and instead reflect on the shifting sense 
of self with and through an entity that is experienced as both me-and-not-me. Whilst an 
autoethnographic posthumanism might seem contradictory, I argue that it is a 
fundamental step in acknowledging our humanistic tendencies and beginning to 
reflexively engage with, and critique, these ideals. To do so, this thesis “posthumanises” 
traditionally humanistic constructs: acting and empathy. To widen this concept further, 
a third analytic re-interrogates different aspects of subject formation to consider how 
these too could be “posthumanised”. This suggests a broader application of 
posthumanism, demonstrating how previous notions of mastery, autonomy, and 
individuality can be critiqued and destabilised in order to view our practices and 





Chapter 1: A Posthuman PhD 
 
Introduction 
I first started playing videogames clustered around a PC with my family when I was 
around five or six years old. My parents, my brother, and I undertook fascinating 
adventures, from Castle of the Winds to Little Big Adventure, from Myst to Riven, from 
DragonLore to Discworld. I remember those times with acute fondness, even for the 
frustrating parts; the sound of the character Rincewind saying “that doesn’t work” for 
the 5000th time is one I am sure many players are haunted by, not just the Wilde family. 
Despite my early engagement with videogames, I never quite imagined that I would be 
using this medium as a context to explore the human condition or to conceptualise the 
posthuman. Yet, this thesis is precisely that – an exploration of posthuman subjectivity 
through gameplay. 
This thesis works on the basis that we are posthuman – but that we do not yet 
know what that means, how posthuman subjectivity is emergent, or how our humanist 
practices might be rethought in order to align with more posthuman perspectives. In the 
following chapter I outline some of the main arguments that have driven my exploration 
of these issues, and give an overview of the context of gaming, before providing a 
breakdown of the thesis and the aims of each chapter. 
 
The posthuman 
Talking about the post-digital context, Kwastek (2015: 79) explains that ‘we apply the 
prefix ‘post’ to question some established concept which we might have all too easily 
taken for granted’. This to me sums up the importance of the posthuman – to question 
the taken for granted concept of the human and to critically re-engage with what that 
term means. We cannot claim that what it means to be “human” has been a stable 
category. Historically, different rights have been extended to different subjects, different 
behaviours have been deemed “normal”, and we have conceived of different ways to 
understand the world. The term “human” then, does not seem adequate to encompass all 
of the shifting attitudes and agendas that have been housed by that term. It is evident 
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that our understanding of our “selves” and our interaction with the world around us, the 
“subjects” and “objects” within it, is evolving. The “posthuman” can be and has been 
used as both a philosophical vessel through which to explore this shift, as well as being 
used as a title.  
In this thesis I draw mainly on Braidotti’s (2013) genealogy of posthumanism 
and her vision for a posthuman subject and posthuman ethics; on Barad’s (2007) notions 
of entanglement and intra-action to explore the ways in which we are not ontologically 
distinct subjects (as the concept of “inter”action might suggest) but are bound up in our 
relations to everything around us; and on Hayles’ (1999) version of the posthuman as a 
material-informational entity. In our current, media saturated climate, we are often 
exposed to “moral panic” stories that suggest our increasing intimacy with machines is 
irrevocably changing our behaviours (for the worse). However, posthumanism is a 
philosophy that points out that many of these “changes” are not actual changes in our 
nature, but a change in our understanding of what the ontology of the human is. Humans 
have always been reliant on other technologies and tools – from wearing clothes to 
building houses we have always been augmented and shaped by our surroundings. Yet, 
in the traditional concept of the liberal human subject, which has dominated our 
philosophical view of self for some time, there is an understanding of the human as an 
autonomous being. The liberal human subject aimed to perpetuate a unified sense of self 
and of control, but our increasing intimacy with technology appeared to be a dramatic 
and new “challenge” to that. However, the unity of the human was never complete, and 
posthumanism is a philosophy that shows how our relationship with technologies, tools, 
and “others” reveals the fallacy of assuming the skin is the boundary of the human. As 
Blackman (2012: 77) claims ‘we are not singular and bounded, but rather permeable 
and open to being affected and affecting’ through circumstances, environments, and 
feelings beyond what is housed within the body. 
McLuhan (1994 [1964]) demonstrated the ways in which different media were 
an “extension” of a pre-existing human capability: clothing becomes an extension of the 
skin, keeping us warm; wheeled vehicles are an extension of the feet, allowing us to 
travel. However, posthumanism disrupts this subject-centred view, and instead argues 
that more than extended, we are instead entangled with our media and technologies – as 
well as with our environments and with human and non-human “others”. From this 
 
3 
perspective, ‘[h]umans do not simply manipulate or control machines, data, and 
networks any more than machines, data, and networks simply manipulate or control us’ 
(Paasonen et al. 2015: 2). Rather than considering the McLuhan-based model of a 
central “subject” extending their human capabilities outwards and utilising media in a 
hierarchical understanding of anthropocentrism, a posthuman model disrupts and 
displaces this centrality, and understands the human as just another part of the 
entanglement. As Kember and Zylinska (2012: 13, original emphasis) explain: 
 
[i]t is not simply the case that “we” – that is, autonomously existing humans – 
live in a complex technological environment that we can manage, control, and 
use. Rather, we are – physically and hence ontologically – part of that 
technological environment, and it makes no more sense to talk of us using it, 
than it does of it using us. 
 
Hayles (1999: 6) claims that ‘people become posthuman because they think they 
are posthuman’. If that is the case, I am irrevocably posthuman. I agree with the 
sentiment of the posthuman condition: that to conceive of ourselves as the stable, fixed, 
anthropocentric liberal human subject seems inherently flawed when we consider our 
deep entanglements in the world around us. The process of conducting this PhD has 
enhanced and asserted that feeling and this thesis goes on to explore the emergence of a 
particular posthuman subjectivity. However, what does it mean to be posthuman in a 
world as deeply rooted in humanism as ours? 
Posthuman subjectivity suggests a condition of emergence, intra-acting with 
other entities and understanding our subjectivity and our actions as contingent and 
entirely dependent on what is around us. Where “interaction” suggests two distinct 
entities engaging with one another, Barad’s (2007) notion of intra-action serves as a 
revision of this to account for the ways in which we emerge only from those 
engagements, and therefore disrupts a subject/object binary (I explore this term further 
throughout the thesis). However, our societies still revolve around “ideals” of liberalism 
(even in its “neo” form), capitalism, and meritocracy, including an emphasis on 
individualism. We are given the impression that we should view the self as a project, 
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and that we should undertake the personal responsibility to monitor and regulate the 
self. This “self-knowledge” is then used as a form of governance, but in a way that still 
implies we can control and master ourselves. To some extent, our technologies are now 
becoming more implicit in this self-monitoring, through the use of biosensing 
technologies, and the quantification of self. Even when dependent on technology to 
monitor our blood sugar levels or keep our heart beating in the right rhythm, we 
maintain the myth of agency and control. We rely on our computers to house our 
memories (telephone numbers, photographs, notes); yet we install apps for “brain 
training” to exercise the mind and work on our recall. These examples of our reliance 
on technologies demonstrate our entanglement with them, yet there is a tension between 
this reliance on an “other” and the desire to see the self as individual, and as a project 
we can work on for self-betterment. As entangled as we are, we are embedded in 
societies that seek to individualise. If we are individual, and individually responsible, 
we are easier to control, as we can each be held accountable to manage our “selves”. 
We are often happy to conform to this standard – we are, to say the least, ambivalent 
about the notion of “giving up” control – as if it was ever “ours” in the first place. We 
thrive on our ability to monitor and control ourselves. We adopt anthropocentric 
attitudes that see humans as the centre of the universe. Earth, animals and machines are 
there to do our bidding1. And why would we want to give this up? This comfortable 
position of being able to congratulate ourselves for our autonomous achievements and 
to have subordinate “objects” is a luxury. In this society then, perhaps the claim that 
‘people become posthuman because they think they are posthuman’ (Hayles 1999: 6) is 
oversimplified. We are all entwined, but how do we really think of ourselves as such? Is 
thinking of ourselves as posthuman enough? What are the actions of a posthuman? How 
do we embrace our entanglements? 
My own understanding of the posthuman subject is one that is very much 
embodied. Exploring subjectivity is a complex task, and this becomes even more 
fraught when you are also claiming that subjectivity is not individually “owned”, but is 
dependent on all the entanglements that come together to give subjectivity that distinct 
sense of being “you”. However, in order to research how posthuman subjectivity 
																																																						
1 The emergence of many dystopian depictions of our future when the world around us reasserts its 
independence from human will demonstrates our deep-seated fear of such a loss of control. 
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emerges, and how we can rethink our everyday actions as “being posthuman”, it seemed 
advisable to choose a specific context. We are, I believe, always posthuman. We are 
never singular selves, separate from our surroundings: our need to eat, drink and breathe 
is already testament to that as things “external” to the self are perpetually being 
“internalised” for our survival. But, for the purposes of this PhD project, I have 
embraced one particular entanglement of my posthuman subjectivity. I have actively 
sought entanglement in a digital, online, technological context in order to situate my 
claims within a very specific relationship between “self” and “other”. This posthuman 
subjectivity then becomes the focus of my research, the framework through which I 
explore our intra-dependence on “others”. The example of the avatar-gamer has allowed 
an explicit way to account for what it means to be posthuman, how it feels, and how 
posthuman subjectivity emerges through specific entanglements. The avatar-gamer 
posthuman subjectivity is used to ground the exploration of my own posthumanity. As a 
case study, the principals I explore in that entanglement can then be applied elsewhere. 
In this thesis, I explore ‘subjectivities that are made possible by digital 
technologies’ (Ferreday 2009: 3) but by claiming these as posthuman I am able to 
broaden the scope of the project by demonstrating how the same practices, affects and 
attachments that facilitate this subjectivity are also as prevalent and apparent offline as 
they are online. Thus, the application of posthumanism means insights based on digital 
subjectivities can be applied in other contexts e.g. performance, empathy, memory, and 
the desire to develop and achieve. In bridging these two positions between technological 
and non-technological posthumanism, what I propose is that the distributed subjectivity 
of the avatar-gamer is one that arises from what could be historically considered to be 
very human “essences” or ways of interacting with the world, people and objects around 
us. This project therefore extends the claim that ‘subjectivity is emergent rather than 
given, distributed rather than located solely in consciousness, emerging from and 
integrated into a chaotic world rather than occupying a position of mastery and control 
removed from it’ (Hayles 1999: 291). To develop earlier accounts of posthuman 
subjectivity, this thesis actively explores how subjectivity is emergent, distributed, and 
integrated. 
Whilst I therefore agree with claims that ‘we were always posthuman’ (Tufekci 
2012: 34), this example of posthuman subjectivity also takes up recent calls to explore 
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the ‘affective attachment to the everyday technologies of the internet’ (Ferreday 2009: 
2) and how these online activities are raising questions of subjectivity2. 
 
What is in a game? 
Although the primary focus of this thesis is to explore posthuman subjectivity, the use 
of gaming as a context means that the research will also contribute to the field of game 
studies. I have no doubt that posthumanism is a philosophy that helps to make sense of 
the world through its conception of our ability to affect and be affected, to emerge from 
our intra-actions with environments, surroundings, people and technologies, and to 
disrupt problematic worldviews of anthropocentrism and some of the undesirable 
aspects of humanism. However, my concern with posthumanism and the posthumanities 
is that their potential is often limited to an audience of academics, theorists, and 
philosophers, rather than their application in everyday activities. I aim to address this 
gap by identifying the massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) 
avatar-gamer as an example of an everyday posthuman subjectivity, and to demonstrate 
the posthumanising of commonplace practices and affects. This application of theory in 
“real world” (albeit specifically privileged) scenarios makes theory relevant and useful. 
The capacity of videogames has expanded in the last half a century to create new 
interactive worlds for us to explore, work, and play in. Originally, digital games were 
limited as to what the gamer could do – there was little choice, and so player experience 
only varied in relation to in how many points were gained and how far the gamer 
progressed (Garrelts 2005: 2-3). However, through the development of the medium, 
more recent digital games have expansive spaces and more ways to interact, so that each 
player experience can be more individual and the played game is different depending on 
who plays it and how (Garrelts 2005: 3). Using a videogame for an exploration of an 
entangled posthuman subject has been useful as it represents one way in which “self” 
and “other” are entwined – as Garrelts (2005: 16) claimed, research on digital games 
‘cannot focus on the game, or the gamer; it must focus on the intersection and 
negotiation between the two – any other focus and the object of study dissolves’. 
																																																						
2 Whilst Ferreday (2009: 2) uses the “everyday” to define and justify her exploration of text-based 
websites, I would argue that online gaming is also an increasingly everyday activity. 
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As I will explore in the following chapters of this thesis, games can be studied in 
a variety of ways that challenge the binary between “real” and “virtual” worlds. For 
example, scholars have considered the ways in which the prevalence of technological 
games have affected our attitudes in other ways by exploring the phenomenon of 
“gamification” – an example of how games as a medium have shaped human 
association and action. The “gamification” model has seen businesses attempt to 
harness the incentives provided by gaming, employing gamification techniques in an 
effort to enthuse their workforce (see, for example, McGonigal 2012; Burke 2014).  
Gaming is, to many, such an everyday and ordinary habit that it is one that goes 
unquestioned and unconsidered. According to the UK Interactive Entertainment website 
(2017) some estimates of UK player demographics suggest that in 2016 there were 
‘18million people aged between 6 and 64 playing games in the UK, or 38% of the 
population in that age group […] Across all UK 6-64 year olds, […] 21% (10.2million) 
[played] online games’. However, despite this, as Hitchens et al. (2012: 2) state, ‘the 
nature of the interaction between player and player character, and the effects upon it, are 
far from fully understood’. My research makes a contribution to filling this gap in the 
knowledge, and offers posthumanism as a way of theorising the avatar-gamer 
collaboration. It does so by exploring the ways in which posthumanist theory can apply 
to gaming, in order to suggest a new way in which we can understand subjectivity and 
how it is shaped through our engagement with “external” stimuli. 
MMORPGs offer an intriguing site for research and my own research takes 
place in one of the oldest, World of Warcraft3(WoW), which launched in 2004. The 
game is open to an international audience to sign up and explore a 3-dimensional world 
by creating an avatar from a range of races and professions. World of Warcraft 
continues to expand as a gameworld, with new areas, expansions, and characters being 
added to the game. The World of Warcraft franchise is also developing, and 2016 saw 
the release of a blockbuster film, Warcraft, based on the game. 
MMORPGs are worlds in which players can explore vast landscapes with their 
customised, humanoid avatar. Thousands of players can simultaneously play the game 
online, and encounter each other within the gameworld. World of Warcraft has its own 
																																																						
3 Produced by Blizzard Entertainment. 
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histories and geographies, and two opposing factions (Alliance and Horde) battle 
through a variety of regions. The World of Warcraft avatar is viewed from a third-
person perspective and traverses a 3-dimensional landscape to undertake “quests” given 
by NPCs (non-player characters), which lead to rewards in experience points, money 
and items. Different aspects within the world can be interacted with, for example: in 
order to fight monsters; converse with NPC tradespeople; gain new skills; and to 
communicate with other players to chat, share quests, and form guilds. As experience 
points mount up, the avatar-gamer progresses through different levels, opening up new 
abilities and areas. Characters are created by choosing from 13 different races (ranging 
from gnome to undead), with each having their own history and background within the 
world, as well as their own customisable aesthetic. Choosing a “class” (12 options, from 
monk to mage) denotes your role and primary playing style within the game (see World 
of Warcraft 2017a and 2017b for full details of races and classes in the game). 
Player experiences even of the same game can, therefore, differ greatly and the 
avatar in the gameworld is a figure that can be analysed in a variety of ways. The 
blurring between avatar and gamer has been explored extensively (e.g. Banks and 
Bowman 2016; Gee 2008; Filiciak 2003; Sundén 2012) and player experiences vary 
between seeing the avatar as a “tool” for navigation (Collins 2011); as “characters” to 
empathise with (Belman and Flanagan 2010); as an “ideal self” (Jin 2011); or as a 
“representation” of the gamer’s identity in the gameworld (Filiciak 2003: 97; Cerra and 
James 2012: 168). However, many of these analyses are grounded much more in a 
traditional humanist approach. Viewing the avatar as a tool, for example, implies a 
hierarchy wherein the avatar is an object both separate from and subservient to the 
player. Whilst viewing the avatar as a character could be argued to be somewhat more 
post-anthropocentric in recognising the avatar has certain qualities, it nevertheless 
imposes a self/other dichotomy.  
Conversely, the application of the posthuman alters how we view this 
relationship and the subjectivities that are formed. Rather than understanding the human 
as fixed, bounded and stable, in a position of mastery over the game, instead I view the 
intra-acting elements of avatar-gamer as non-hierarchically entwined. This post-
anthropocentric understanding acknowledges and embraces the inseparability of notions 




Introducing the chapters 
In the following chapter, Proposing the Posthuman Gamer, I expand on the application 
of posthuman theory to the game environment. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to offer a full genealogy of posthumanism, I draw on some of the central themes 
of the philosophy, explaining their importance and relevance, before applying these to 
the avatar-gamer. This chapter sets out the context for the research in more depth. 
 Having claimed the MMORPG gamer as posthuman, Chapter 3: Embracing 
Methodological Contradictions then discusses the ways in which I explore this 
subjectivity within my thesis. Drawing on autoethnography for a posthuman project 
could be seen as problematic to the research context. Writing about the self and my 
experiences might be considered contradictory given the posthuman acknowledgement 
that the notion of self as singular is a flawed conception, and the proposal that we 
should be turning away from anthropocentrism. However, I read the “I” of the 
autoethnography through the lens of posthumanism – accepting that this “I” is made up 
of a multitude of different components and that the self is ‘always relational, always 
defined by its interconnections with others’ (Blackman 2008: 117). The “I” I employ 
destabilises anthropocentrism by its affordance of equal emphasis on the avatar as a part 
of the posthuman subjectivity. 
 Chapter 4: Themes, Positions and Disclaimers introduces the key analytical 
devices used to make sense of posthuman subjectivity in this thesis: acting, empathy, 
and subject formation. I have mentioned that despite our reliance on our environments, 
technologies, and the “others” around us, we still attempt to understand the self as 
individual and autonomous, master over our own environment. Throughout this thesis, 
beyond the context of the gamer as posthuman, I explore different actions, affects, and 
understandings of self to demonstrate how this is not the case. Through the analytics of 
acting, empathy, and subject formation experienced in-game, I show how these 
potentially humanistic understandings of self are actually inherently bound to the 
“others” around us. 
Chapter 4 also provides some caveats. I explain my scepticism towards the 
concept of “immersion”, and my desire to demonstrate that being posthuman and 
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playing a game are complex experiences, irreducible to only the “good parts”. I also 
make it clear in this chapter that whilst the construction of this thesis suggests a neat, 
linear narrative, this has not been the case. My experiences in-game have all been 
intertwined, and the structure of this thesis is therefore an imposed practice of sense-
making, rather than an “accurate” portrayal of a chronological encounter with different 
affects. 
 The following chapters then do the interpretative work of putting these analytics 
into effect. Chapter 5: From Acting to Intra-Acting is the first theme, and considers the 
ways in which acting theories that are based in a humanistic historical moment can be 
drawn upon to demonstrate the intra-dependence between self and other. Analysing 
gaming experiences through acting theory sheds a particular light on the avatar-gamer 
subjectivity, and offers an opportunity to take forward certain practices from acting into 
our understanding of subjectivity. In acting, the relationship between actor and character 
could be theorised as one of mastery and control, but I “posthumanise” these theories by 
drawing on the more entangled aspects that demonstrate the reliance of each entity on 
one another. 
 In broadening these ideas out from a particular profession, Chapter 6: Enacting 
Empathy considers how the intra-action between “self” and “other” is also apparent in 
the “human” ability to empathise. I draw on moments in-game of the avatar-gamer 
experience and read these as an empathic intra-connection. By demonstrating the 
cognitive-affective connection between the avatar and the gamer I consider how these 
moments demonstrate a further destabilising of the notion of us as ontologically 
separate units. However, this analysis is problematic for certain conceptions of 
empathy, which impose a strict self/other dichotomy. I therefore propose a version of 
posthuman empathy, which allows us to view empathy as an entanglement between 
entities, where each is affected by the “other”. 
 The final theme again extends the scope of the research project by moving into 
wider aspects of subject formation, and considering these in a posthuman light. In 
Chapter 7: Emergent Subject Positions, I study the humanistic practices of making sense 
of the self that occur online. Even in the context of an MMORPG, in a research project 
that specifically seeks to explore being posthuman, I am plagued by the desire to see the 
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self as singular, and to make sense of my experiences in linear ways that conform to 
certain expectations of the good citizen. In this chapter, I therefore problematise those 
experiences, and consider what it would mean to view our approaches to achievement, 
attention, memory, and development in a posthuman way. 
Chapter 8: A Contingent Conclusion draws together the main arguments of this 
thesis. In this chapter I make clear my proposal that we can make sense of posthuman 
subjectivity by posthumanising (in this case meant to both extend and to equalise) the 
conceptualisation of the actions that we take. In doing so I extend my use of 
posthumanism to not only think beyond the “human” as an ontological unit but also to 
think about how our everyday actions and understandings of self can be considered in a 
posthuman way. I “posthumanise” concepts throughout the thesis by reading them 
through the lens of posthumanism, problematising their anthropocentrism and offering 
insight on their entanglement. The conclusion therefore demonstrates how my research 
is made accessible outside of the context of gaming, thus proving the ways in which we 




This thesis addresses a gap in current literature surrounding posthumanism and 
posthuman subjectivities by taking a specific example of a posthuman subjectivity, and 
exploring it in more depth. I critically examine how our relationship with a non-human 
technological other is felt, what characterises that subjectivity and how we might, 
therefore, begin to analyse this subject formation in order to make sense of it. As I 
repeatedly state throughout this thesis – being “posthuman” feels very “human”. The 
way we are able to affect and be affected by others and environments around us shows 
us to be the entangled beings posthumanism suggests. What we need to do now is to 




Chapter 2: Proposing the Posthuman Gamer 
	
Introduction 
In the following chapter I provide an account of “the posthuman” that I engage with 
throughout this thesis in order to offer a brief overview for the reader and to situate this 
project within a broader framework. I first consider both utopian and dystopian 
accounts of our relationships with technology. Given the wide ranging literature in this 
area, I have paid particular attention to a few key texts I feel are representative of the 
main arguments. I explore the limitations in these binary approaches to new 
technologies, and consider this as the context in which the term “the posthuman” has 
emerged to provide an alternative account. I then outline the concepts of posthumanism 
that have been taken up in my research. These include: the critique of the liberal 
subject; the decentering of the human to unfix it from the centre of our worldview; the 
inclusion of “other”, non-human entities into our concept of subjectivity; and the 
multifaceted relationships that we have with these non-human others. Through these 
concepts I then consider how this might shape the notion of the “posthuman gamer” that 
this thesis aims to interrogate. 
	
Against utopian/dystopian dichotomies 
In the current age of a Western society saturated with “new” media and teased by the 
tantalising promise or threat of what that might become, there have arisen a variety of 
positions on what our technologically mediated selves and relationships may or may not 
achieve. There has been much debate from several different camps on what this 
increased connection and intimacy with our technology means, and how (or, indeed, 
whether) it can be seen as an indication of the changes to our humanity that we will face 
as technology becomes even more advanced. For example, in The Emotion Machine 
(2007) Minksy argues for an understanding of how we think that demonstrates “reason” 
and “emotion” as the different ways of thinking that can be broken down into a process. 
In doing so, he suggests that we can build artificially intelligent machines to “assist” 
with our thinking, and become as “thoughtful” as we are (Minksy 2007). Elsewhere, 
Kurzweil (2000: 256) sees a future that holds a ‘complete merger of the species with the 
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technology it originally created’ – computers integrated into brains and bodies – whilst 
Joy (2000: n.p.n.) argues against this “utopian” vision to raise concerns that advances in 
technology and weapons of mass destruction mean that ‘it is no exaggeration to say we 
are on the cusp of the further perfection of extreme evil’. Caricatured in these ways as 
either utopian, allowing us to overcome, for example, categories of age, gender, class, 
race (e.g. Plant 1997; Haraway 1991), or dystopian, where the cyborg-self becomes 
inhuman and emptied of feeling (e.g. Turkle 2011), these differing views each make 
interesting and potentially productive arguments. However, as I explore below, for the 
most part they each fall foul of making sweeping statements and reducing the 
experience to either one or the other on a binary of dystopian or utopian sentiment. 
There are concerns from many that our increasing intimacy with machines is a 
thoroughly negative turn that equals a lack of intimacy with other humans, and I review 
some of the most popular accounts below. Theorists in this area critically engage with 
our technological relationships. Turkle (2011) asks, for example: is sleeping with our 
phones next to us, checking them before we go to sleep and as soon as we wake up, 
distancing us from the human who we might be sleeping next to? Are communicative 
devices actually becoming barriers to our “real” and intimate communications face-to-
face? As we program robots to care for the elderly, are we disregarding our 
responsibility to future generations? 
Turkle is a well-known example of someone previously a technological 
optimist, now turned sceptic. In her first book, The Second Self, Turkle (2011: xi) 
‘focused on how evocative computers fostered new reflection about the self’. It is, 
according to Turkle (2011: xi) herself, a book ‘full of hope and optimism’. But in the 
decade that followed she began to be troubled by stories of those people who, rather 
than seeing computers as an intermediary, preferred their online existence to that of 
“real life”. In Turkle’s (2011) latest book, Alone Together, she considers how our 
insecurities in “real life” relationships have culminated in, according to her research, us 
turning to technology in order to be both connected but also protected from the 
fallibility of humanity, the risks and disappointments associated with those connections. 
Parts of Turkle’s (2011) studies consider the role of robots and our ability to 
imbue them with such importance. She explains that when we enter into relationships 
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with objects that then thrive under our care we connect with them in ways that 
experience those objects as intelligent (Turkle 2011: 24). She believes that it is our 
desire to ‘fill in the blanks’ (Turkle 2011: 24) of what those objects or technologies are 
capable of; willingly giving the machine human qualities and projecting traits that allow 
us to connect with technology. From Turkle’s (2011) perspective, we want to 
anthropomorphise. Sharing our emotions with, for example, a robot allows us to feel 
intimacy and empathy for the “other”. Rather than seeing this as an extension or 
development of emotion and connection though, Turkle’s (2011: xii) concern with such 
relationships is that ‘we expect more from technology and less from each other’. She 
argues that we enter into these relationships with our technologies, we imbue them with 
more intimate human traits as we begin to become less intimate with our fellow human 
being (Turkle 2011). Whilst others might argue that technologies have brought us closer 
together by conflating the distances of both space and time (see, for example, Ferreday 
2009), for Turkle (2011) these technologically mediated relationships, even when with 
fellow humans, are not of the same quality or richness that face-to-face interactions can 
bring.  
According to Turkle (2011: xiv) ‘we seem determined to give human qualities to 
objects and content to treat each other as things’. Turkle’s (2011) research is thorough 
and is based in extensive qualitative research, but it also speaks to a societal fear of 
technology – particularly targeting parents and the dangers their children face online. 
This form of media / moral panic could be considered cultural generationalism – ‘a set 
of discursive formations in the West that denounces the practices, behaviours, concerns, 
ideas and pastimes of youth and children while nostalgically venerating those of the 
recent past’ (Cover 2006: n.p.n.). Cover (2006) writes that there is a cultural 
apprehension for technologies that are not only viewed as dangerous through their 
“new-ness” but through their links to virtuality. The “virtual” promise is likened to the 
escape from the “real” that taking drugs can provide (Cover 2006). This, as Cover 
(2006: n.p.n.) argues, creates a problematic comparison of addiction, and offers a 
reductionist understanding that fails to account for the ‘complex matrix of desire, 
identity and sociality that produces the choice to spend significant time engaged in 
game activity’. Whilst some fears for children’s safety online are not unfounded, on the 
other end of the spectrum there are certain more positive views of our connection and 
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collaboration with the non-human “other”. 
For some, the loss of humanity as “centre” of our worldview is a positive turn 
towards de- or post- anthropocentrism that allows us to rewrite certain understandings 
of “the human”. For example, early cyberfeminist accounts of the internet 
enthusiastically embraced new technology and suggested that cyber culture permitted 
freedom from constructs of class, race, gender and sexuality. In ‘A Cyberfeminist 
Manifesto for the 21st Century’ (1991), for example, the VNS Matrix hailed their 
activism as the ‘virus of the new world disorder’, and urged people to disrupt and queer 
gender binaries through new technologies. Others saw the new technologies of the late-
twentieth century as a chance to rewrite politics. For these researchers, new methods of 
communication meant a new form of democracy were needed which could produce 
radical, transparent and participatory politics (Kellner n.d.). Kellner (n.d.) suggests that 
a democratisation of politics requires ‘relentless criticism of the existing media system’ 
but could happen both within mainstream media and through alternative, ‘oppositional 
media’ outside of the mainstream. In the technopolitics suggested by Kellner, new 
forms of cyberdemocracy are facilitated through our access to and use of the internet as 
a platform for the creation of new public spheres. Indeed, the hope of new political 
structures continues today, and remains attractive, as evidenced by Castells (2012), who 
has analysed the emergence of social movements in online spaces, becoming one of the 
world’s most cited communications scholars. 
Another consideration of utopian accounts has been the promise that advanced 
technology might bring to new relationships between humans and non-humans. Robots 
are increasingly being designed as caregivers either to the young or the elderly. 
Potential positive outcomes include providing more independence for the elderly, 
keeping them out of care-homes for longer (Sharkey and Sharkey 2012) or providing a 
‘therapeutic playmate’ for children with autism (Dautenhahn 2003)4. However, even in 
these positive scenarios, issues of robot ethics and robot rights then come to light, 
especially when these machines become intelligent and (seemingly) emotive 
themselves. Whilst Sparrow (2012) questions whether robots of the future that display 
human-like intelligence will be allowed to be turned off or destroyed; Verugglo and 
																																																						
4 There are also dystopian accounts within this ideal, for example Channel 4’s television programme 
Humans explores the fictional “synth” (synthetic) caregiver as a controlling jailer. 
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Abney (2012: 348) ask, ‘[a]s robots increase in autonomy and complexity, and their use 
becomes ever more pervasive in society, will the robotic programmer, builder, user, or 
the robot itself be the proper locus of moral evaluation and legal responsibility?’. 
Questions circulate as to whether we have a responsibility to care for the machines we 
make, and Fuller (2015) states: ‘not to give automated machines some measure of 
respect, if not rights, is tantamount to disowning one’s children – “mind children”, as 
the visionary roboticist Hans Moravec called them a quarter-century ago’. Elsewhere 
there are discussions as to our ethical obligation in the creation of intelligent machines, 
and how we can offer these machines a worthwhile life, with possibilities for 
compassion, growth, and understanding (Hughes 2012: 75). 
However, instead of viewing our relationship with and use of technology in 
dystopian terms that suggest we are losing our connections with each other, or utopian 
terms that consider us as ‘parents of machine children’ (Hughes 2012: 74) – children 
that can provide companionship and support – I suggest we instead need to take up 
Braidotti’s (2013: 90) call ‘for resistance to both the fatal attraction of nostalgia and the 
fantasy of transhumanist and other techno-utopias’ and consider the posthuman view of 
our connections and relationships with technology. 
Despite their opposing arguments, both Turkle and Moravec’s claims are 
implicitly humanist. Both consider technology to operate from outside of the human, as 
an “other”. In a posthumanist view, our relationships with technologies are instead what 
define us. We are constantly entangled with technologies, animals, humans, and 
environments to the point where exactly what compromises the “human” is in fact made 
up of a multiplicity of component parts and selves, as I explore below. As such, 
technology cannot be a “threat” to “humanity” – it is what makes us “human” in the 
first place. 
Posthumanism therefore accepts the fact that we are entangled beings, formed 
by the other entities that create our entanglements. In this view, ‘[d]igital technologies 
are part of this world and of our worldview; they are part of what shapes us materially 
and ontologically as embodied subjects’ (Shinkle 2005: 30). This can operate on two 
levels. Firstly, such an argument displaces the idea that our “interactions” online are 
inferior forms of communication. However, in accepting our intra-action with certain 
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digital technologies we are also able to consider intra-action with non-digital “others”, 
be they technologies, environments, animals, or “others” from our own species. The 
posthuman therefore both encompasses our connection with technology, our entangled 
selves, and a post-anthropocentric view of those relationships. I consider what this 
posthuman view of the subject might mean below. 
 
Complicating the posthuman 
Posthumanism is a term that can mean many different things to many different people 
in a variety of contexts. As Wolfe (2010: xii) states, ‘the term has begun to emerge with 
different and sometimes competing meanings’ and Roden (2015: 20) agrees, saying that 
posthumanism ‘comes in different flavours’. Herbrechter (2013: 41) supports a 
complicated concept of the posthuman when he suggests that: 
 
a new paradigm of thought has been emerging which is characterized by its 
opposition to and its transcendence of humanism. This paradigm, Franklin 
writes, opposes the separation between human and nonhuman environments 
and, instead, emphasizes the complexity and interrelatedness of human and 
nonhuman forms of agency. 
 
Herbrechter’s (2013) account suggests an oppositional paradigm, but one that holds a 
few key principles. Some of the main arguments of posthumanism are its 
acknowledgement of permeability, and the rejection of both anthropocentrism and the 
idea that the human is a bounded, fixed, stable self. 
From this viewpoint, Haraway (1991: 178) pointedly asks ‘[w]hy should our 
bodies end at the skin, or include at best other beings encapsulated by skin’, when 
subjectivity is defined so much by experiences that happen beyond the body. How we 
understand our bodies has shaped how we understand our “selves” and the body and 
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subjectivity therefore become intertwined to the degree that there is no difference5. 
Pepperell (2003) erodes the perceived boundary between mind and body by drawing on 
a range of contemporary ideas from sensory deprivation to quantum reality. He 
demonstrates the ways in which our bodies are conscious through the ways in which 
apparently “mental” states are often most easily recognised through our “physical” 
attributes (Pepperell 2003). Accordingly, he suggests that ‘we might be gradually drawn 
to the conclusion that our minds, our bodies and the world are continuous’ (Pepperell 
2003: 20). Posthuman subjectivity is therefore not a refusal of the flesh: rather than 
transcending the body we instead extend our embodied awareness (Braidotti 2013; 
Hayles 1999). In opposition to accounts of posthuman subjectivity as anti- or 
dehumanising, we might instead posit a subjectivity whereby ‘we are no less human 
than the first time an ancestor picked up a stick to extend an arm’ (Tufekci 2012: 34). 
This links to the idea of the originary prosthesis or originary technicity suggested by 
Derrida or Stiegler and their successors (Frabetti 2011). In this work the 
“instrumentality” of technology is disavowed in favour of technology as formative – 
‘the human co-emerges with tool use […] Stiegler maintains that human beings can 
experience themselves only through technology’ (Frabetti 2011: 6 and 7, my emphasis). 
Taking into account the further studies into affect, embodiment, and permeability, not 
to mention the different subjectivities that we inhabit, the idea of the “rational” and 
autonomous being becomes problematic (explored below in more detail), and hence a 
posthuman model that accommodates a more fluid understanding of “being” can be 
usefully employed (Wilde and Evans 2017: 4). The singular subject is replaced by the 
view of subjectivity as a flow and a fold, where our materialities are shaped by others in 
our environment, who may be both human and non-human (Wilde and Evans 2017: 4). 
The idea of opposing the separation between humans and “others”, and the 
complexities that follow have various far reaching consequences in a multitude of 
fields. For Hayles (1999: 290-291), the posthuman model understands that ‘human 
functionality expands because the parameters of the cognitive system it inhabits 
expand’. This form of posthumanism looks to how our “extensions” and expansions 
																																																						
5 ‘If we can accept that thought may be distributed throughout the body (and the body distributed through 
the environment) then we must assume that any factor that affects the body might have a bearing on 
thought’ (Pepperell 2003: 25). 
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have wider implications for our agencies beyond a single human body, and instead 
considers differently enacting and intra-acting bodies as producing different modes and 
ways of being. In my thesis I apply posthumanism to World of Warcraft, a MMORPG 
gaming environment, and the site of my autoethnographic study. It is my argument that 
the MMORPG gamer represents an embodiment of a posthuman subjectivity. 
However, before I focus on this it is important to reiterate that in my use of 
posthumanism I do not only view the posthuman as one who is technologically 
mediated. As Tufekci (2012: 34) argues ‘we were always posthuman’, that is to say we 
have always reached beyond the boundaries of our own skin, have always formed 
relationships with human and non-human others. The posthuman view acknowledges 
and embraces the ontological inseparability of components of “self”, “other” and 
“environment”. This therefore forces ‘a displacement of the lines of demarcation 
between structural differences, or ontological categories, for instance between the 
organic and the inorganic, the born and the manufactured, flesh and metal, electronic 
circuits and organic nervous systems’ (Braidotti 2013: 89). Posthumanism could be 
considered as a multifaceted philosophical tool or theory wherein we are able to 
reconfigure and reconsider various implications from past conclusions. 
There are, arguably, three main themes to a concept of “the posthuman”, which I 
take to be a questioning of: the liberal human subject; the idea of a fixed, bounded, 
stable self; and anthropocentrism. The account presented in this thesis is specifically for 
the purpose of positioning the reader, in a thesis that uses the posthuman as the basis of 
the theoretical perspective in the work, rather than a fully detailed genealogy (for more 
exhaustive works see How We Became Posthuman by Hayles (1999), The Posthuman 
by Braidotti (2013), What is Posthumanism? by Wolfe (2010), Posthumanism: A 
Critical Introduction by Herbrechter (2013) to name but a few). However, below I will 
very briefly cover some of the main arguments of posthumanism, in order to 
contextualise and place my own understanding of the term. I draw on a variety of ideas 
and negotiate my own position in relation to these. 
 
The liberal human subject 
Whilst relationships with technology form part of the rationale for the posthuman turn, 
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they are far from the only instigating factor and posthumanism has a complex and 
multifaceted basis informed by the critique of what or who the “human” is. As 
Whitehead and Wesch (2012: 4) state ‘the notion of the “human” is always a contingent 
category’ and different versions of what counts as a “human” have been constructed 
and conceived during our history in order to justify the whims of those in power. 
The rejection of the “liberal human subject” therefore stems from the idea that 
what actually counts as “human” is already flawed if you consider that, historically, 
only a particular kind of human has had full access to rights. The liberal human subject 
has traditionally applied to a white, male, heterosexual, Western, fully abled human, 
where other parts of society have been excluded even the most basic rights. It is only in 
the last century and a half that we have seen slavery abolished; women granted the right 
to vote and own their own property; the Disability Discrimination Act passed; and the 
recognition of LGBTQ+ rights. Women, ethnic minorities, disabled people, or anyone 
belonging to LGBTQ+ communities have historically been treated as lesser subjects, 
without access to the rights and benefits of others. Given that these rights have only 
previously extended to a specific minority Braidotti (2013: 1) writes that: 
 
[n]ot all of us can say, with any degree of certainty, that we have always been 
human, or that we are only that. [...] Not if by “human” we mean that creature 
familiar to us from the Enlightenment and its legacy: “The Cartesian subject of 
the cogito, the Kantian “community of reasonable beings”, or, in more 
sociological terms, the subject as citizen, rights-holder, property-owner, and so 
on” (Wolfe 2010a). 
 
Furthermore, the idea of the “ideal” human subject attracted a great deal of 
critique from post-structuralists who began to question individualism as a social and 
cultural construction rather than an intrinsic quality of the “perfect” or ideal human 
subject (Burr 1995). Whilst posthumanism has some chronological overlap with post-
structuralism it differs in some important ways (dependent on different readings and 
definitions). According to Braidotti (2013: 188), ‘[t]he posthuman subject is not 
postmodern, because it does not rely on any anti-foundationalist premises. Nor is it 
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poststructuralist, because it does not function within the linguistic turn or other forms of 
deconstruction’. She states that the ideas of signification and representation that frame 
post-structuralist thought do not apply to the materialist and vitalist posthuman subject 
(Braidotti 2013: 188). Rather than ascribing to ‘the primacy of culture and of 
signification over subject formation’ (Braidotti 2013: 188), a vital politics instead 
understands these factors as contingent within a particular historical moment, in need of 
updating to reflect the non-unitary status of the subject. 
From this perspective, whilst humanists believe in autonomy, responsibility and 
self-determination this amounts to an idea that ‘the human being is not the plaything of 
forces from which he cannot hope to escape […] the humanists think that the individual 
can achieve autonomy, that is, act by reason of his own will and in accord with the laws 
that he himself accepts, without necessarily conceiving this to be outside the human 
community’ (Todorov 2002: 33). What actually constitutes the “liberal human subject” 
is therefore already problematic, and in its most basic form posthumanism can arise 
from an acknowledgement of this and the desire to critically investigate and redefine 
what exactly we mean by “human” and what attributes we assign it. Responding to this 
prejudiced and somewhat unstable category, the “posthuman” signals ‘the end of a 
certain conception of the human’ (Hayles 1999: 286) – the liberal human subject, a 
rational and reasonable being. Posthumanism is therefore a field that has arisen from 
multiple critiques of the exclusivity of achieving the status of the “human” in all its 
privilege; for example, key critiques come from (but are not limited to) feminism, anti-
colonialism, race studies, disability studies and queer studies.  
 
A fixed bounded stable self 
Much of the basic premise of the idea of a human being individual, autonomous and 
fully in control of their own thoughts and actions has, in more recent years, come into 
question. This idea of the “rational” being can be linked to the ‘fiction of autonomous 
selfhood’ (Blackman 2017). As Blackman (2017: n.p.n.) explains, ‘[t]his fiction is one 
that assumes that the human subject is ideally bounded, responsible for their actions, 
self-enclosed and able to develop or enact the capacity for change and transformation 
through their own agency’ and as such has ‘become part and parcel of how we are 
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governed and managed as citizens and populations’ (Blackman 2008: 113).  The 
rational, autonomous being is therefore a particular construction designed to suit a 
particular style of governmentality; by making the subject accountable they are also 
made controllable. This links to our current cultural context of neoliberalism (see 
Chapter 7: Emergent Subject Positions for further critique of this). 
What the rational subject of humanism does not acknowledge is the much more 
porous, dispersed, intra-connected aspects of “being” that influence our daily existence. 
We are constantly entwined with others – human and non-human – around us, and this 
recognition has led to a renewed understanding of how and what we are affected by and 
how we are moved; the fact that our embodiment extends beyond our skin shows that 
the idea of the boundaries that separate “us” from the rest of the world are flawed when 
taking into perspective our distributed awareness and permeability. Although not 
specifically linked to posthumanism, Blackman’s (2012) account of “immaterial 
bodies”, for example, suggests an understanding of the self that is constantly permeable. 
She provides examples of this permeability from early psychology, where suggestion, 
hypnosis and “mental touch” trouble notions of separate, bounded bodies (Blackman 
2012). In another example, crowd mentality represents a concept ripe for the 
interdependence of one body with another, and is clearly evident in a range of spaces, 
such as at festivals, dance and clubbing spaces (Blackman 2012; Thrift 2008; Henriques 
2011). The experience of these spaces is not of an individual, unified body, but is rather 
experienced collectively and affectively (Wilde and Evans 2017: 3). 
The different subjectivities that each one of us can embody at once also 
demonstrates how the idea of a unitary, stable sense of “self” is also flawed – we are 
many things at once and again, part of this is to do with who we are with, where we are 
in time or space, and how we intra-act with human and non-human others. 
This entanglement is experienced in relation to technology in the way described 
by Toffoletti (2007: 2): 
 
[i]n this climate of biotechnologies, virtual worlds and digital manipulation, a 
relationship between the organism and the machine emerges that contests 
organic bodily boundaries, the locus of identity and the status of the human. 
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Clear distinctions between what is real and what is virtual, where the body ends 
and technology begins, what is nature and what is machine, fracture and 
implode. 
 
As Toffoletti (2007: 2) states, digital technologies are becoming more integrated 
into our everyday existence and bodies, expediting the fundamental reconsideration of 
how we conceive of the “human” as an ontologically distinct category. What is 
interesting about this acknowledgment is that we have a history in Western culture of 
personally augmenting ourselves for our own benefit – from clothes, to glasses, to 
walking sticks, to cars, to the telephone, mobile phone, internet and computers we have 
constantly been happy to capitalise on the permeability of the human and our ability to 
“extend” our embodied awareness. However, it is only recently that we have begun to 
consider what this deep intra-dependence between “self” and “others” might mean for 
the status of the human. In this regard, as the clear distinctions begin to collapse, we are 
then required to consider what Braidotti (2013) terms a “posthuman ethics”. She states 
that in considering the subject in a non-unitary way we therefore encounter ‘an enlarged 
sense of inter-connection between self and others, including the non-human or “earth” 
others, by removing the obstacle of self-centred individualism’ (Braidotti 2013: 49-50).  
The way humans use technology to “extend” the self clearly links to McLuhan’s 
(1994 [1964]) thesis that media are the ‘extensions of man’. McLuhan (1994 [1964]) 
argued the ways in which different media were an extension of a pre-existing human 
capability. However, as Herbrechter (2013: 50) states, ‘McLuhan’s radical analysis 
might still have been too anthropocentric’. Although Herbrechter (2013: 50) goes on to 
claim that McLuhan’s work ‘underestimates the extent to which technologization is 
changing us as a species’, I would argue that the focus on “is changing us” could be 
more usefully considered as “has formed us”. This view considers “technologization” 
not as a new, digital, virtual process but as a historic entanglement with and through 
“others”. As stated, the human has always been able to “extend” itself, but what we are 
able to extend and adapt, how we can be changed, and our understanding of our 
position within our relationship with other media (and matter) is changing.  A 
posthuman approach displaces the anthropocentric understanding of the stable human 
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extending themselves, and instead views this as a complex and non-hierarchical 
entanglement between intra-acting, mutually dependent, entities. 
Therefore, in a posthuman view, rather than considering the human as the main 
benefactor in utilising and adapting the “other”, be that technology, the environment, 
animals, etc. we instead consider that rather than these “others” being “extensions”, 
they are in fact implicitly part of what it is to be human: ‘that what defines humanness 
or humanicity to use Vicki Kirby’s (2011) term is our mixed natures and that we are 
composite anthropods’ (Blackman 2017: n.p.n.). “The human” is therefore ‘profoundly 
dependent into its surroundings’ (Pepperell 2003: 20). This acknowledgement allows us 
to consider these relationships as a mutual exchange in a more rhizomatic 
understanding of the perceived importance of the conjoined, intermingled, intra-acting 




As a result of this acknowledgement that we are neither stable unitary subjects 
unaffected by our interactions with “others”; and a recognition of how badly we have 
classified the “human” before in terms of privileging one type of human over another, 
we have begun to recognise that an anthropocentric attitude is also flawed. As stated 
above, our reliance on all things “other” demonstrates the entanglement of the “human”. 
How can we claim that we are the centre of the universe, when we rely so heavily on 
our environment to thrive? Without air, food, water and shelter as a basic minimum we 
would not survive. To believe that human, let alone man, is the centre of the universe is 
a fallacy, and in recognising our reliance on the “others” around us we can begin to 
develop a more complex and, hopefully, a less hierarchical understanding of humans’ 
place in the world. Braidotti (2013: 60) explains the key concept as follows: 
 
[p]ost-anthropocentrism is marked by the emergence of “the politics of life 
itself” (Rose 2007). “Life”, far from being codified as the exclusive property or 
the unalienable right of one species, the human, over all others or of being 





In understanding this it might be suggested that assigning or defining basic rights we 
can soon see how privileged ideas of “life” travel. If we extend certain “rights” to 
humans, and we then manage to reach a point where the “human” who receives those 
rights is any human and not just a fixed stereotype or the “right kind” of human, we 
then begin to move this critique into other realms, questioning, for example, our 
understanding of animal others. As Wolfe (2010: 99) states, there have previously been 
aspects of animal rights that have remained inherently humanist. Where ethical 
consideration has been broadened to incorporate previously marginalised “others” this 
does not always amount to the destabilisation of the role of the human (Wolfe 2010: 
99). Braidotti (2013: 79) similarly argues that “animal rights” do not always attend to 
the specificity of animals, but imposes an anthropomorphism which belies the inter-
relation between human and animal. This anthropomorphism is evident in the current 
situation where animal rights only extend to a certain limitation of “animal” (in much 
the same way as human rights extending to only a certain type of human). From this 
perspective we then might question, for example, why invertebrates should be afforded 
less of an ethical review of care than vertebrates.  
The answer is undoubtedly anthropocentric – we have come to care more for 
those creatures who have either become useful to us, or companions to us, and they 
become the ones that we are more willing to anthropomorphise. This is apparent in the 
way in which we respond with moral outrage towards those who are cruel to, for 
example, dogs – a companion species that we have not only domesticated but now also 
project human qualities onto and hold fictional dialogues with6. On the other hand, 
should the animal be considered to inconvenience or disgust us there is far less issue 
taken with, for example, using poisonous sprays, available at supermarkets and 
convenience stores nationwide, to eliminate flies. A hierarchy is therefore obviously still 
imposed, and this needs further displacement in order to reach the full potential, or 
promise, of post-anthropocentrism. As Braidotti (2013: 67) states: ‘[p]ost-
																																																						
6 For more critical analysis of companion species and humans’ relationships with dogs in particular see 
Haraway’s (2003) The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People and Significant Otherness. 
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anthropocentrism displaces the notion of a species hierarchy and of a single, common 
standard for “Man” as the measure of all things. In the ontological gap thus opened, 
other species come galloping in’. These “other species” encompass all elements of life, 
from animal to earth and even machine, but, as indicated, we are not yet at a point 
where this is being fully acknowledged, or accepted. 
There is, however, evidence that this is changing. For example, such a line of 
questioning inevitably leads to not only a reconsideration of such ethics and speciesism 
on smaller scales but also larger, considering the earth as an ecosystem. Disrupting our 
position of power within that system and destabilising the idea that the environment 
should serve humankind has led to an accounting of our vast impact on it. Characterised 
as the anthropocene, researchers in this field explore the current period as one in which 
the geological and ecological impact of humanity has been the dominant influence on 
the planet, referencing climate change as one example of this (see, for various 
discussions, the Critical Climate Change book series edited by Cohen and Colebrook, 
Open Humanities Press 2017). From a post-anthropocentric viewpoint, these 
environmentally detrimental (potentially disastrous) ramifications are unacceptable, 
unsustainable, and unethical. In order to combat these negative consequences, rights are 
also being fought for other, environmental, entities, for example, in the case of the 
Whanganui river in New Zealand, which has been granted legal status as a living entity 
in March 2017 in an attempt to protect and conserve the Māori ancestral river (Roy 
2017).  
Elsewhere, some forms of posthumanist research acknowledge our deep 
entanglements with nature through fields such as plant studies: reconceiving plants as 
active and intelligent agents and questioning how they influence the construction of 
“the human” (Ryan 2015). In tandem, as well as a reconsideration of our position in the 
hierarchy of “natural” life, there has also been a rethinking of the role of “objects” and 
material others. Again, if we displace the human from the centre of our worldview we 
begin to see the vitality in “others” – evident in the work of Bennett’s (2010: vii) 
Vibrant Matter, which disrupts the binary of ‘dull matter (it, things) and vibrant life (us, 
beings)’. 
It is arguments such as these that have then also led to a rise in the field of 
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“robot ethics” (Lin et al. 2012). If matter is vibrant, and if the earth should not be 
thought of as in servitude to humanity, then why should our machines? A focus on 
‘thing-power’ (Bennett 2010: 4)7 with a post-anthropocentric attitude is also apparent in 
object-oriented ontologies (OOO) and philosophies, which put ‘things at the center of 
being’ and suggest that ‘humans are elements, but not the sole elements, of 
philosophical interest’ (Bogost 2012: 6)8. If we acknowledge that humans are not the 
most significant species or entity on the earth then we should also, accordingly, look to 





My sense of posthumanism […] comes both before and after humanism: before 
in the sense that it names the embodiment and embeddedness of the human 
being in not just its biological but also its technological world, the prosthetic 
coevolution of the human animal with the technicity of tools and external 
archival mechanisms […]. But it comes after in the sense that posthumanism 
names a historical moment in which the decentering of the human by its 
imbrication in technical, medical, informatic, and economic networks is 
increasingly impossible to ignore, a historical development that points toward 
the necessity of new theoretical paradigms (but also thrusts them on us), a new 
mode of thought that comes after the cultural repressions and fantasies, the 
philosophical protocols and evasions, of humanism as a historically specific 
phenomenon. (Wolfe 2010: xv- xvi) 
																																																						
7 In the context of my research it is worth nothing that Ash (2012a: 10) has already claimed that 
videogames have thing-power ‘insofar as they contain a dynamic which exceeds both the players’ and 
designers’ intentions’. 
8 Whilst there are clear overlaps between OOO and posthumanism, Bogost (2012: 8) suggests that 
‘[p]osthumanism, we might conclude, is not posthuman enough’. However, it isn’t entirely clear which 
posthumanism Bogost feels is insufficient (see Bogost 2012: 16-17 where he derides a posthumanism that 
focusses on human enhancement whilst lauding Bryant’s (2011: 40) definition of a posthuman ontology 
as among, entangled, and implicated in other beings). Whilst the position and power of objects and others 
certainly should (and, in this thesis, does) change from that of a humanist perspective, my own research 
focusses on posthuman subjectivity rather than OOO in order to find new ways of understanding our 
subjectivity in relation to this shift. The way we make sense of our selves is flawed and should be re-




As is made clear from the above quote from Wolfe (2010: xv-xvi) it is useful to 
consider the pervasiveness of our posthuman-ness both in terms of pre- and post-
humanism. This is not meant in a sense that the posthuman comes after or is a successor 
to the “human”, rather, the posthuman is, as Wolfe (2010: xv-xvi) states, a shift in the 
understanding of the role of the human. Thus “posthuman” means after a particular 
understanding of the human, which was ethically and conceptually flawed, not after the 
human in its current physical, biological, or mediated forms. As Blackman (2017: 
n.p.n.) explains: 
 
[i]f we are all aliens, then perhaps this will provide the grounds for an ethics and 
philosophy that can counter the harsh and barbaric articulation of difference as 
otherness, which has marginalised, persecuted, discriminated against and drawn 
lines around who and whose lives count, and come to matter within the context 
of the category of the human. 
 
The “posthuman” is therefore not a figure that comes “after” the human in a way that 
might indicate a new form of evolution or enhancement. However, critiquing, rejecting, 
and rethinking the attributes of humanism allows us to view our relationships with non-
human “others” in ways that do not perceive the human as superior or separate to and 
from its surroundings, but instead considers us as constantly intra-acting (Barad 2007), 
which sheds new light on potential subjectivities. Rather than two distinct categories of 
subject and object “inter”acting, components “intra”act meaning that the ability to act 
emerges from within the relationship not from outside of it. The destabilising of the 
liberal human subject is therefore extended through the critique of its accompanying 
‘notions of free will, autonomy, rationality, [and] consciousness as the seed of identity’ 
(Hayles cited in Kroker 2012: 11) as we instead begin to acknowledge our deep intra-
dependence with “external” factors. 
Whilst in both popular and critical discourse our relationships with technologies 
have sparked ‘the haunting temptation of overcoming that finitude of the embodiment’ 
(Tufekci 2012: 35) that is simultaneously conceived of as either utopian or dystopian; 
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from a posthuman perspective these technological intimacies signal just another way in 
which the idea of the subject as a site of control, autonomy and mastery has been 
disrupted.  
In this sense it is also important to make clear that this is where my distinction 
between posthuman and transhuman should be articulated. Again, “transhuman” is a 
slippery term and encompasses a variety of positions. I am, however, wary of the term 
and much of its associated research and reading as often the idea of the transhuman 
comes from a perspective of transcendence: the return of an idea of dualism, that our 
minds and bodies are not inextricably linked but our informational mind can be 
uploaded to a computer and we can be “disembodied”. Often “transhumanism” refers to 
a desire for the advancement of evolution of the human being such that it undergoes a 
radical transformation and “overcomes” the “limitations” of the human body (More 
2013: 3-4). In many ways the transhumanist desire to overcome the “meat flesh” of the 
body links back the Cartesian mantra of “I think therefore I am”. In Descartes (1924 
[1637]) opinion the act of “thinking” is the only thing that can truly be known. Whilst 
he could imagine that he had no body, or that the world might not exist, he could not 
imagine not thinking, therefore it must be (Descartes 1924 [1637]). He uses this thought 
experiment to conclude: 
 
I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and 
which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material 
thing; so that “I,” that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly 
distinct from the body, and is even more easily known than the latter, and is 
such, that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is. 
(Descartes 1924 [1637]: 31) 
 
Descartes (1924 [1637]) therefore suggests a mind/body dualism, not only marking the 
mind and body as distinct from one another, but privileging the mind over the body. 
Where Descartes (1924 [1637]) states: ‘the soul is of a nature wholly independent of the 
body, and that consequently it is not liable to die with the latter’ transhumanists also 
believe in the ability of the mind to go on living without the body. 
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Furthermore, Roden’s (2015: 13) critique of transhumanism usefully identifies 
that ‘[t]ranshumanists also sign up to this ethical view of humans as uniquely 
autonomous or self-fashioning animals. Like their humanist forebears, transhumanists 
think that human-distinctive capacities like rationality, compassion and aesthetic 
appreciation are intrinsically valuable and should be cultivated and protected’. This is 
reinforced by More’s (2013: 5) assertion that self-direction and rational thinking are 
founding principles of transhumanism – and as I explained above these autonomous, 
individual-oriented values are not in line with the version of posthumanism that I 
employ.  
Rather than viewing our connections with computers or avatars as a precursor to 
an ability to upload our minds to computers, I instead believe in the embodied, 
embedded, and everyday use of machines (to cite Hine’s (2015) approach to internet 
research). I am not advocating nor seeking a relationship with machines that looks 
towards a disembodied future – as this thesis shows I am instead detailing the many 
ways in which are bodies are affected, and we are physically and emotionally moved by 
our relationship with technological others. This, to me, is a far more realistic symptom 
of our increasing connection with machines, and is therefore one worth exploring. It is 
important that we consider new ways of understanding our subjectivities that account 
for these relationships in ways that neither trivialise nor radicalise the potentials for 
human-machine intra-action, and instead account for these entanglements as 
symptomatic of our history of entanglements with technological and non-technological 
“others”. However, because there is not a single definition of “human”, “posthuman” or 
“transhuman” this understanding of the term will doubtless clash with other definitions 
in the field, and this is precisely why it is so necessary for me to contextualise and 
position my study within this field. 
	
The posthuman gamer 
So far I have outlined some of the key aspects of what can constitute or be meant by the 
term “posthumanism”. As a philosophical or theoretical framework posthumanism 
draws on these concepts. The being that then embodies these philosophies, theories, or 
values, is therefore the posthuman. In this thesis I suggest drawing on a notion of “the 
posthuman” that posits new forms of subjectivity have been emerging in 
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technologically mediated societies, which nevertheless only serve to highlight already 
existing forms of subjectivity that are neither necessarily high-tech, nor disembodied 
(Braidotti 2013; Hayles 2006; Herbrechter 2013). Instead, what is suggested is a view 
of subjectivity that is not singular, unchanging or self-contained, and so rejects many of 
the ideas implicit in the concept of the liberal human subject (e.g. autonomy, self-
determination and individualism).  
To be entangled and post-anthropocentric does not, therefore, require a digital 
environment, and neither does the posthuman. Whilst some might consider the focus on 
the MMORPG avatar-gamer as an indication that I believe posthuman subjectivity to 
only occur within technologically mediated environments, this is not the case. However, 
Braidotti (2013: 92) has argued that contemporary machines facilitate interrelations and 
‘stand for radical relationality’ and so MMORPG gaming provides a particular context 
for me to explore a posthuman practice that is digitally entangled. I therefore utilise 
certain aspects from understandings of the posthuman that are more technologically 
dependent when theorising the subjectivity emerging from avatar and gamer. For 
example, Toffoletti (2007: 27-28) states: 
 
to be posthuman is to construct a notion of self within a culture of simulation, 
virtuality and the digital. It is a new mode of existence by which the subject 
comes into being, as distinctions collapse between nature and artifice, self and 
computer, virtual and real, animate and inanimate. 
 
Using Toffoletti’s (2007) idea, I suggest that the MMORPG gamer represents a specific 
example of an embodiment of posthuman subjectivity. In the virtual, simulated 
gameworld a “notion of self” is constructed wherein the distinctions between avatar and 
gamer collapse, forming a new notion of “self”. By drawing on this quote (and others 
related specifically to a technologically dependent posthumanism) I am not proposing 
that we are “human” and that through gaming or digital engagement we “become 
posthuman” – that is not my belief. The above arguments in this chapter demonstrate 
the “always posthuman-ness” of our existence through our entanglements, and our 
relations and intra-actions with that which is outside of our skin demonstrates our 
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reliance on our environments and technologies in forming the “human”. We are always 
engaged in multiple intra-actions, some of which are beyond our conscious awareness. 
However, as a research project, this thesis focusses on specific conscious observations 
around the emergence of a particular posthuman subjectivity. My argument is that 
avatar-gamer entanglement provides a useful example to demonstrate the posthuman 
subject that is ‘an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-
informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and 
reconstruction’ (Hayles 1999: 3). Maintained by both the game and the gamer, this 
posthuman subjectivity is a form of shared, intra-dependent agency, a blend of material 
gamer and informational avatar as created and hosted by the game. 
It could be argued that Hayles’ (1999) posthumanism is less radical than some 
in her use of “boundaries” between components, where others suggest there are none. 
That said, the entity that Hayles’ (1999) proposes is still one that works with aspects of 
permeability and post-anthropocentrism that are central to my argument. In developing 
this line of thought, and in order to destabilise the “separation” between avatar and 
gamer further, a more “radical” posthumanism that disrupts such boundaries is seen in 
Barad’s (2003: 815) work that explores the notion of phenomena as ‘the ontological 
inseparability of agentially intra-acting “components.”’ In Barad’s (2003; 2007) terms, 
the human does not operate outside or aside from technology. Instead, we are entangled, 
which is ‘not simply to be intertwined with another, as in the joining of separate 
entities, but to lack an independent, self-contained existence’ (Barad 2007: ix – see 
Chapter 5: From Acting to Intra-acting for more explanation of the posthuman gamer in 
these terms). Responsibility is distributed among the constituent entities (in the case of 
this research these entities would be of avatar and gamer, not to mention the unexplored 
others9) and our agency emerges as an ability to act within a certain context.  
As Barad (2007: 136) states, ‘[p]osthumanism does not presume that man is the 
measure of all things […] Posthumanism doesn’t presume the separateness of any-
“thing,” let alone the alleged spatial, ontological, and epistemological distinction that 
sets humans apart’. I agree with Barad’s (2007) view of humans as constantly intra-
																																																						
9 As Barad (2007: x) states ‘entanglements are not isolated binary coproductions’ but in order to refine the 
trajectory of this thesis it is only the avatar and gamer that I focus on. This is a superficial cut, but one 
that is enacted in order to give clarity and coherency to the argument. 
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acting, and that the “human” cannot be meaningfully separated from the “non-human”. 
However, where Barad (2007: 183) argues that these terms (human/non-human) present 
a dichotomy that is precisely against a posthumanist account, I nevertheless include the 
notions of “human” and “non-human” to more clearly articulate my argument. This is 
particularly important given the specific context that I am discussing. Whilst 
‘[p]osthuman subjectivity reshapes the identity of humanistic practices, by stressing 
heteronomy and multi-faceted relationality, instead of autonomy and self-referential 
disciplinary purity’ (Braidotti 2013: 145) the intra-action within the context of World of 
Warcraft provides a specific way of exploring that heteronomy and relationality.  
To be clear: whilst “humans” are not separate from “non-human” others that 
they rely on and are entangled with, Barad (2007) argues that differential boundaries 
between “humans and “non-humans” are enacted through intra-actions. Therefore, as 
not all “humans” (or even all “posthumans”) are familiar with the specific context of 
playing with an avatar in a digital world what is at study here is a specific intra-action; 
the avatar-gamer intra-action is what Barad (2003: 817) would term a ‘material 
enactment’. The avatar in World of Warcraft therefore offers a seemingly very explicit 
example of what could traditionally be conceived of as an “external other” to provide a 
context to explore the deep entanglements that occur in these intra-actions. In exploring 
a context where the “otherness” of components might seem “obvious”, and drawing 
attention to the ‘practices through which these differential boundaries [of the categories 
of human and non-human] are stabilized and destabilized’ (Barad 2007: 66) to 
demonstrate posthuman subjectivity in this context, it is my aim that we are able to 
develop an understanding that allows us to be better equipped to then critically analyse 
more implicit aspects of our posthuman subjectivities.  
From this perspective, the entanglement that I suggest gamers experience with 
their avatars and the subjectivity that arises therein is therefore just one example of 
emotional, physical and cognitive distribution. In this example, and for the purposes of 
my PhD, this is a technologically mediated posthuman subjectivity, however that isn’t 
to say that the same principles and conclusions of the research cannot be applied in 
other contexts, or that other examples would not prove to be just as illuminating. 
Gaming is the context; posthuman subjectivity is the study. Yet, it is my proposal that 
gaming nevertheless represents an apt example of posthuman subjectivity as 
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experienced from an entanglement of “human” and “non-human” entities (Simon 2006; 
Boulter 2015). I do not want to propose a gaming exceptionalism: however, gaming 
does provide a strong example where we see a ‘relationship between organism and the 
machine’ (Toffoletti 2007: 2) that challenges clear distinction. As Boulter (2015: 2) 
points out, ‘gaming enacts [...] a practical realization that the human is a fluid, dynamic, 
unstable, discontinuous entity. The digital game thus, in its radical critique of the idea 
of a transparent, unified self, becomes a site of interrogation and sustained 
philosophical analysis’. Using gaming as a context to explore the lived experience of a 
posthuman subjectivity I consider how we can critically examine the avatar-gamer to 
see how this subjectivity is constructed and accounted for.  
In the interrelation of the avatar and the gamer we could argue that the melding 
of game and gamer constitutes the posthuman subject that is ‘seamlessly articulated 
with an intelligent machine’ (Shinkle 2012: 103) as experienced gameplayers know 
automatically where to place their fingers to touch buttons without looking, anticipating 
and reacting to the bodies on their screen and engaging in a cognitive, emotional and 
mental flow; demonstrating a particular material enactment of posthuman subjectivity. 
Gaming culture research has already recognised the subjective effects of 
gameplay experiences. The concept of the cyborg as a metaphor of human-machine 
hybridity (Haraway 1991) has been extensively used by game research to understand 
new subjective experiences enabled by the game. O’Riordan (2001), for example, 
explores her relationship with the avatar-character Lara Croft from the game Tomb 
Raider as one cyborg-subjectivity activated by human agency, and so moves us away 
from dystopian constructs of technological determinism. Drawing on the cyborg, 
research has also shown interconnections between real life and game life (e.g. Taylor 
2006) and technology and culture (e.g. Crogan and Kennedy 2009). Research has paid 
attention to the way the game allows a heightened experience of the cyborg-body, 
through for example rumble packs and the gameplay visuals (e.g. where the avatar’s 
experience of blindness or blurred vision is re-presented on screen) (Lahti 2003). Such 
research usefully demonstrates the promise of the cyborg is mythical, showing how 
notions of the transcendental body overlook that we are still located in gender, class and 
race structures (Lahti 2003). 
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The cyborg usefully demonstrates one extension of self through gameplay. But 
for some, this is an approach whereby the avatar is merely a vessel waiting for the 
player to inhabit, and not a relationship that flows both ways. O’Riordan’s (2001) 
emphasis on human agency, for example, focuses too much on the human capacity in 
the gaming relationship, and her conception instead still adheres to a hierarchical 
consideration of the place of human/machine relationships, embodiments and 
subjectivities. Although O’Riordan’s (2001: 236) understanding acknowledges some 
hybridity of avatar/gamer, as well as highlighting the role of embodiment and affect, 
she specifies that ‘the player enters into a symbiotic hybridity which negotiates game 
space so that the self becomes the self-and-avatar, in a diffuse but distinct relationship 
between person and machine’. Again the differentiation between this cyborg-based 
view and a posthuman perspective would be in a posthumanist acknowledgement that 
technology does not constitute a binary opposition to the human. It is instead through 
our relationships with technology that the human is constituted. This works on several 
layers: it signifies an understanding that humans are technologically facilitated / 
augmented / constructed beings, but it also draws on the notion that our “individual” 
agencies are in fact only contextual. For example, in the same way that I can only drive 
a car because of the car, I can only play a videogame because of the game. These 
relationships with technology are therefore not us exerting a control over our machines, 
but our machines “controlling” our behaviours, agencies, possibilities, and therefore 
subjectivities. “I” am therefore constituted as much (if not more so) by my available 
“technologies” than I am by my physical self.  
Farrow and Iacovides (2012: 5) state that ‘[w]e do not relate to bodies in virtual 
world […] in the same way that we relate to our own corporeality […] phenomena are 
experienced as representation, not as subjective experience’. My understanding of 
gameplay is a counterpoint to such perspectives – gaming is a fully embodied, 
emotional and shared experience. In taking on this perspective, I side with Banks’ 
(2015) critique of avatar-gamer research, who disagrees with work suggesting a one-
directional and wholly separate embodiment that moves from gamer to avatar, which 
produces a hierarchical relationship between human and non-human. 
To move beyond the unidirectional and vessel-like avatar, other research has 
documented the complexity of the avatar-gamer relationship in more posthuman, or 
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post-anthropocentric ways. Gee (2008: 259) suggests that the avatar allows for a 
‘projection’ of the gamer’s desires and intentions. However, Gee (2008) also suggests 
that this is a two-way process, where the gamer also conforms to the desires and 
intentions of the game (for more on this see Chapter 6: Enacting Empathy). Gaming 
thus becomes an exchange, allowing for negotiation between avatar and gamer. Taylor 
(2009) too highlights the importance of thinking about gameplay as an assemblage, an 
interrelationship between various components that flattens out hierarchies between 
avatar and gamer and where agency exists outside of any particular agent (see also 
Filiciak 2003; Shinkle 2012). A more seamless intra-action between avatar and gamer is 
proposed here, which opens up the space for thinking of the relationship between 
“human” and “machine”. This comes closer to the kinds of posthuman subjectivity that 
I also suggest is engendered by Sundén’s (2012) research, and which allows a romantic 
relationship that is neither completely embodied by avatar nor gamer. 
In her autoethnographic study, Sundén and her avatar, Bricka, form a romantic 
relationship with another avatar, Slap. Sundén’s (2012) analysis of this human-machine 
relationship explores the interconnections between herself, her avatar, and the avatar of 
the other player, suggesting that the relationship complicates notions of one body and 
one subjectivity, given the multiplicity of performers, both human and non-human, that 
took part in the romance (Wilde and Evans 2017). Reflecting on her desire for the other 
avatar-gamer, Sundén (2012: 169) asks: ‘[w]as it her, regardless of the game? Was it 
her through the game? Was it her through the orc woman and the ways in which she 
moved and talked and somehow managed to reach out to me and touch something 
within me through the screen?’. The mediation of digital romantic attachments through 
the psychical bodies that control their movements means that spaces between 
subjectivities refuse clear separation between avatar and gamer: ‘“Hi Jenny and Bricka! 
I smile. Slap grins. We flex our muscles”’ (Sundén 2012: 174). 
Sundén’s (2012: 177) own relationship to her avatar-self is described as ‘[p]art 
identification, part desire’. Sundén (2012: 177) explains her connection to Bricka as 
both an inseparable sameness and fascinated difference: this incorporation being ‘an 
intriguing part of game experiences’. Along with Sundén (2012) and others (e.g. 
Filiciak 2003; Gee 2008), I also argue for a horizontal, interdependent relationship in 
avatar-gamer interaction: what is new in this thesis is the alignment of this with 
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posthuman theory (see for exception Boulter 2015 on how gaming enacts and narrates 
posthuman themes) and the move from interaction to intra-action as per Barad’s (2007) 
notion of entanglement, which I similarly extend to intra-dependence rather than 
interdependence. 
Where the romantic relationship between avatar-gamer and another avatar-
gamer might seem remarkable, these experiences have become increasingly everyday. 
In the ‘networked society’ personal lives are increasingly co-constructed through 
technological interaction with a screen (McCarthy 2001). Recent approaches document 
the very embodied, emotional and connected meanings of technologically enabled 
subjective experiences in games (e.g. Taylor 2006). For example, Filiciak (2003) notes 
how gameplay actions have a real effect on the subject, and so constitutes an important 
part of their experience. He suggests these connections bring us closer to new sets of 
interrelated subjectivities that are not bound in the same way by traditional territories or 
industries (e.g. local villages or venues for consumption). Shinkle (2012) too notes how 
interaction between player and screen creates a connection, not only of excitement and 
awe, but also repetition, boredom, and frustration: for example, when the machine 
crashes or fails to load properly. Not necessarily utopian or remarkable, such emotional 
accounts of digital culture demonstrate the capacity for feelings of belonging (Ferreday 
2009), affective responses (Karatzogianni and Kuntsman 2012) and embodied, visceral 
ways of interacting with the screen (Hillis 1999). However, although much research has 
demonstrated the extensions of the body through an online, digital and networked 
society, few have drawn a close conceptual link between gaming and posthuman 
subjectivity (Wilde and Evans 2017: 3). 
Drawing on aspects of intra-action, entanglement, and post-anthropocentrism, I 
have demonstrated how posthuman subjectivity can be used to define gameplay, as a 
fluid, horizontal and relational experience between human and machine. However, such 
a claim does not explain what facilitates this subjectivity, especially if we understand 
posthuman subjectivity existing everywhere, as a general state of “humanness” 
(Braidotti 2013). Nor does the definition of gameplay as posthuman make sense of the 
very visceral emotions that take place, such that one can fall in love during gameplay 
with another avatar (Wilde and Evans 2017). In this thesis, I propose drawing on this 
specific material enactment of posthuman subjectivity in order to better understand how 
 
38 
our intra-actions operate and how our entanglements are facilitated. 
	
Posthumanising traditionally humanist traits 
As stated, this thesis works alongside various forms of posthumanism, but draws most 
specifically on the technologically mediated posthuman as an example to provide 
context to the study of subjectivity. Having said this, the way in which I explore the 
posthuman subjectivity is by considering how this subjectivity is felt, experienced and 
made sense of. It is my belief that even though there are many ways in which the 
classification of “posthuman” is far more fitting than the traits associated with the 
“human” to account for our entangled states of being, it is nevertheless problematic to 
assume that this will radically alter the ways in which we actually experience our daily 
life. Rather than turning completely away from humanist concepts we instead need to 
re-interrogate them in order to find the usefulness with them; these “humanist” 
discourses have shaped us – our behaviours, our engagements and the ways in which 
we make sense of our selves and our experiences. 
The following quote from Wolfe (2010: xxv), which I break down below, is 
useful in articulating my stance towards accounting for the posthuman lived experience: 
 
[t]o return, then, to the question of posthumanism, the perspective I attempt to 
formulate here – far from surpassing or rejecting the human – actually enables 
us to describe the human and its characteristic modes of communication, 
interaction, meaning, social significations, and affective investments with 
greater specificity once we have removed meaning from the ontologically closed 
domain of conscious-ness, reason, reflection, and so on. 
 
I am not rejecting the human in terms of suggesting we radically overthrow or disavow 
any of our ways of feeling in the world (beyond anthropocentric, liberal humanist 
behaviours and worldviews). I am instead hoping that I can take up Wolfe’s (2010) 
claim and describe some of our experiences with more specificity precisely through 
paying close attention to the relationship with our technologies from a posthuman 
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perspective, which acknowledges our entangled selves and accounts for the technology 
as an equally important part (in this example) of the avatar-gamer subjectivity. Wolfe 
(2010: xxv) continues: 
 
[i]t forces us to rethink our taken-for-granted modes of human experience, 
including the normal perceptual modes and affective states of Homo sapiens 
itself, by recontextualizing them in terms of the entire sensorium of other living 
beings and their own autopoietic ways of “bringing forth a world”. 
 
In using performance, empathy, and aspects of subject formation as my main 
themes to analyse the posthuman subjectivity enacted between avatar and gamer, I am 
recontextualising these traits or qualities by expanding what might have been 
traditionally “humanistic” actions and posthumanising them. This involves examining 
these traits from a posthuman perspective, considering how they are both challenged 
and enhanced by a posthumanist reading, reconceiving of them in these terms and 
rewriting them to operate in a posthuman account of subjectivity. I therefore blend 
principles of posthumanism (e.g. a post-anthropocentric acknowledgement of the 
entanglement of beings) with the principles of performance, empathy, and our desires 
for achievement, progression, and development (see individual chapters 5-7 for explicit 
explanation of how these themes are “posthumanised”). 
Wolfe (2010: xxv) goes on to state that his perspective on posthumanism also 
attends to the ‘specificity of the human’. Whilst such attention might be accused of 
becoming once more humanistic in its approach, he describes the specificity of the 
human in similar terms to the originary prosthesis and the “always posthuman” ways 
discussed above – stating that humans have co-evolved with technicity and materiality 
in ways that have fundamentally formed what the human “is”. In order to attend to the 
human in these intra-active, entangled, co-evolved ways, the analytics that I use of 
acting, empathy, and subject formation are themselves demonstrative of our entangled 
humanity, as chapters 5-7 demonstrate. 
However, it is also important to state that those analytics – acting, empathy, and 
subject formation – are things that we as humans (however flawed that term may be) 
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feel and experience in our daily lives. I am not attempting to overcomplicate or offer a 
radically reconstructed view of our lived experience; I am using the experiences that we 
already have and are familiar with but interrogating them further through the lens of 
posthumanism. 
I believe that this is an important step in theorising the posthuman as it deals 
with concrete examples and practices that we engage in and demonstrates their potential 
to be posthumanised, and therefore, our potential to account for a posthuman life. This 
therefore demonstrates not only how we are posthuman, and extends our understanding 
of the “formation” or emergence of posthuman subjectivities and entanglements; but 
also offers examples to follow in thinking or acting in a posthuman way. Rather than 
denying our posthumanity, and conceiving of our practices as coherently conceived and 
mastered, posthumanising our own understanding of these practices could be seen as a 
very practical step in posthuman ethics that follows Braidotti’s (2013: 95) ‘ethics based 
on the primacy of the relation, of interdependence, [and] values zoe10 in itself’. Whilst 
Braidotti (2013) suggest an ethics based on seeing the self as radically relational and 
non-unitary, the posthuman acting, posthuman empathy, and posthuman subject 
formation I propose in chapters 5-7 of this thesis demonstrate ways of putting this 
ethical belief into practice. 
	
Conclusion 
The above has provided a basic introduction to some of the ideas from within 
posthumanism that I draw on for my thesis. I do not view the posthuman as having to be 
technologically augmented, and instead draw on broader themes of post-
anthropocentrism, the entanglement of the “human”, and the instability of the “self” to 
situate my own posthuman subjectivity. In this regard I agree with those who have gone 
before that we have always been posthuman – the category of the human has been 
flawed and ill-defined, and the promise of “the posthuman” is not in offering an entirely 
“new” way of being but in re-addressing the question of what it is to be human, and 
providing a different understanding. In order to explore posthuman subjectivity further I 
consider it not only as something that we are and that we embody, but something that 
																																																						
10 Zoe as ‘the non-human, vital force of Life’ (Braidotti 2013: 60). 
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can be facilitated through certain practices. By applying posthuman ideals or values to 
practices that we engage in – “posthumanising” them – the aim of this thesis is to better 
understand our posthuman subjectivities, how they are lived and how they are 
experienced. I therefore draw on a particular enactment of posthuman subjectivity to 
ground this study. The MMORPG gamer is just one example that could have been 
chosen, but I believe it is an example that clearly demonstrates how that which we 
understand as “external”, “other”, “machine”, or “virtual” can become as much a part of 
how we understand ourselves as any other technology or “other”. In this thesis the 
informational avatar forms the posthuman subjectivity that emerges as much as “I” do. 
At times, because this example is a digital manifestation, I draw on posthuman themes 
or literature that link to digital “others” to illuminate the relationship between avatar 
and gamer. However, this should not be taken to mean that this thesis and its arguments 
are technologically deterministic or essentialist. The “humanist” practices I draw on and 
“posthumanise” – acting, empathy, subject formation – are all applicable to a range of 
scenarios and situations. In applying these to my analysis of the lived experience of 
posthuman subjectivity I demonstrate the ways in which we might go on to apply a 
posthuman approach to all of our practices, and begin to understand our ways of being 
in the world in a less anthropocentric light. 
In the following chapter, I discuss the way that I account for “the posthuman” 
by “immersing” myself in a specific entanglement and exploring the emergent 
posthuman subjectivity autoethnographically. As Rutsky (1999: 21-22)11 explains, we 
																																																						
11 ‘The position of human beings in relation to this techno-cultural unconscious cannot, therefore, 
be that of the analyst (or theorist) who, standing outside this space, presumes to know or control it. 
It must instead be a relation of connection to, of interaction with, that which has been seen as 
“other,” including the unsettling processes of techno-culture itself. To accept this relation is to let 
go of part of what it has meant to be human, to be a human subject, and to allow ourselves to 
change, to mutate, to become alien, cyborg, posthuman. This mutant, posthuman status is not a 
matter of armoring the body, adding robotic prostheses, or technologically transferring 
consciousness from the body; it is not, in other words, a matter of fortifying the boundaries of the 
subject, of securing identity as a fixed entity. It is rather a matter of unsecuring the subject, of 
acknowledging the relations and mutational processes that constitute it. A posthuman subject 
position would, in other words, acknowledge the otherness that is part of us. It would involve 
opening the boundaries of individual and collective identity, changing the relations that have 
distinguished between subject and object, self and other, us and them. This change is itself a 
mutational process that cannot be rationally predicted or controlled; it can only be imagined, 
figured, through a techno-cultural process that is at once science-fictional and aesthetic. It is only 
through opening ourselves to this kind of creative process, by taking part in the complex web of 
relations in which we are implicated, rather than simply trying to control them, that we can hope to 
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need to interact with the techno-cultural climate, allowing ourselves to change, opening 
ourselves up to our posthuman subject position, accepting that we are unstable, 
technologically shaped, in order to imagine, represent, and understand how our future 
could unfold. 
In using my own experiences in World of Warcraft and developing a specific 
relationship and subjectivity with a non-human “other” I have “become posthuman” 
(whilst equally arguing that I already was, I have nevertheless become a part of another 
posthuman subjectivity which is specific to my relationship and entanglement with my 
avatar Etyme). By employing the terminology of “becoming”, I am explicitly aligning 
myself with a body of work that proposes that the “human subject” is never complete, 
but is in a constant process of changing and adapting (Stagoll 2005). The unsecured 
subject that Rutsky (1999) mentions is evident in my fieldnotes, which flow between a 
sense of “me”, “her”, “us” and “we”, acknowledging how Etyme reconstitutes the sense 
of subjectivity. I view her not as an object and instead embody the complexities that 
have arisen from being so intimately involved with technology, in order to then attempt 
to account for it in ways that both emphasise the posthuman experience but are 
nevertheless accessibly “human” and familiar through their written style. 
  
																																																						
imagine, to bring to representation, a future that, though it may seem unpredictable and alien, will 




Chapter 3: Embracing Methodological Contradictions 
‘I speak as an ‘‘I,’’ but do not make the mistake of thinking that I know precisely all 
that I am doing when I speak in that way.’ (Butler 2005: 84) 
‘Self is fleeting.’ (Rambo Ronai 1992: 107) 
	
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I made a claim for the MMORPG gamer as an embodiment of 
posthuman subjectivity, drawing on posthuman thought most clearly aligned with Barad 
(2007), Braidotti (2013), and Hayles (1999). However, claiming gaming as an example 
of a posthuman entanglement does not “do” much on its own in terms of advancing 
posthuman research, and does not make sense of the experience. In order to contribute 
to new forms of knowledge and new ways of making sense of this (posthuman) subject 
formation, this thesis explores this entanglement as lived experience and aims to make 
sense of the visceral emotions and affects that occur through the embodiment at study. 
In the following chapter I outline my methodology. Whilst I would not primarily situate 
my research within the field of game studies but instead that of “posthuman studies”,12 I 
nevertheless draw on game studies methods as the game is the site of the research, if not 
the only focus. The approach is then informed by my posthuman ontological and 
epistemological standpoint, which is woven throughout. 
The avatar-gamer relationship has been explored in a variety of ways throughout 
the history of game studies. However, as I demonstrate below, not all of these are 
suitable for exploring a posthuman subject formation. Drawing on more creative and 
reflexive approaches, I use an autoethnographic approach to research my own 
experience as a gamer in World of Warcraft. However, as this chapter demonstrates, 
this is not unproblematic, and a posthumanist approach is negotiated in order to 
complement the main theoretical framework of this thesis. 
This thesis utilises the MMORPG gamer as one example of posthuman 
subjectivity in order to critically consider this phenomenon and analyse how it is 
																																																						




facilitated and experienced.  Digital games have brought about an interesting 
development in the study of our interaction with technology. Whilst by no means the 
only medium that posthuman subjectivity could be explored through, the medium 
provides a very specific and very explicit aspect of becoming engaged with technology 
in ways that makes our entanglement both obvious and, therefore, hard to deny. 
	
Game studies research 
Game studies is a relatively new field in which scholars, academics, practitioners and 
enthusiasts have been able to begin to critically explore how this apparently ludic, 
entertainment based industry has given us opportunities to play with different 
“versions” of the self, or self-expression (see, for example, Wolf and Perron 2003; 
Garrelts 2005). The analysis of videogames can be considered in a variety of different 
ways, through notions of work, play, narrative, art, and performance, as well as 
educational potentials in serious gaming (Wolf and Perron 2003: 2). This demonstrates 
the multiple ways of studying gameplay, and the field of game studies continues to 
thrive and grow, exploring the capacity of games as a tool to investigate 
communication, culture and media.  
In some ways, this field being in its infancy has allowed a form of freedom to 
game studies. Unhindered by preconceived ideas of what it should or shouldn’t do, 
game studies has begged, borrowed and stolen from other fields in order to make sense 
of its own. As such game studies theory has brought together: 
 
a convergence of a wide variety of approaches including film and television 
theory, semiotics, performance theory, game studies, literary theory, computer 
science, theories of hypertext, cybertext, interactivity, identity, postmodernism, 
ludology, media theory, narratology, aesthetics and art theory, psychology, 
theories of simulacra, and others (Wolf and Perron 2003: 2)13. 
 
																																																						
13 See Evans and Stasi (2014: 6) for a similar argument about fan studies, where they term fan studies a 
‘melting pot’ that draws from a wide range of disciplines. 
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In the “short” history of game studies (initially appearing in the early 1970s), 
scholars have therefore explored the economic implications of games (e.g. Castronova 
2003), the ways in which we play (e.g. Bartle 1996), the relationship between players 
and their avatars (e.g. Banks 2015), ludic vs. narrative involvement (e.g. Frasca 2003), 
and immersion (e.g. Cairns et al. 2014). Whilst some studies focus on the temporality of 
gameplay as an “escape” from reality (for a discussion of the problematic binaries of 
such thinking, see Calleja 2010), other studies consider the far-reaching social and 
cultural consequences of our gameplay (e.g. Kolo and Baur 2004; Simon 2006). Many 
of these studies are fascinating, but, to me, the view of gaming as a temporary fictitious 
engagement with an escapist reality can be demeaning to the experience. For example, 
Boulter (2015: 28), whose work looks explicitly at the gamer as a “parable” for the 
posthuman, still falls into the narrative of viewing the gamer-as-posthuman as ‘an 
imaginative, temporary escape from the claims of the material world, the world of real 
bodies’. This enforces the very binaries of virtuality vs. materiality that posthumanism 
in some guises seeks to overcome, and therefore imposes a reductionist view that I want 
to avoid in my own research – I argue that our relationships with technology are not an 
escape from our own subjectivities, they are precisely what shape them in posthuman 
ways. 
Despite the range of approaches in game studies, there has been a notable lack 
of literature that has examined the gamer as posthuman, aside from Boulter’s 2015 
publication, and some minor links drawn by Shinkle (2012) and Filiciak (2003), as well 
as Simon’s (2006) mention of the idea of the posthuman socialities that gaming may 
form. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there has been extensive research into the 
game/gamer/avatar relationship using various interpretations of cyborg theory. 
O’Riordan (2001: 232) states that the cyborg is a ‘useful model to articulate the 
relationship between player and avatar’ as it works on the basis of a relationship born 
out of intimacy. However, I disagree with O’Riordan’s (2001: 232) claims that the 
game is a ‘static artefact which is only activated by organic agency’. Her view is still 
much more humanistic in its perspective than mine, arguing that ‘[a]lthough new 
technologies can provide new sources of agency, they are still structured through 
human relations’ (O’Riordan 2001: 232). These views are limited in their capacity for 
seeing the game as a space for its own vibrancy (see, for example, Bennett 2010), or for 
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a posthuman view of technology being what constitutes us. However, one of 
O’Riordan’s (2001: 237) most pertinent points is the claim that cyberspace and game 
space are ‘changing the ways we conceptualize separate domains of self and other’. She 
therefore states that ‘different theoretical constructions are required to analyse, rather 
than observe, the collapses which are occurring’ (O’Riordan 2001: 237). 
Following this call for different theoretical constructions, posthumanism is a 
theory worth utilising in place of cyborgian constructions of avatar and gamer, as it 
extends the acknowledgement of a “hybrid form” into a philosophical reimagining of 
what it is to be human. Conceiving of the technologically enhanced human as a cyborg 
seems to focus on the “extension” of the human. Posthumanism, on the other hand, 
suggests that the idea of an “unextended” human, stable and distinct in its own 
independent, individuality, was always incorrect, inadequate, and misleading (Braidotti 
2013). Consequently, rather than viewing technology as an enhancement to the human, 
we can conceptualise the relationship between biology and technology as a “relational 
ontology”. Relational ontology, as suggested by Barad (2007: 93): 
 
does not take the boundaries of any of the objects or subjects of these studies for 
granted but rather investigates the material-discursive boundary-making 
practices that produce “objects” and “subjects” and other differences out of, and 
in terms of, a changing relationality. 
 
Such a relationality implies a more rhizomatic relationship between human and 
machine, as each is dependent on the other in order to emerge as an entity, rather than 
one being seen as superior. But how can we adopt a method to explore this relationship 
in a way that accounts for this rhizomatic understanding? 
 
Game research methods 
Without wanting to repeat too much of Chapter 2: Proposing the Posthuman Gamer, 
this chapter draws on game studies but with a particular view to analysing how this 
field has used research methods. Games have been studied in a multitude of different 
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ways from many perspectives and for various purposes, and accordingly a variety of 
different research methods have been employed. In his 2003 paper, ‘Playing Research: 
Methodological approaches to game analysis’, Aarseth identified three different 
approaches to games research, emphasising either gameplay (focussing on the 
sociological or ethnological), game-rules (associated more closely with game design or 
computer science), or the gameworld (considering aesthetics, history or economics). 
Throughout his paper he considers where or what the method is in game research 
(Aarseth 2003). He goes on to list the potential ways that games could be researched, 
from speaking to developers, to observing others at play (Aarseth 2003).  
More “textual” analyses – surveying the game itself rather than its players – 
have demonstrated critical media mis-representations that are re-enforced in certain 
videogames, from racism (e.g. Poor 2012; Nakamura 2009) to sexism (e.g. 
Corneliussen 2011). Other research projects have explored aspects of the construction 
of time and space and experiences of temporality (e.g. Juul 2005; Aarseth 2011; Ash 
2012b), as well as the formal logic of games as their own corporate ideologies based on 
work and reward systems (e.g. Rettberg 2011). Elsewhere, interviews with gamers have 
been used in the past to tell us much about their social attachment to gaming 
communities and their relationships with their avatars (e.g. O’Connor et al. 2015; Banks 
and Bowman 2016; Banks 2015). 
There have been interesting developments in our understanding of the 
demographic of gamers and the games that they play, and web based forum discussions, 
survey responses and game-based websites have all been analysed to explore how this 
links to offline interpretations of the “gamer” identity (e.g. Bergstrom et al. 2014; 
Baxter-Webb 2014). As persistent and individualised game spaces (Wolf and Perron 
2003: 11), MMORPGs have expanded the possibilities for game research, considering 
how online, game-based relationships are formed and how communities and 
relationships persist outside of the gamespace (e.g. Taylor 2006) or in alternate 
gamespaces when their own have been disrupted (e.g. Pearce and Artemesia 2009); and 
the appeal of gameworlds for marginalised “others” to find spaces to express 
themselves through performances of gender and sexuality (e.g. Eklund 2011; Pulos 
2013). Fan studies has contributed to the debate, considering, for example, the 
motivation behind fans’ machinima creations (e.g. Lowood and Nitsche 2011). 
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The specificities of the avatar-gamer relationship have also been explored from 
a variety of angles, often through one-on-one interviews and qualitative analysis. Cote 
and Raz (2015) argue that as videogames are interactive, interviews can provide insight 
into their meaning and significance to players. As they explain, in-depth interviews are 
suitable for gaining detailed, personal insight rather than “representative” or 
generalizable data (Cote and Raz 2015: 93). Furthermore, one-on-one interviews in 
games research can allow for co-constructions between participant and researcher, 
where the researcher enters into a dialogue with their participants and an analysis 
develops through a reciprocal exchange of information and understanding (Cote and 
Raz 2015). 
However, Cote and Raz (2015: 95) highlight the problem I have with the 
suitability of this method for my own research project, when they state that in-depth 
interviews might be weak at exploring certain topics. Because in-depth interviews rely 
on the ability for participants to think through and verbalise their answers, a research 
project on posthuman subjectivities may not be particularly accessible. When exploring 
how posthuman subjectivities are facilitated, some understanding of this terminology, 
philosophy, and the associated implications is necessary. For instance, questions such as 
“what makes you feel close with your avatar?” are too vague to construct a particular 
argument for a posthuman subjectivity. If participant answers were to be analysed in 
this way my concern would be that this would be an imposition of ideas on the research 
participant, which seems somewhat unethical as they may instead see their relationship 
with their avatar as humanist and hierarchical. Some methods suggest other ways of 
engaging participants in the co-production of their analysis. Member checking involves 
returning to the participant with the analysis of their interview for them to comment on 
(Morgan 1997). Stimulated recall would involve recording gamers gameplay and asking 
them to comment on their actions and thoughts as they watch the footage back (linked 
to game play research by Pitkänen 2015). However, neither of these methods would 
seem to provide much benefit for my particular research questions as this may lead to 
more of a contradiction within the research proposal than a “validation”. For example, 
if I were to suggest an analysis that demonstrated a rhizomatic relationality, but the 
participant disagreed with this and felt themselves to be very much “in control” of their 
avatar this would create further tension in the research. Much of this stems from the fact 
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that our feelings of attachment, subjectivity, or even of our own “posthumanity”, are so 
subjective that the questions asked of focus groups or even of individuals may not 
capture the essence or feeling that is being explored. This is further complicated by the 
traditionally humanistic societies that we are a part of, where much of what we are 
taught aligns more readily with notions of a liberal human subject than an emergent 
posthumanism. Although such tensions could have been accounted for with further 
commentary and analysis, ultimately these forms of data collection seemed to move me 
away from the lived experience of posthuman subjectivity and how feelings of 
entanglement emerged through different affective experiences. 
For these reasons, more intuitive methods of research practice were much more 
practical and viable for my own project as they were the only methods that enabled me 
to embrace my subjective experience. Ethnography as a method of participant 
observation has been highly effective in a range of game research exploring online 
communities and player experience (see, for example, Pearce and Artemesia 2009; 
Taylor 2006; Nardi 2010; Boellstorff 2008). In these studies, researchers “immerse” 
themselves in the online community or game that is at study, and draw on their own 
experiences reflexively to contribute to their research data and share further insight to 
the experiences of the gameworld. However, there is again a disjuncture here between 
my own research questions and this method. How does one observe another’s 
posthuman subjectivity? In the gameworld I would only see the avatar and the 
environment. But even in the physical world – were I to visit players’ own 
environments and watch them play – I would still only be getting partial fragments of 
what was occurring between the interaction of “human” and “machine”14. As Aarseth 
(2003) explains, if we are merely outwardly observing others at play we are liable to 
miss out on much of the mental (and, indeed, physical) interpretation of the game: for 
example, which parts of the game the gamer might ignore, and which are the most 
pertinent to them. 
																																																						
14 This is not to say that interesting and useful data cannot be gathered through observing media usage. 
There have been research projects involving audience ethnographies in television studies that have used 
the method of “text-in-action” i.e. of watching a participant watch a TV programme and discussing it. 
These studies have been used to explore the role of media in terms of referential viewing in order to 
understand how participants then make sense of these programmes as being significant to their lives (see, 
for example, Wood 2005). 
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Ultimately, I do not feel that either interviews or observational data would have 
matched the ontological or epistemological standpoint of my research, as I will now 
explain. To explore posthuman subjectivity means accepting the key philosophical 
arguments of posthumanism. Although I would argue that we are all posthuman, to 
impose a posthumanist reading onto the words of others who may not feel the same 
seems, to me, somewhat unethical. There is a tension here in the research project – I do 
not want to create a posthumanism that is either elitist or abstract, but equally it is a 
topic difficult to explore through questioning others in order to “identify” posthuman 
subjectivity, especially if they do not have the academic framework to make sense of 
the self as posthuman. Moreover, whilst I believe knowledge is informed by experience, 
and therefore both participant and researcher experience can count as data, it is again 
very hard to “capture” the experience of posthuman subjectivity. As the aim of this 
thesis was to consider how posthuman subjectivity emerges and is experienced this was 
not something I felt I could search for in others. Instead, I decided to draw on the 
experience of those digital ethnographers who had gone before me (Pearce and 
Artemesia 2009; Taylor 2006; Nardi 2010; Boellstorff 2008 etc.), who had incorporated 
their own participation alongside their observation of others. However, rather than 
using my own experience in addition to more “traditional” research methods I instead 
decided to embed myself fully in the research data and undertake an autoethnography. 
	
Autoethnography 
My background is in performance studies and drama, and as such my experience is 
based predominantly in the ways in which I can use myself: my body, my emotions, my 
experiences. The accompanying written component to my previous studies was based in 
critical reflective portfolios, encouraging not just a use of “self” but an analytical 
engagement with “self”. Moving to doctoral study, the idea of using my experiences 
was therefore one that I felt comfortable with. Consequently, I was drawn to 
autoethnography as a way of exploring the subjective experience of “being posthuman”. 
As Gruppetta (2004: 7) states, in certain forms of research involving participant 
“others” ‘we search for the epiphanies of our subjects but fail to acknowledge our own’. 
I believe that using the “self” to study lived experience is a valuable way of gaining 
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subjective insight. As stated above, this methodology is one that fits with both my 
ontological and epistemological standpoint: I believe that there are posthuman 
subjectivities, and therefore engage in the ‘posthuman refusal of the ontological 
primacy of human existence’ (Ferrando 2012: 10). The avatar-gamer is one way of 
exploring this. I do so by drawing on an aspect of my own posthuman embodiment, 
something that is nevertheless informed by ‘non-human experience as site of 
knowledge’ (Ferrando 2012: 1015) through the incorporation of the avatar and game, 
thereby constructing knowledge that is based in posthuman experience16. 
 
What is autoethnography? 
Ellis et al. (2010: n.p.n.) position autoethnography as ‘one of the approaches that 
acknowledges and accommodates subjectivity, emotionality, and the researcher’s 
influence on research, rather than hiding from these matters or assuming they don’t 
exist’. In autoethnographies the writer/researcher is therefore used as a tool, ‘as an 
object of description, analysis, and/or interpretation’ (Chang 2008: 35), and so it is my 
(entangled) experiences that form the data of this work. Ellis et al. (2010: n.p.n.) state 
that a reflexive ethnography aims to describe the ways in which a deep immersion in a 
particular cultural context affects the researcher, facilitating articulation and 
understanding of the impact of environment on being, by acknowledging personal 
experience as a valid form of data collection and interpretation. As such, 
autoethnographies are often linked to phenomenology and are about bringing personal 
lived experience, rigorous cultural analysis and emotive forms of representation 
together in research in order to create accessible texts that provide ‘evocative thick 
descriptions of personal and interpersonal experience’ (Ellis et al. 2010: n.p.n.). For my 
part, I do not use phenomenology as this could be argued to be a very anthropocentric 
and humanist philosophy (although post-phenomenology is developing as a field to 
counteract this focus). However, I am using the techniques of autoethnography to 
explore my intimate and affective engagement with a gameworld and with a specific 
																																																						
15 Ferrando (2012: 10) links this to a ‘posthuman epistemology’. 
16 See also Blackman (2015: 25) who suggests that ‘methodological sensitivity is not an entirely human 
affair, and requires many eyes and ears – human and nonhuman – which can work with traces, gaps, 
absences, submerged narratives, and displaced actors in order to shape a form of mediated perception’. 
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avatar. Analysing this by drawing on literature from posthumanism has demonstrated 
how this practice can be seen to constitute one embodiment of posthuman subjectivity. 
This therefore utilises my (entangled) experiences but applies them to a broader field of 
study. 
The purpose of a methodology that examines subjective lived experience is the 
hope or belief that ‘one’s own experiences are also the possible experiences of others’ 
(Van Manen 1990: 54). An autoethnography would therefore have the potential to be 
‘simultaneously highly personal and yet also, […] highly generic’ (Ihde 2002: xviii), 
thereby making it possible for a lived experience written by one person to have the 
ability to resonate with another and to ‘shed light on another’s world’ (Kozel 2007: 24). 
This resonance and relevance is of utmost importance in my hopes for a thesis that uses 
posthumanism as a useful, meaningful, “everyday” example of how philosophy is 
applicable in explaining and exploring the ways in which we live. 
All research projects fail to fully “capture” lived experience as they necessarily 
transform it (Denzin 1992: 20), however forms of reflexive writing often ‘construct 
first-person stories rather than trying to maintain the conventions of impersonal, 
academic argumentation and persuasion’ (Dicks et al. 2005: 34). Ellis and Bochner 
(2000: 747) argue that this allows us to write more directly, from the source of our own 
experience in narrative, poetic, and evocative ways. As Clough (2010: 16) writes: 
 
autoethnography has remained one of the most common responses to the 
criticism of ethnographic writing; its aim is to give a personal accounting of the 
location of the observer, which is typically disavowed in traditional social 
science writing, traditional ethnography especially. It does this by making the 
ethnographer the subject-object of observation, exploring experience from the 
inside of the ethnographer’s life, emphasizing emotions or feelings. 
 
Further to drawing on the researcher’s own experiences, autoethnographies often take a 
more narrative form, as this can be seen to be an appropriate method of communicating 
cultural experience as it is through narrative that we understand our own lives 
(MacIntyre 1984: 212 cited in Ellis and Bochner 1992: 97; see also Polkinghorne 1991). 
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In this way the writing style can also hope to reach a wider audience than conventional 
scholarly research and engage readers emotionally. As Paasonen et al. (2015: 12) 
discuss, personal writing can overcome some of the boundaries that scholarly, academic 
texts might induce, including a sense of detachment and passivity17. Incorporating 
visceral experiences therefore becomes a negotiation between the embodied and 
semantic (Paasonen et al. 2015: 12). 
An example of work that explores the negotiation between academic and 
intimate writing can be seen in Rambo Ronai’s (1992) layered account The Reflexive 
Self Through Narrative: A Night in the Life of an Erotic Dancer/Researcher. This 
highly engaging piece of writing documents the researcher’s experience of erotic 
dancing and negotiates her feelings as both a dancer and a researcher, moving from 
empowerment, to disgust, to detachment, to analysis. Her writing style switches 
between description and analysis and is highly affective in terms of drawing the reader 
into the research in a way that is accessible. 
In my own use of autoethnography I do not employ a fully narrative style, as I 
instead embed my fieldnotes within a more traditional frame of analysis and discussion 
in order to explore the posthuman subjectivity that the fieldnotes embody. In these 
sections the academic voice allows me to articulate a range of critical and conceptual 
ideas in more depth (see To 2015: 71 for a similar argument). In this regard the research 
again attempts to negotiate the potential tension between an accessible text and an 
academic critique, however as per Ferreday (2009: 31) ‘my response to theoretical work 
is also affective’. The analytical passages are therefore as affectively-driven as the data 
collection: each respond and react to something that has moved me in some way, 
whether that is from playing the game or reading and writing theoretical insights. 
Moreover, I do draw on Rambo Ronai’s (1992) writing style as my fieldnotes 
themselves also move between different positions of researcher, gamer, analyser etc. 
																																																						
17 It is worth noting that there is a history of thinkers, including Benjamin, Brecht and Adorno, to name 
just a few, who would argue that it is in fact accessible, linear narrative forms of culture that produce 
passivity, and that more difficult, fragmented forms of expression are needed to jolt audiences out of this 
detachment (Stevenson 2014: 318-320). Nevertheless, my own opinion is that these critically alienating 
texts can serve to baffle and bore audiences who may feel put off by their academic exclusivity, and that 
more accessible texts appeal to a wider audience. 
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and thus a fluid subjectivity is demonstrated throughout (I expand on this further in the 
below sections “I, posthuman”, and “Practical application”).  
Historically, autoethnography follows ethnography as a reaction to “objective” 
research. Previous forms of knowledge production had relied heavily on a hierarchical 
understanding of subject positions and forms of knowledge production. These sought to 
produce a singular understanding of complex and subjective issues, and relied on a 
significant power imbalance between the “researcher” and the “researched” (for further 
critiques of this perspective see, for example, Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002; 
Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009; Denzin 2009; Law 2004; Back and Puwar 2012). The 
“crisis of representation” refers to the realisation that a researcher’s output as an 
“objective” and “factual” documentation – or representation – was problematic given 
the standpoints, biases, and subjectivity that each researcher brings to their project (see, 
for example, Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 3; Tracy 2013: 253). In this climate, the notion 
of one single factual truth became a tenuous one, opening up space to ask questions of 
who represents who, and the notion of the authorly self (Denzin and Lincoln 2011; 
Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009). This ‘postmodern scepticism regarding generalization 
of knowledge claims’ encouraged an ‘increased focus on emotion in the social sciences’ 
(Anderson 2006: 373). In response to this, different forms of writing arose which 
embraced the necessary subjectivity and partiality of knowledge (Tracy 2013: 253). 
Accordingly, there has been a rise in reflexivity in research and an acknowledgement of 
the researcher’s position of power in conducting, analysing and constructing her 
research (Ellis et al. 2010 and Davies 1999: 4). This is important in order to account for 
ways in which the researcher’s subject position and situated knowledge (see Haraway 
1988) may, consciously or unconsciously, affect the conclusions that they draw from 
their research. 
 Ellis and Bochner are seen as pioneers in the field of autoethnography (Chang et 
al. 2012: 19). Their (often co-authored) work on personal narratives and 
autoethnography has spanned over two decades and they have emphasised the need for 
evocative and reflexive work (Bochner and Ellis 2016), drawing on their own 
experiences of, for example, the loss of loved ones (Ellis 1995), and having an abortion 
(Ellis and Bochner 1992), to more recent work that has explored autoethnographic 
vignettes of sleeping (Ellis 2016). This range of work alone hints towards the uptake of 
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autoethnography into different fields, moving away from exclusively confessional tales 
or extremely personal narratives of taboo topics, into more “mundane” and everyday 
experiences. 
As previously mentioned, ethnographies in games or virtual worlds have risen in 
the past decade, and subjective participation in games has been widely acknowledged as 
an appropriate method of complementing the study of games and gamers (see, for 
example, Lammes 2007; Aarseth 2003; Cote and Raz 2015; Pearce and Artemesia 2009 
to name a few)18. As Aarseth (2003: n.p.n.) states: 
 
[i]f we have not experienced the game personally, we are liable to commit 
severe misunderstandings, even if we study the mechanics and try our best to 
guess at their workings. And unlike studies of films and literature, merely 
observing the action will not put us in the role of the audience.  
 
Aarseth (2003: n.p.n.) goes on to explain that: ‘[w]hen others play, what takes place on 
the screen is only partly representative of what the player experiences’. An example of 
this from my own gameplay can be seen in my fieldnotes where I discuss holding my 
breath whilst my avatar is underwater. Holding my breath was an essential part of the 
analysis of that subjective experience – but is something that could have easily gone 
unnoticed by an external observer. 
Despite the recognition of the subjective insights researcher gameplay can 
provide, there have been far fewer fully autoethnographic explorations in game than 
their ethnographic counterparts19. Sundén’s work in World of Warcraft is a notable 
example, and one that I draw inspiration from. As Sundén (2012: 165) writes: ‘[g]ames 
have a tendency to wind up the body – to rush its heart, to sharpen its senses, and to 
speed up its reflexes,’ but she argues that there is a gap in the research of this actually 
																																																						
18 Whilst Crawford et al. (2011: 284-286) are critical of placing too much emphasis on lived experience 
this is more a response to the potential “privileging” of the game or gameplay in the field of game studies 
overall, which they feel may lead to gaps in the field. For my own research project, it is necessary that I 
“privilege” gameplay as it is the relationship and emergent subjectivity between “human” and “machine” 
that is being studied. 
19 As opposed to a reflexive ethnography where researcher experience is drawn on but is not the main 
method of data collection. 
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being acknowledged – a gap she seeks to address. She believes ‘there appears to be 
something of a glitch in the translation from ontology to epistemology in the research of 
digital games’ (Sundén 2012: 165), as although games are understood to be embodied 
and sensuous, there is little methodological acknowledgement of the place of the 
researcher’s own embodied and sensing experience. In justifying her methodological 
approach and use of autoethnography, Sundén (2012: 176) says: ‘I ask myself whether 
this experience changed me in a way that significantly affected how I understood the 
field. It did’. 
It seems unlikely that anyone who places themselves as part of the research 
topic, anyone who uses themselves as a “tool” in their methodology, will be unaffected, 
their views unchanged to the culture, or phenomenon under scrutiny. In my own time 
gaming I have been surprised by my connection with my avatar, how at times her pre-
programmed voice which reprimands me (usually when I am trying to cram too many 
items into an already full bag) jolts me and disrupts my sense of me/we/her/us when her 
agency is seemingly taken away from me in those words. My own project seeks to 
follow Sundén’s (2012: 170) example by asserting that whilst informants may tell the 
researcher of their experiences, ‘[m]y story is not qualitatively different’ (my 
emphasis), and is therefore just as valuable a source of knowledge production as any 
other. 
Nevertheless, there are certain issues arising from using an autoethnographic 
approach, and it has been criticised as a method for being overly emotional, or for 
manipulating narrative truth (Ellis and Bochner 2000: 745). However, whether writing 
and researching based on our own experience or that of participant others, all accounts 
and descriptions will fail to fully capture “raw” or lived experience. This is because all 
recollections, reflections, description, interviews or conversations – indeed all 
‘research’ – are ‘already transformations of those experiences’ (Van Manen 1990: 54). 
Ellis and Bochner (2000: 745) state that all of the stories we tell are always at risk of 
“distorting” the past. Autoethnographies, therefore, are less concerned with whether 
they convey narrative truth (in terms of exactly chronicling events as they unfolded) 
than whether they convey the feelings and experiences of those events in an evocative 
way. I suggest that by using my (entangled) experiences and writing about those I am 
able to do my best to ensure that the writing portrays an account of the experience that 
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resonates in some way with others. It could also be argued that the inclusion of others 
as my dataset would only involve further distance between the data and the reader, and 
that further transformation might occur through the interpretation – between myself and 
my participants and then between my words and my readers – without the ability for 
reflexive engagement with the conclusions drawn from the engagement with the text.  
This is precisely why a first-person method, or an autoethnography, might be 
preferential, as ‘[m]y own life experiences are immediately accessible to me in a way 
that no one else’s are’ (Van Manen 1990: 54). Therefore, the transformation or 
mediation that experiences must necessary go through in order to become written texts 
will only be once removed from the experience through the work of the researcher, 
whereas when using others experiences they are already further removed from the 
source. Indeed, certain qualitative research methods would suggest that if the research 
project uses participants, after the researcher has analysed the initial data they should 
return to their participants to validate the understanding or conclusions drawn, the 
process of member checking previously mentioned (Morgan 1997; Savin-Baden and 
Major 2012: 477). In an autoethnography this is already implicit within the method – 
you are constantly reworking your own words and reinterpreting your own data.  
That said, our access to our own experience could be problematised and 
critiqued in various ways: first by our reliance on memory; and second because of the 
transformative effects of our reflection. Chang (2008: 72) claims that memory ‘often 
reveals partial truth and is sometimes unreliable […] Memory selects, shapes, limits, 
and distorts the past’. However, Ellis and Bochner (2000) would argue against the 
notion of distortion as being problematic. Instead, memory is viewed as a process of us 
trying to make sense of our lives through the narrative form (see Chapter 7: Emergent 
Subject Positions for the posthumanising of memory). Furthermore, all forms of 
research rely on some form of interpretation, and to denote one as “right” and another 
as “wrong” seems entirely subjective. Nevertheless, keeping detailed self-reflexive 
fieldnotes is recommended by Chang (2008: 89) in order to capture ‘behaviours, 
thoughts, emotions, and interactions as they occur […] to preserve vivid details and 
fresh perspectives’. The process of thinking, and indeed writing, about our “immediate 
experience” can alter it. Having these initially preserved perspectives in fieldnotes 
allows us to become more critically aware of the transformations, and examine how and 
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why these might have occurred. This is not to say that the process of thinking and 
writing about our experiences necessarily transforms the experience in an “untruthful” 
way – as Richardson (2005: 961-962) states: ‘[e]xperience and memory are, […]  open 
to contradictory interpretations governed by social interests and prevailing discourses’. 
Ellis (2004: 117) also makes a pertinent point, that ‘all memory takes place in the 
present and is oriented toward the future. My current frames of memory – and my need 
to have a coherent sense of myself – influenced what I remembered and what the 
memories mean to me’. As such we might consider “true memory” to be a humanist 
notion that aids in the construction of a “rational” self – something which this thesis 
critiques, and which I explore in more depth below (see the section I, posthuman 
below). 
It is also important that in an autoethnography there is a constant engagement 
with the text as it is being written. Interpretations are never complete or finite, but by 
engaging with our analysis multiple times over the course of a research period we can 
hope to add new thoughts to our prior conclusions. In this way, Lather (2007: 126) 
suggests we can contrast the notion of objectivity instead with ‘explicit incompleteness, 
tentativeness, the creation of space for others to enter, the joining of partial voices. 
Authority then comes from engagement and self-reflexivity, not distanced 
“objectivity”’. This allows us to ‘to tell and retell’ our analyses, and accordingly 
‘[t]here is no such thing as “getting it right” only “getting it” differently contoured and 
nuanced’ (Richardson 2005: 962). 
Autoethnography’s focus on highly subjective, personal, emotional and 
embodied forms of knowledge production has aligned it as an “affective” methodology 
(see, for example, To 2015), and I explore this aspect of my methodology in more depth 
below.  
	
Accounting for affect 
Affect is defined variously as force; intensity; being moved; excess; viscerality; before 
emotion; beyond emotion; and exchange (for more discussion of affect see Gregg and 
Seigworth 2010; Wetherell 2012; Blackman 2012; Paasonen et al. 2015). However, it 
has also been defined as ordinary (Stewart 2007), and has moved toward the exploration 
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boredom and inertia (Petit 2015). Despite differing viewpoints, most would agree that 
the “turn to affect” in academia has signified a shift in focus to account for embodiment 
and feeling, and to counteract a focus on the discursive (Wetherell 2012: 19). Paasonen 
et al. (2015: 4) suggest that various turns toward the material and somatic have 
extended ‘theoretical investigations to the embodied, the sensory, and the lively in ways 
that question the anthropocentrisms of earlier intellectual inquiry’. The intensities we 
experience in our physical being have been, at times through the history of philosophy, 
neglected in favour of the (humanistic) rational mind and a focus on language as the 
main way of knowing about the world (see Wetherell 2012; Paasonen et al. 2015). 
However, through a series of near simultaneous realisations or theorisations, “the body” 
is gradually coming back into play. Gregg and Seigworth (2010: 6-8) list eight different 
potential orientations that have led us to a concentration on affect, from phenomenology 
(see, for example, Ihde 2002); to explicitly feminist work (see, for example, Braidotti 
2013); to ‘contagions of feeling, [and] matters of belonging’ (Gregg and Seigworth 
2010: 8; see, for example, Blackman 2012 and Ferreday 2009). Through these 
approaches, affect has enabled a focus on the body and has been seen as a turn that is 
able combat the predominance of the discursive, the sense-making and the rational. By 
acknowledging affect, we take our attention back to the body, to things that are visceral 
and that move us. In my own research, recognising affect in gaming is of utmost 
importance as I rely on exploring the embodied feelings in gameplay, and investigating 
how the interaction between human and machine is felt emotionally, cognitively, and 
physically. 
But what use is it to research such ways of being if we then only reduce this to 
words? Why the “affective turn” when we then turn promptly back to language and 
linguistic? How can we represent affect in our research only through words? This is 
something that everyone who researches affect must contend with, and is a dilemma 
that is being thoughtfully negotiated by many scholars in various fields (see, for 
example, Knudsen and Stage 2015 for a range of approaches from the humanities and 
the social sciences, exploring affective environments from nightclubs to heritage 
spaces). For this project, I am convinced that autoethnography is a suitable 
methodology despite its reliance on the written word precisely because words too are 
affective: ‘[w]riting itself is an affect-laden process: driven by interest and desire, 
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subject to frustration and misery as well as productive of joy and excitement’ (Gibbs 
2015: 223). Whilst words may not be able to capture how we feel, what we shouldn’t 
downplay is their ability to function as part of the subject formation itself, and to convey 
what we mean and, as I explore further below, to form our understanding of our 
experiences.  
I am concerned by the way in which the turn to affect ‘means turning away from 
something else’, and agree that ‘this may, depending on the degree of the turn, lead to 
the rhetorical dismissal of existing forms of thought’ (Paasonen et al. 2015: 5) rather 
than critically engaging with them. Instead, my fieldnotes demonstrate not only an 
attempt at conveying my physical, visceral reactions, but also the ways in which I 
immediately begin to make sense of those, and incorporate those feelings into the 
narrative that I construct on the page. 
The content of the notes do not only work through physical feelings and 
emotions. They also begin to analyse and try to make sense of the experience 
organically, without waiting for a separate “analysis” research phase.  I view writing as 
‘an act of mediation where bodily impressions, modulations, arousals, and motions are 
translated in order to be brought into the representational space of the text’ (Paasonen et 
al. 2015: 12) – although I consider the written document as something which not only 
represents, but performs, as I explore in more depth below. 
The act of writing necessarily changes the “thing” which we are describing. To 
not do this would be to artificially separate affect: 
 
[i]t is a mistake to try to remove pre-conscious visceral perception from its usual 
and habitual world/brain/body/mind contexts, and to artificially freeze and 
isolate affect as a separate element from the dynamically integrated sequences in 
which these things normally operate. No easy distinction can be made between 
visceral and cultural meaning-making, and why should we make one – where is 
the advantage? (Wetherell 2012: 67)20 
																																																						
20 Whilst Wetherell’s (2012: 3) account criticises the overgeneralisation of affect such that she believes 
certain theory ‘slides over distinctions between human and non-human’ affect, her work has nevertheless 




What Wetherell is saying here makes sense in the context of my own fieldnotes, which 
are not separate from theorisation and analysis themselves. There are often moments 
where in a single fieldnote I will make an account of an affective, visceral feeling, and 
automatically try to make sense of it, contextualise it, and justify it. As Kozel (2007: 9) 
states: ‘reflection is not only a secondary process or a commentary on experience, but 
also the process of thinking that transforms the doing. […] Thought impacts experience 
just as experience impacts thought’. The writing of the fieldnotes automatically seeks to 
make sense of the experience: ‘I reflect and start typing, and the reflection is already 
replaced by the typing experience’ (Rambo Ronai 1992: 104). Several of my accounts 
go through description of the experience to a rationalising and reasoning of it, to a 
probe about such motivations, or, at times, a self-conscious dismissal of them – 
laughing at or critiquing my own responses as it becomes apparent through 
interrogation that the reasoning behind them is in some way “inadequate” or “flawed”. 
The automaticity of our compulsion to make sense of our experience is nearly 
inescapable – and therefore to separate an affective account from that would be as much 
of a transformation of the experience as writing it is. Because of the ways in which this 
accounting for oneself (to borrow Butler’s 2005 title), one’s actions or one’s 
experiences can be seen to “do” something through the change that occurs in the “self”, 
some theorists have considered ‘autobiographical telling as a performative act’ (Smith 
and Watson 2001: 47, see also Butler 2005). As per Wetherell (2012: 68): 
 
[t]here are several ways in which emotives [first-person speech acts] are 
performative. First, they have what Reddy describes as self-exploring and self-
altering effects. An utterance like “I feel angry” can be a moment of 
crystallisation. A range of confused, often fugitive, mental flowerings become 
formulated and labelled. This process of description changes the state being 
described in subtle or very obvious ways. It reflexively acts back and 
reconstitutes the experience as a certain kind. The moment of description in 





Whilst some might argue that the performative writing of an affective experience 
distorts the affective experience itself and fails to “capture affect”, what we should also 
consider is that, turning to Barad (2007: 55), ‘these sets of practices are complexly 
entangled in ways that representationalist views of science (which treat theory and 
experiment as separate domains with one or the other as dominant and primary) elide’. 
We need to make sure that in attempting to account for something visceral we do not 
continue to dichotomise body and mind – however this is as important in terms of 
avoiding a reversal of the dichotomy to instead privilege the body over the mind by 
disavowing the written word. 
 As Paasonen et al. (2015: 4) explain, many affect theorists believe that text has 
constrained analysis and downplayed the sensory. However, in the turn to affect, why 
do we decide then that language is a “lesser” form? As Wetherell (2012: 62) states: 
‘[b]rain/body responses are autonomous only in the most limited senses and for all 
intents and purposes cannot be meaningfully separated from the rest of the assemblage 
that includes cultural, cognitive and conscious elements’. As such, in the turn to affect 
and the refusal of Cartesian dualism we need to be careful that we do not fall foul of 
recreating the same problem – maintaining the dualism but asserting the body, or affect, 
as the superior aspect with the mind, or the discursive or linguistic being reduced to an 
afterthought – deemed ill-suited for study and instead privileging ‘the non-conscious 
and the non-representational’ (Wetherell 2012: 53). As per Wetherell (2012: 19) ‘[t]his 
again seems as wrong turn’. She continues, ‘[f]or many, discourse is seen as a taming 
affect, codifying its generative force […]. On the contrary, I shall argue that it is the 
discursive that very frequently makes affect powerful, makes it radical and provides the 
means for affect to travel’ (Wetherell 2012: 19). In my fieldnotes I therefore aim to use 
affective writing to make the experiences in game accessible to the reader in order to 
provide a visceral insight into “feeling posthuman”. 
I argue that the writing of the affective and the use of the “I” are in fact the most 
advantageous and useful ways of researching the lived experience of posthuman 
subjectivity. Any separation is artificial, but the discursive can make affect travel 
(Wetherell 2012; see Ahmed 2014: 12-15 for a similar argument, where she argues that 
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‘words are not simply cut off from bodies, or other signs of life’). In this way, then, 
considering the written component of autoethnography as both echoing life in its 
attempt to make meaning from experience, and as a potential mode of travel for affect, I 
would suggest that the role of my fieldnotes is to demonstrate affective meaning-
making and to make that feeling travel by affecting the reader. In this regard I agree 
with Ferreday (2009: 52 and 54) that ‘reading is affective’ and is not ‘a “second best” 
activity that is distinct from and inferior to “real life”’. As Rambo Ronai (1992: 104) 
says, ‘[i]t is my hope that readers will live their own experience while reading about 
mine and have an understanding of my lived experience as a result’, and my aim is the 
same. 
The fieldnotes do not attempt to fully “tame” affect, or isolate it from its 
environment. Instead they serve a different, dynamic role in their ability to convey the 
experience through affecting the reader through words – as Paasonen et al. (2015: 11) 
write: ‘authors try to grasp and convey some of [affects] elusive yet visceral intensity’. I 
aim to use descriptive language in my fieldnotes in order to convey the environment, 
atmosphere, reaction, or emotion that I am in or experiencing, using creative words and 
imagery to convey some sense of what I am experiencing even for someone who has 
not done or experienced that thing before. To argue that such a thing is impossible is to 
deny the whole affective sphere of literature, which has moved us to laughter, tears, 
shock and outrage, long before videogames. As Ferreday (2009: 54) argues, texts 
‘produce strong affective responses that draw the reader in’. 
A further way in which affective writing aims to convey visceral emotions is 
through locating them in embodied experience. Kyrölä (2014: 5) writes of using 
‘autobiographical accounts of my own viewing and analyzing experiences – in other 
words, a strategic “I” – as a resource for grounding the analysis at the intersection of the 
cultural and the personal’. This is both validation for the use of autobiographical 
experiences as well as justification for the use of embodied experiences to explore 
affective engagements. However, whilst Paasonen et al. (2015: 12) argue that the use of 
first person stories is particularly suited to affective work in order to ground and situate 
affective experiences to avoid overgeneralisation, there remain issues with the 
incorporation of the personal. Smith and Watson (2001: 1) trouble the notion that 
writing about our own lives is simple, by pointing out that in the act of writing we 
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become both ‘the observing subject and the object of investigation, remembrance, and 
contemplation’. Their book Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting Life 
Narratives goes on to point out that: 
 
there is no coherent “self” that predates stories about identity, about “who” one 
is. Nor is there a unified, stable immutable self that can remember everything 
that has happened in the past. […] the narrating “I” is neither unified nor stable. 
It is split, fragmented, provisional, multiple, a subject always in the process of 
coming together and of dispersing (Smith and Watson 2001: 47 and 60). 
 
Whilst this is an understandable claim I would suggest that just because an “I” is 
unstable and partial this does not make what this “I” has to say any less of a valid 
source of data. I would continue as Sundén (2012: 170) before me by using the “I” 
despite understanding this “I” as fractured and partial, rather than stable and whole. By 
acknowledging this partiality the research makes clear an epistemological uncertainty as 
‘ways of knowing are shaky, partial, and always in the process of being proved 
otherwise’ (Sundén 2012: 171). However, I would suggest that this is, and can always 
be, the case. Our understanding is always incomplete, as is our knowledge. However, 
‘[t]o know oneself as limited is still to know something about oneself, even if one’s 
knowing is afflicted by the limitation that one knows’ (Butler 2005: 46). 
Autoethnography therefore has a complex position in terms of accounting for an 
“I”. As Grant et al. (2013: 8) explain, at times the voice associated with 
autoethnography can be aligned with positions including ‘modernism, realism, 
positivism, phenomenology, and at a broader sociocultural level liberal-humanism’. As 
such, an “I” might be assumed to speak with authority from a particular position on a 
subject, as ambiguity and complexity might be erased in a literal voice that assumes a 
stable and authoritative position (Grant et al. 2013: 8). To the contrary, Grant et al.’s 
(2013: 8) position is that autoethnographies should precisely account for the emergence 
of the “I”, as the writing of research demonstrates how subjectivity is produced. The 
voice is therefore ‘always provisional and contingent, always becoming’ (Grant et al. 
2013: 8). These arguments are aligned with a more post-structuralist critique and 
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approach to autoethnography, but these arguments are extended further in my own aim 
of using a posthuman autoethnography. 
 
I, posthuman 
Rereading some of Herbrechter’s (2013) book and I am struck again by the 
ways in which some people might take offence at my research topic and 
methodology. Some might find it a contradiction – to study posthumanism, the 
ways in which we are not “one”, by using a method which is self indulgently 
concerned with “I”. If I am not a fixed bounded subject, then from what position 
do I write an autoethnography?  
‘The true nature of subjectivity as fragmented, contradictory and irreducible to 
conscious self-identity, ultimately remains unknowable’ (Herbrechter 2013: 
205). 
Perhaps though this juxtaposition is what is so necessary, and missing from 
current debate. What does this posthumanism look like, feel like, to the 
“human” subject? The inescapable “I” may be a fallacy but it is precisely that - 
inescapable.  
The “I” with which I write this thesis is an intended posthuman, an “I” which is 
not just “me” but Etyme too, bound up as we are together, in this world and 
that. It fluctuates and changes between her, me, we and us as those boundaries 
undergo their “continuous construction and reconstruction” as per Hayles 
(1999). I am writing my-her-our experiences. 
 
‘Although I am writing this as a cyborg, I still suffer from that human frailty of 
a lack of objectivity, particularly when it is myself in the dock.’ (Warwick 2002: 
viii) 
 
As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, there are various approaches to 
posthumanism, and these range from a transhumanist ideal of uploading the mind to the 
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computer (which in fact re-imposes a Cartesian dualism) to those from a more critical 
posthumanist perspective who believe the posthuman to be a fully embodied being. 
Some of the main aspects of posthumanism lie in its disavowal of previous ways of 
conceiving of the human, and with that come the liberal human aspects of autonomy, 
rationality, independent and control. 
There are some versions of critical posthumanism that would extend this 
critique of the liberal human subject to argue that subjectivity is a problematic concept 
to theorise the posthuman condition through, as its roots are deeply embedded in 
humanism (see, for one discussion, Callus and Herbrechter 2012). Herbrechter (2012: 
331) explains the potential pitfalls of autobiography in the following extract:  
 
[t]he very idea of autobiography relies on a subject (or a narrator) who is 
capable of remembering, interpreting and identifying with his or her life story. It 
is a very specific form of embodiment that usually conveys trust in the 
impression that the subject of the narration is identical to the subject of the 
narrative. This is, in fact, what guarantees self-sameness, that is an assurance 
that “I” am “me”. 
 
Herbrechter (2012: 331) goes on to enumerate the critiques of such a claim – ranging 
from blows against the self-conscious “I”; Freud’s distrust of the “I” due to its influence 
from unconscious forces; Marx’s critique of the subject as being manipulated by 
ideologies it is unaware of; and post-structuralism’s “radicalisation” of ‘these forms of 
suspicion, all directed against the idea that subjects are free and competent to give an 
accurate account of themselves’.  
 There are therefore various tensions involved in studying posthuman 
subjectivity using an autoethnographic methodology. For some, the idea of 
posthumanism as a movement, turn or philosophy which acknowledges the 
permeability or entanglement of humans, the ways in which they are constantly shaped 
by “external” forces and stimuli, including the environment, the non-human, and other 
people, means that the idea of the “I” is one which is precarious and therefore writing 
from that position autoethnographically seems contradictory. How can I speak of a 
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“me” when I know that “I” am only what my entanglements make “me”? These 
tensions add a necessary complication to be explored through my research. 
It is my belief that none of us are the singular, bounded subjects that liberal 
humanism would ascribe us to. However, I do not believe it is possible at this stage to 
fully escape the overthrows of the long history of humanism that has shaped us (as 
entangled as I believe myself to be, I still speak of “I”). The “I” is the historical way in 
which humans have come to conceptualise themselves, ‘the very terms by which we 
give an account, by which we make ourselves intelligible to ourselves and to others, are 
not of our making’ (Butler 2005: 21). Whilst this thesis proposes that we can critique 
that separateness from the “other” we cannot yet state that we operate without some 
sense of “self” appearing, even from the perspective that such a self emerges from an 
amalgamation of components that collide. As Butler (2005: 59) states: ‘[n]o one can 
live in a radically non-narratable world or survive a radically non-narratable life’. I am 
therefore suggesting that the “inescapable fallacy” of the I is indeed at this moment 
inescapable – it is, as Deleuze terms it, a ‘grammatical fiction’ (1991: 95) but one we 
need. This could be linked to Blackman’s (2012: 23) exploration of ‘how subjects [live] 
singularity in the face of multiplicity’. Rather than renouncing subjectivity entirely 
then, I aim to critically extend “subjectivity” in a posthuman fashion, by acknowledging 
the multiplicity of beings that contribute to “a” subjectivity at any given time. 
It is therefore not my claim that this “I” from which I write is either stable or 
fixed (see Richardson 2005: 962), nor do I believe it to be free or in a position of power, 
nor do I even presume the assurance that the “I” is “me”. The fieldnotes are not an 
accurate “representation” of the experience of gaming. Instead, I use the fieldnotes in a 
performative way as an emergence of the posthuman subject. In writing the fieldnotes I 
‘enact the self I am trying to describe’ (Butler 2005: 66). It is therefore my intention to 
use the fieldnotes in a post-anthropocentric way despite their reliance on the “I”, 
through demonstrating how that posthuman I is constructed of elements of both human 
and non-human. As per Butler (2005: 81): 
 
I am authored by what precedes and exceeds me […] This does not mean that 
I cannot speak of such matters, but only that when I do, I must be careful to 
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understand the limits of what I can do, the limits that condition any and all 
such doing. In this sense, I must become critical. 
 
Although “I” am more than “me” I do not feel this should exclude writing about the 
“self” – as long as I acknowledge that self as entangled21. I do not feel my material 
self to be a more influential factor than Etyme’s informational self in the posthuman 
subjectivity that we become and that the fieldnotes partially (in their own fragmented 
way) embody. This aligns with recent calls for posthuman methodologies to cultivate a 
sensitivity to non-humans through a non-hierarchical approach – ‘one should not 
assume that human beings are necessarily the most important actor in shaping what 
happens within an event or situation’ (Ash and Gallacher 2015: 83). I explore these 
ideas in more depth below, whilst providing a more detailed consideration (and 
justification) of the complexity of aligning autoethnography with posthumanism. 
In just the same way that my thesis will explore how very “human” feelings 
permeate the research into the posthuman subject constituted from and through the 
avatar-gamer; so too does my research method demonstrate the very “human” way of 
contextualising and understanding this – through the subjective experience of the I.  
Whilst “I” am not only “I” but an amalgamation based on environments, 
atmospheres, bodies, societal, political, economic influences “I” still refer to myself as 
such. I am a posthuman-I, by my own admission and definition. Moreover, I embody a 
particularly “privileged” form of the posthuman. I write from the perspective of a 
Western, white, able-bodied, young, heterosexual, educated, female. The views 
presented in this thesis are therefore a subjective account from that particular 
perspective, and accordingly, somewhat inescapably, present an argument that speaks 
from the privileges associated with all of those facets of how I am positioned; I am 
entangled in many privileged contexts. There are fascinating ways of considering how 
the posthuman applies outside of all of my own contexts. For example, Posthuman 
Bodies, edited by Halberstam and Livingston (1995), presents various ways of using the 
																																																						
21 See Herbrechter (2012) for his explanation of how autobiography can easily be extended to ‘auto-
hetero-techno-bio-graphy’ in order to account for the incorporation of self, other, technology, life and 
writing. (He also includes “thanato” to account for writing as if one were already dead.) 
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posthuman to critique political and social positions. The importance of the accessibility 
of the posthuman should not be underestimated or undermined. Nonetheless, in 
embracing that accessibility it is also necessary to make the accounts of the privileged. 
This thesis is my attempt to contribute to a growing area of research in order that others 
might take these ideas, concepts, and approaches forward in ways that represent their 
own experiences and subjectivities. 
‘We experience the world from a single embodied perspective’ (Roden 2015: 4) 
and I do not refer to myself as a collective nor do I disown the “I” I feel. To do so in my 
research would be, I believe, disingenuous, as it would suggest an approach that is not 
my own lived experience. More importantly, I doubt it to be the lived experience of any 
readers of this text. Although there are of course limitations, tensions, and difficulties 
with writing as a posthuman-I it is nevertheless a more accessible and altogether a more 
useful practice than to become overwhelmingly bound in the internal contradictions 
which it poses, which would ultimately fail to make any accessible reflection or 
intervention through the restrictions of not being able to say anything at all. 
Furthermore, we should consider what point would it serve to attempt to depart 
from the “I” in this thesis? My research attempts to show an “everyday” posthuman 
subjectivity, taking a medium which is accessible to anyone with an adequate computer 
and internet connection,22 and which is used, for many people, in an increasingly 
mundane, everyday, commonplace way (see Juul 2010, for discussion of the increasing 
“casuality” of gaming). The motivation behind this choice is to make theory more 
accessible and applicable to everyday life, to show how relevant posthumanism to our 
daily encounters. It is therefore imperative that my research method also follows this 
ethos, making the theory accessible by demonstrating the difficulties of accounting for 
ones “posthuman” self in a very “human” way. This methodology therefore arose from 
the kinds of questions I am asking in order to demonstrate the affective experience of 
both gaming and being entangled. As Crick (2011: 267) states, gaming is ‘a fully 
embodied, sensuous, carnal activity’ and I needed a method that would demonstrate 
																																																						
22 Whilst full membership requires a paid for subscription, a trial version of World of Warcraft is 
accessible for free. 
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this, and allow room for the excitement, anxiety, fun and boredom that gaming incites, 
and posthuman subjectivity encompasses. 
Whilst some might criticise my method for being self-indulgent and subjective, I 
believe it is just as problematic to write this position out of the research as I agree with 
claims that ‘theory needs to be responsive to lived experience’ (Ferreday 2013: 53). As 
Barad (2007: 55) states: ‘[t]o theorize is not to leave the material world behind and 
enter the domain of pure ideas where the lofty space of the mind makes objective 
reflection possible. Theorizing, like experimenting, is a material practice’. My 
theorising is inherently caught up in my material body and entangled self through the 
use of my own experience and through accounting for myself in the way that I 
subjectively do.  
I am constantly being changed, affected, mediated, by those things – human and 
non-human – around me. As Butler (2005: 7) affirms: ‘there is no “I” that can fully 
stand apart from the social conditions of its emergence’. Similarly, this thesis is not a 
piece which has been solely constructed by me – I am not the autonomous author – this 
writing is affected too, not only by me but by my supervisors, by my family, friends and 
any others who read this. It is affected by the reader, and their context, too, and is 
therefore never a singular thing. It is changed by what I have read and have not, by 
those writings and authors who have influenced me and those I disagree with. It is also 
affected by the spell check programme on Microsoft Word, by the synonym function, or 
by whatever Google suggests when I am struggling for a word and it throws something 
at me. Focussing on the intrinsically multi-layered context and style of this thesis 
throughout, however, would serve to disrupt the (constructed) narrative to such a degree 
that no – even partial, incomplete, subjective – conclusions could be drawn. Instead, I 
have chosen to present my research through a constructed and controlled piece, in the 
attempt to draw some conclusions – however provisional – to focus my research, and to 
explain something clearly rather than many things vaguely. 
Barad (2007: 26) explains: ‘our knowledge-making practices are social-material 
enactments that contribute to, and are a part of, the phenomena we describe’. What 
Barad means by this is that in order to provide meaning in the findings of research 
certain choices have to be made and that the choice of methods, in my case 
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autoethnography, is one of these, and as such effects the research outcome or results. 
This means that the research method is inherently bound up in the research results (see 
also Richardson 2005: 962). In this way, ‘[w]e do not uncover preexisting facts about 
independently existing things as they exist frozen in time like little statues positioned in 
the world. Rather, we learn about phenomena – about specific material configurations 
of the world’s becoming’ (Barad 2007: 90-91). My autoethnographic project aims to do 
this by exploring how intra-action emerges through gameplay.  
To separate methods from results is flawed logic. Barad (2007: 118) argues that 
‘there is no unambiguous way to differentiate between the object and the agencies of 
observation: an apparatus must be introduced to resolve the ambiguity, but then the 
apparatus must be understood as part of what is being described’. Though this 
description is regarding quantum physics we can easily apply the same logic to my 
research project and argue that it is through the use of the autoethnography that my 
specific research findings arise, but also that the specific way in which I bring 
autoethnography and posthumanism together in fact aids the emergence of the 
posthuman subject which I discuss, create, am. The intra-action between the “method” 
(autoethnography) and the “object of study” (posthuman subjectivity) is an inseparable 
part of the way in which I make sense of that posthuman subject, and how the 
posthuman subjectivity emerges in this specific context. “Object” and “method” are 
therefore ontologically inseparable, only emerging from their intra-action with one 
another (Barad 2007: 128). Blackman (2015: 26-27) makes a similar argument to the 
effect that methods give form to processes that are otherwise dispersed and distributed, 
allowing them to be read and re-read through both human and technical means. 
This understanding of the intra-action between object and apparatus then shows 
how the fieldnotes and the posthuman subject are a phenomena arising from the intra-
action between autoethnography, “self”, and avatar, thus acknowledging ‘the 
researcher, instrument and researched to be active and entangled agents’ (Van der Tuin 
2014: 235). It is in this way that we could argue that bringing together two seemingly 
contrasting or contradictory ideas (autoethnography and posthumanism) actually gives 
rise to the “thing” itself – and that without using autoethnography the phenomena which 
I describe (the lived experience of MMORPG gaming as an embodiment of posthuman 
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subjectivity) would emerge in very different ways subject to the specificities of 
different entangled research methods. 
Therefore, the fieldnotes demonstrate how they are a particular aspect of the 
posthuman-that-is-me. Etyme and I are inseparable in our intra-action and in the 
fieldnotes: they would not exist without my intra-action with her, and they do not speak 
only of the human side of our relationship. They present a narrative that occurs only as 
a result of myself and her intermingling. Pearce presents some of her research as co-
authored between her avatar Artemesia and herself (see, for example, Pearce and 
Artemesia 2006 and 2009) in a way that is reflective of what occurs in my fieldnotes. 
The fieldnotes cannot escape the posthuman subject that they represent – or as Barad 
(2007) might argue, help to create. What I mean by this is that it is through the 
fieldnotes that my subjectivity with Etyme is made sense of and solidified, and so in 
some ways comes to be. As Gibbs (2015: 227) states: ‘[w]riting is inevitably a process 
in which subjectivity continually risks itself, finds itself, loses itself, and remakes itself 
in its dialogic relations with the worlds to which it attunes’ and this aligns with the 
notion of the fieldnotes embodying the posthuman subjectivity that emerges from my 
intra-action with Etyme. We are lost and found through the fieldnotes, the specificities 
of our individuality are constructed in relation to one other just as the subjectivity we 
embody together emerges. 
Clough has provided an account of the drawbacks within autoethnography from 
a posthuman angle, and her work poses some interesting points that are worth noting 
here. She cites Haraway’s issues with ethnography evolving to include self-reflection 
and states that for Haraway self-reflection as a practice of rethinking is an inadequate 
methodology for the criticism of technoscience (Clough 2000: 15-16). Haraway instead 
proposes that this should instead be replaced by ‘critical direct action’ (Clough 2000: 
15-16). My issue with this is that there is little help, guidance or indication of what such 
a “critical direct action” might look like – and, importantly, how one might begin to 
document such an action in a way other than writing. For example, it could be argued 
that my gaming is not only a ‘practice of rethinking’ but is in fact a ‘critical direct 
action’ which I take on semiotic(avatar)-material(embodied) “objects”. However, as a 
doctoral candidate I still need to account for this experience in a way that is quantifiable 
by a panel of experts. 
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Clough (2000: 17) does make an understandable and founded critique of 
autoethnography, stating that where post-structuralism deconstructs the subject, 
autoethnography seems to insist on restoring it in order to voices own experiences and 
emotions and claim them as one’s own. However, as I have stated, in my own 
methodological use of autoethnography this is not an uncomplicated use of the subject – 
in “voicing” in-game experiences through the fieldnotes I am not aiming to claim these 
experiences as my own, or at least not entirely my own. I instead use the fieldnotes as a 
space to explore the entangled entities that contribute to that experience, and any 
“restoration of subject” is instead a claim of, and for, the posthuman subject. 
I therefore write as a flawed being, but in a way that is consistent to humanity’s 
self-deception. Using Derrida’s notion of autoaffection, Clough (2000: 17) writes: 
 
[i]t is autoaffection that allows the presumption of the unity of speech and 
precommunicated thought, giving the subject an inner presence, an inner voice, 
so that the subject, when it speaks, is presumed to speak its own voice, to speak 
its intention and to express its inner being. 
 
My response to this for my own part is that my fieldnotes are presumed to speak 
something that is the posthuman subject’s voice, the voice of that which is me and 
Etyme entangled and entwined – not more “me” or more “her”, but both. Whilst Clough 
(2000: 17) states that ‘autoaffection is crucial to any refusal of an intimacy between the 
body and the machine, nature and technology, the virtual and the real, the living and the 
inert’ this is what my own autoethnography is trying to avoid. Rather than giving the 
“subject” an inner voice per se I am trying to give that particular “posthuman 
subjectivity” a voice, and precisely express the intimacy between body and the 
machine, the virtual and the real. It is also important to be self-critical of this claim, and 
to acknowledge the issue that the “voice” that is employed, whoever’s it may be, cannot 
capture the experience and the intimacy, but nor can anything else. We therefore must 
accept that although the textual accounting for experience is not a wholly “accurate 
mirror” to the experience it is nevertheless an attempt to make those experiences 
accessible to others. In doing so I suggest that we use Barad’s (2007) use of 
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performative rather than representative to account for the ways in which the writing of 
texts contribute to the “realisation” (or at least tangibility) of posthuman subjectivity, 
and that we utilise the power of words in ways that make them most useful and suitable 
for our purpose. 
I might therefore conclude that my methodology is a diffractive one (Barad 
2007: 46 onwards), which advocates moving away from representationality to 
performativity. This diffractive methodology focusses on ‘performativity: subject and 
object do not preexist as such, but emerge through intra-actions; entangled ontology: 
material-discursive phenomena; onto-epistem-ology: knowing is a material practice of 
engagement as part of the world in its differential becoming’ (Barad 2007: 89). These 
factors are epitomised in my research project through the posthuman – the subject 
emerges through the intra-action between avatar and gamer; the phenomena is 
materially embodied and discursively formed through the fieldnotes; and the 
methodology functions through a material engagement in gaming and a posthuman way 
of becoming. In this understanding, autoethnography is a critical practice of 
engagement, and the fieldnotes that I collect from my autoethnographic study do not 
only represent the posthuman but are a demonstration of the performance of posthuman 
subjectivity. Whilst I analyse the texts in what might be argued to be a more reflective 
way, I would nevertheless argue that this was only enabled through the initial 
engagement with the game that gave light to those experiences. The process of writing 
itself is entangled and engaged, and the analytical ideas that are framed around the 
fieldnotes in this thesis are therefore similarly critically working within the data. 
A diffractive methodology displaces a focus on research as representational, as 
representation suggests an ontological difference between “representations” on the one 
hand and “the represented” on the other (Barad 2007: 46). In contrast, a performative 
approach disrupts the perceived independence of these “entities” (Barad 2007: 49). It 
instead focusses on what the practice or performance of “representing” actually 
produces, and takes into account that knowledge comes from directly and materially 
engaging with the world (Barad 2007: 49). This performative reading can be applied 
both to my analysis of my fieldnotes as well as my interpretation of Etyme. It is not my 
understanding that Etyme represents “me” as an ‘ontologically separate entity’ from the 
avatar. Rather, my inquiry is focussed on how a posthuman subjectivity emerges from 
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within the avatar-gamer intra-action. As such – following Barad (2007) again – my 
performative understanding occurs through my direct engagement with Etyme. As 
Barad (2007: 54, my emphasis) states: ‘theorizing must be understood as an embodied 
practice, rather than a spectator sport of matching linguistic representations to pre-
existing things’. Thus the fieldnotes are a demonstration of how I have embodied the 
state of being a gamer, being posthuman. Furthermore, they actively constitute and give 
rise to a sense of solidarity in this way of being. 
As I focus specifically on the avatar-gamer relationship in this research this 
could be seen to enact a “cut” in the research. Barad (2007: x) explains that 
‘entanglements are not isolated binary coproductions’ and it is important to note that the 
posthuman subjectivity that I am discussing is constituted by more than just these two 
entities. This subjectivity is also formed by the gameworld, including the computer 
being played on, and the other gameplayers, to name just a few of the structures and 
components that feature in the entanglement. However, by focussing on the 
entanglement of these entities the research hopes to disrupt the humanist centrality of 
the author even whilst employing the “I”, by demonstrating how that “I” is constructed 
and experienced in a permeable fluidity with a range of different external stimuli – and 
again this is referred to within the notes themselves, which move and change between 
reflection, documentation and analysis as they both describe and critique their 
descriptions. Most explicitly this construction is demonstrated through relationship with 
the avatar, but the ways in which the fieldnotes reference other media, affects, and 
emotions also plays its part. In this way the research project takes up recent calls for a 
rethinking of contemporary digital ethnography, that breakdown the author of research 
as all-knowing, and pays attention to the distribution of agency particularly in online 
cultures (Broekhuizen and Evans forthcoming). The accounts of this research are then 
posthuman not only in their disruption of human / non-human but also through their 
methodology in the disruption of researcher / research field. 
 
Practical application 
Whilst the above has outlined certain theoretical and methodological approaches to the 
use of autoethnography in a “virtual” world, I will now go on to explain the ways in 
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which this actually took place. As all researchers know, the process of data collection 
and organising is messy and subject to revision (Tracy 2013: 30). The below explains 
the process in a way that I hope is coherent, yet accounts for this messiness and 
demonstrates the overlaps in research phases. 
The first “practical” aspect of undertaking this research project was deciding the 
game that the study would take place in. World of Warcraft has been running as an 
MMORPG for 12 years and over the course of its history it has expanded in various 
ways. One of the positives of using World of Warcraft is it has this rich history to draw 
on and was one of the first MMORPGs that was highly successful and popular, with 
subscriber numbers reaching over 10million (Laurel 2013: 123-124). The possibilities 
in World of Warcraft are varied, such as opportunities for playing on different servers 
(player vs. player, player vs. environment, or role-playing servers) as well as options of 
13 different races to choose from, and 12 classes. Moreover, as it is an established 
world there are (hopefully) less glitches, and there is also an understood gaming 
protocol. There is a system of progression in World of Warcraft for levelling up to level 
10023, and at various levels along the way new talents, skills, and specialisations are 
unlocked, as well as new mounts for travel and new dungeons. World of Warcraft 
provides quests which can be undertaken individually or in small groups as well as 
dungeons which require a party and raids which are only accessible to higher level 
players. There are also possibilities for joining various different guilds which are 
created by players and which one can join and contribute to. Some of these guilds might 
be specifically focussed on levelling and achievements, whereas others might have a 
more social aspect to them. There is also a large amount of research which has taken 
place within World of Warcraft, providing a rich set of literature to draw upon including 
its own reader: Digital Culture, Play, and Identity: A World of Warcraft Reader (2011). 
Laurel (2013: 123-124), describes World of Warcraft as the ‘elephant in the 
marketplace’: 
 
going strong with over 10 million subscribers in 2013 – the largest MMORPG 
in history. Various types of interactions are enabled by the various “realms” of 
																																																						
23 At the time of writing, July 2017. 
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the game, each with distinctive play properties to suit the palate of the player 
(for example, how much fighting they want to do). Non-player characters 
(NPCs) – often with fairly sophisticated AI structures – serve as enemies, 
friends, wizards, familiars, monsters, and other sorts of forces on the level of 
character to shape dramatic action. Through devices like deeds, quests, and 
guilds, World of Warcraft as well as many other games of its ilk, provides 
affordances – often necessities – for significant interaction among players, to 
work together for common goals or against common enemies. 
 
As stated at the outset of this chapter, I do not suggest that it is only through 
gaming that one experiences a posthuman subjectivity and similarly I do not suggest 
that it is only through World of Warcraft that one can experience a posthuman 
subjectivity with an avatar. Much of what I describe in the following thesis could have 
resonance with gameplayers of any kind – and non-gameplayers at that – as I draw on 
broader themes of subject formation. However, the research is undeniably highly 
subjective in nature and entanglements are ‘highly specific configurations’ (Barad 
2007: 74), so it is equally possible that other World of Warcraft players may not find 
the analysis synonymous with their experience. 
In practice, the autoethnography took place over a period of 18 months in order 
to facilitate a deep understanding of the phenomenon of gaming, as well as allowing a 
distinctive period of time for the relationship between myself and my avatar to form and 
develop. Examples of works which validate the need for such a period within the 
gameworld can be seen from Pearce’s ethnography for her PhD thesis Playing 
Ethnography: A study of emergent behaviour in online games and virtual worlds 
(2006), and Sundén’s autoethnography as cited in her paper ‘Desires at Play: On 
Closeness and Epistemological Uncertainty’ (2012).  
It is also important to explain the approach to gameplay that was used to account 
for the way in which I approached the “field” and the “activity” at study. Aarseth (2003: 
n.p.n.) asks ‘how do we play? Is playing for analytical purposes different from playing 
for pleasure? That depends on our reason for the analysis’ and this highlights the need 
to analyse gameplay – or our engagement with any media, culture, or environment in 
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the way that it has been designed to be experienced. For example, Aarseth (2003) points 
out the ways in which some academics, short on time, might resort to following guides 
or walkthroughs to get through a videogame more quickly. However, he asks ‘how is 
the flavor of the game kept intact?’ (Aarseth 2003: n.p.n.). For me, this is precisely the 
reason that I played the game as a game in my own engagement with it. I believe it is 
imperative when studying media to study the medium as it was intended – inasmuch as 
that is possible24. It would seem disingenuous to state that the avatar-gamer in World of 
Warcraft provides one example of posthuman subjectivity if I were to adopt a playing 
style that distorted the game to “make” it that way. Instead, I have tried to adopt a 
playing style that is “natural” to me. 
My purpose is to analyse the relationship between avatar and gamer in 
considering it an embodiment of posthuman subjectivity. My argument is that gaming 
represents a common example of media usage and therefore that this is phenomenon 
that is accessible and relatable to a large group of people (whilst in recent years 
Blizzard have stopped released subscriber numbers (Eurogamer.net 2015), in 2007 
World of Warcraft had ‘8.5 million active subscribers spread across four continents: 
Europe, North America, Asia, and Australia’ (Corneliussen and Walker Rettberg 2011: 
4)). As such my exploration of gaming and of the avatar-gamer subjectivity should be 
one that mimics this “everyday”-ness of the experience of the gamer (whatever that may 
be) and so I have throughout the process done my best to play the game as “naturally” 
as possible, allowing time for short scratch notes to be taken (see below) and researcher 
observances to be noted. 
This “natural” or “normal” playing style is in itself an entirely subjective thing. 
Bartle’s (1996) Hearts, Clubs, Diamonds, Spades: Players who suit MUDs discusses 
four player types that he identifies in MUDs, multi-user dungeons/dimensions that were 
text based, real-time virtual worlds that were the precursor to MMOs. The player types 
have continued to be cited in literature pertaining to MMOs and MMORPGs, and still 
serve as an insightful basis for how players play, (although it should be noted that any 
																																																						
24 Whilst I agree that this doesn’t mean that players necessarily always a play a game as it was intended I 
also believe it is misleading to enter a game for the purposes of researching it only to purposefully disrupt 
the status quo. An offline ethnography would never commit such a faux pas, so why should it be 
excusable in an online setting? 
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player can move between these different styles of play, and the list is far from 
exhaustive). According to Bartle (1996: n.p.n.), players can be split into achievers 
(“diamonds” – seeking treasure); explorers (“spades” – digging for information); 
socialisers (“hearts” – empathising with other players); and killers (“clubs” – hitting and 
killing people). Aarseth (2003: n.p.n.) adds cheaters to this list, citing those who use 
walkthroughs or guides as his example. Aarseth (2003: n.p.n.) also goes on to expand 
the typology of players by emphasising player experience, as whether you are a 
“newbie”, “casual”, or “hardcore” gamer also denotes your playing style. Whilst many 
games appeal only to one “type”, Corneliussen and Walker Rettberg (2011: 5) explain 
that as ‘World of Warcraft is not faithful to any one game genre […] many different 
kinds of player types (see Bartle 1996) can find activities that interest them in World of 
Warcraft’. 
As someone who has grown up around videogames, my own playing style 
aligns most closely with Bartle’s achievers and explorers. I follow the game-related 
goals and aim to rise in level and complete the tasks and quests set, but also enjoy 
finding new areas and side quests for exploration, lending a sense of mystery and non-
linearity to the game. As Bartle (1996: n.p.n.) states: 
 
[for achievers] it’s the fact that the game environment is a fully-fledged world in 
which they can immerse themselves that they find compelling […] [for 
explorers] it’s the sense of wonder which the virtual world imbues that they 
crave for; […] Scoring points all the time is a worthless occupation, because it 
defies the very open-endedness that makes a world live and breathe. 
 
I would say that I am a “casual” player of games but was new to World of 
Warcraft, and had not previously played it before embarking on this PhD project. As 
such, for my own gameplay experiences I have noted that my initial aim in being an 
“achiever” was at times been in order to overcome the “newbie” status, but that later in 
the game, once comfortable with my surroundings and the game narrative I was more 
willing to veer away from the narrative to find side quests and missions. This is in line 
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with my playing style of other videogames that offer an adventure and explore style 
narrative (e.g. Fable, Assassin’s Creed, Dying Light, etc.). 
Bartle (1996: n.p.n.) suggests that the difference between achievers/explorers 
and socialisers/killers is that whereas achievers/explorers aim to interact with or act 
upon the gameworld; socialisers/killers aim to interact with or act upon the 
gameplayers. My achiever/explorer inclination therefore suggests a less social approach 
to gameplay, and it could be argued that this suits an exploration of the avatar-gamer 
subjectivity as this is my main engagement in the game, rather than focussing on trying 
to create relationships with other players. Nevertheless, in order to at least attempt to 
incorporate some knowledge of the social aspects of World of Warcraft in my analysis I 
joined guilds, engaged in chats, and took part in dungeons and battlegrounds. 
Interestingly, as my fieldnotes show throughout chapters 5-7, these experiences at times 
suggest a “killer” streak in my gameplay, where inflicting damage has demonstrated 
how ‘[k]illers are proud of their reputation and of their oft-practiced fighting skills’ 
(Bartle 1996: n.p.n.). 
The main issue encountered with socialising in the game was that the game 
mechanics in World of Warcraft seem to strongly separate socialising from gameplay. 
The following fieldnote explains this in more depth: 
 
I have often thought about the way that interaction with other players can take 
you away from the gaming experience. This happens for example when you are 
having conversations about things completely unrelated to World of Warcraft, 
or, in a more literal sense, if you are engaged in chat, it is very difficult to both 
move your avatar and type into the chat box. This means that the two actions 
are nearly mutually exclusive. It is part of the reason why have found it difficult 
to become involved in guilds. I want to study the experiences in gameplay, not 
the community interaction. I want to study my relationship with Etyme, my 
avatar, my character, not so much the relationships formed with other players. 
Obviously this is a significant part of the game, nevertheless, I have struggled to 
find it an interactive part of GAMEPLAY. This morning whilst gaming I had the 
realisation that this is because the act of typing takes you away from the avatar 
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body, and in this way, the avatar becomes “disembodied”. From my experience 
the act of gaming is very embodied. However, typing, is a completely different 
experience. It effectively means “separating” from the avatar in favour of 
another pursuit. This is my problem with the guilds. If the chat is minimal, the 
“disembodied” effect on the avatar is not so noticeable. However, if chat is 
sustained, what is the avatar body there for? It does not indicate your presence 
because that has shifted to a “liveness” and immediacy within the chat box – 
not the gameworld. Perhaps this effect would be less troubling and indicate less 
of a “break” with the avatar if the avatar bodies of those you were chatting with 
were nearby. Chatting with someone who you can see at least indicates that it is 
the avatars too who are communicating (this is also the case in dungeons and 
sometimes battlegrounds depending on your proximity to those who are 
chatting). In these instances, if the avatars are still you can consider it a normal 
aspect of conversation as proximity is required and it is not unnatural to stand 
and have a conversation with someone. If you are in the same guild however, 
you can engage in guild chat whilst being nowhere near each other – these 
words appearing in the chat box with no indication as to the body (avatar or 
otherwise) behind them. In this case then, the immobility of the avatar is an 
oddity; incongruous. As MacCallum-Stewart and Parsler (2011: 232) state: 
‘[t]he act of having to type every word a character says places a remove 
between player and avatar’. 
	
Fieldnotes and analysis  
Participant observation therefore operated through participation in the game and 
observation of the phenomena and the lived experience of gaming. As Boellstorff et al. 
(2012: 88) state: ‘there is no shortcut to the investments of time and immersion required 
for effective participant observation research’. Short “scratch notes” (Ottenberg 1990: 
148) were made during gameplay in order to capture key data points to then be 




(example of a short scratch note) 
(example of the written up fieldnote) 
This enabled me to keep track of notable moments without having to fully disrupt the 
gameplay by writing them up immediately, although occasionally I would “pause” my 
gameplay to write up a detailed description of a moment if there were aspects that I felt 
I might not remember clearly that I felt were particularly notable. This fluctuation in 
notation style links with broader research surrounding ethnography, which has 
demonstrated that the different ways in which ethnographers write their fieldnotes 
depends on their approach to the nature of participant observation (Emerson et al. 2007: 
354). For the most part my notes served as reminders, ‘entries to be elaborated and 
“finished” upon leaving the field’ (Emerson et al. 2007: 354). However, the “pausing” 
in gameplay to write a fieldnote was sometimes spurred on by a desire to write about 
gameplay whilst still in a specific game location – for example, if I were writing about 
the atmosphere or environment that I was in, pausing in my gameplay whilst still in that 
place helped me to attempt to express that affective encounter in writing, taking the 
time to more carefully examine the assault on my senses. In a similar way, often, rather 
than leaving the game entirely and exiting the application on my laptop I would instead 
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log out of the game but leave it running on the character selection screen whilst writing 
my fieldnote. This would provide me with an audio-visual link to the game that 
somehow made me feel still suspended in my connection with the game whilst writing 
up my notes in more detail on an alternative device. Alternatively, there were times 
when the audio-visual link and being in the gameworld were enough to elicit a response 
before even “playing” (see below example). 
(example of a fieldnote that was written when logged in to World of Warcraft but 
“paused” from gameplay. Blurring applied for emphasis on relevant extract but to 
demonstrate length of fieldnote) 
 
That said, for the most part the production of scratch notes that were later developed 
allowed me to play the game as a “naturally” as possible – i.e. as I would play any 
game, as a “gamer” rather than as a “researcher”. 
Boellstorff et al. (2012: 84) recommend ‘priorities to guide the production of 
fieldnotes’ for participant observation, whilst also noting the importance of being open-
ended in order to allow for the transcription of details which may at the time be deemed 
superfluous but at a later date could contribute to research findings. For my own 
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research the guiding priorities emerging from the research questions were initially 
descriptions of the lived experience of gaming; the relationship between avatar and 
gamer (embodiment, subjectivity etc.); and the relationship of human with machine 
(gamer with game, player with computer). As my themes began to emerge this helped 
to refine my research questions and also guide the production of fieldnotes (these are 
discussed more in the following chapters, 5-7). 
I used the note-taking application Evernote to write, collect and organise my 
fieldnotes. Evernote is a cloud based application that allowed me to access my notes 
from a variety of devices as well as through the browser application from any device 
with an internet connection, and these would all automatically sync as notes were added 
or amended. The application is password protected and my notebooks are private so 
cannot be accessed by any other parties. I created a designated “notebook” for my 
fieldnotes, and wrote notes directly into the application. Evernote allows fieldnotes to 
be tagged, which fits with traditional ethnographic data tagging – labelling notes with 
micro-units before coding into categories of data (Boellstorff et al. 2012: 165).  This 
enabled me to see when particular ideas or moments were more popular and 
demonstrated an emergent theme, which I then went on to analyse. 
Data analysis of the autoethnographic fieldnotes took place by looking at the 
fieldnotes in a new light, reading them with the purpose of looking for emerging themes 
and patterns in the data. Boellstorff et al. (2012: 166) state that ‘[t]he key to data 
analysis is to interact with the dataset: read it, study it, immerse oneself within it, and 
let the data paint a portrait of the culture we are studying,’ – let us here replace 
“culture” with “experience” or “subjectivity” and the engagement with data is the same. 
Chang (2008: 131) suggests various strategies for the continued efforts of data analysis 
and interpretation in autoethnography, including: searching for recurring topics, themes, 
and patterns; identifying exceptional occurrences; comparing yourself with other cases; 
contextualising; comparing with social science constructs and ideas and framing with 
theories. For Boellstorff et al. (2012: 167 and 168) ‘[w]hatever procedures we employ, 
the goal is to organize the data into manageable pieces we can then thematically analyse 
and easily locate when writing up research results […] the goal of analysing data 
collected via participant observation is to discover patterns that illuminate the research 
question and develop new insights’.  
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For me this phase was interesting as the emergence of the three main themes 
seemed to be for the most part rather organic, and Savin-Baden and Major (2012: 440) 
have stated that thematic analysis ‘acknowledges that analysis happens at an intuitive 
level’ through “immersion” in data. 
The first theme I identified, focussing on the performative aspects of gaming 
and links to acting theory, was unsurprising given my background in performance. As 
Chapter 5: From Acting to Intra-Acting demonstrates, this theme was also one that 
became immediately apparent as the initial phases of the game are in some ways some 
of the most strikingly similar to performance as the process of developing a character is 
central to the beginning of the game and here some of the most obvious overlaps occur. 
Whilst there were tags such as “performance” and “gaming as acting”, fieldnotes were 
also tagged with, for example, “narrative” or “appearance”, so that these then also 
developed subthemes for analysis. 
As I progressed through the game the emergence of empathetic feelings were 
increasingly common. These affective and visceral moments could not be ignored and I 
began to notice a pattern emerging in the moments that I was most compelled to write 
about and the connection I had with Etyme at these times. Empathy was therefore a 
more “emergent” theme, in that it is less obviously linked to a particular researcher bias 
or aspect of my own situated knowledge. These moments were particularly affective, 
and initially tags varied from “embodiment” to “frustration”, “feeling hurt”; “concern” 
etc. The “empathy” tag was applied retrospectively to some of the fieldnotes gathered 
under various headings, as I began to notice this as a common factor and consider this 
as the analytic that could be applied to these moments. 
The theme regarding the broader aspects of subject formation arose from a 
gradual documentation of aspects that occurred after I had been playing for some time, 
when the avatar-gamer subjectivity had existed for long enough to have a “history”. I 
noticed moments where I reflected on the “lifecycle” of my time in game and realised 
how this provoked moments of nostalgia. In doing so this allowed me the opportunity to 
consider these reflexive, “subject forming” practices outside of the game, which 
enabled a critical re-interrogation of these practices as intrinsically humanistic. 
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The constantly interconnected timescales which any research takes place along 
is evident in this way through my own fieldnotes which begin to reference other 
literature, move into analysis, refer to others of my own fieldnotes and begin to even 
construct their own narrative. The idea of these phases being distinct between data 
collection, tagging, analysis and developing narratives is a neat but often inaccurate 
view of ethnography, as all of the phases often intermingle. As Emerson et al. (2007: 
361) state, fieldnotes ‘provide a critical, first opportunity to write down and hence to 
develop initial interpretations and analyses’. The incorporation of analytical asides in 
fieldnotes has been suggested in various ways, for example through the addition of 
separate, theoretical notes (Schatzman and Strauss 1973) or through bracketed analytic 
ideas (Lofland and Lofland 1995). However, my own style is more in keeping with 
Emerson et al.’s (1995) suggestion of ‘in-process analytic writing’ that incorporates 
asides and commentaries within the fieldnote itself, that is then further developed 
through the analytical stage. It is my belief that for autoethnography and affective 
research the disruption of observational vs. analytical stages is even more muddied by 
the fact that the researcher is so intimately involved with their own data and analysis 
that it is unlikely that a concrete distinction would occur. As Rambo Ronai (1992: 104) 
explains, ‘the telling of [one’s experience] is a circular process of interpretation that 
blurs and intertwines both cognitive and emotional understandings’. Accordingly, I 
began grouping fieldnotes and drafting analyses of themes whilst my gaming was 
ongoing, and this meant a constant process of adding to the emerging themes as more, 
relevant fieldnotes were collected to add to each narrative25. 
On the one hand, these themes form the basis for the aspects of experience that I 
have chosen to analyse, and I then engaged in a process of filtering through different 
fieldnotes and selecting the most “appropriate” to explore. As with all research, more 
was written both in terms of fieldnotes and analysis than appears within this thesis, but 
the fieldnotes that were selected were chosen both for their affectivity and their ability 
to demonstrate a particular notion concisely and with clarity. After grouping my 
fieldnotes into different themes a form of diffractive thematic analysis occurred. I 
engaged with the fieldnotes critically, reading them against literature for that “theme” 
																																																						
25 This process occurs across qualitative research in various methods from ethnography to grounded 
theory, returning to the “field” in order to check assumptions and deepen knowledge. 
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(acting, empathy, subject formation), drawing comparisons and conclusions and 
‘developing narratives and arguments that bring us to larger theoretical and conceptual 
points’ (Boellstorff et al. 2012: 174). 
However, I then engaged with these fieldnotes “diffractively”, which occurs as 
‘a critical practice of engagement’ (Barad 2007: 90), considering how different 
approaches to our practices matter (Barad 2007: 72). Rather than themes of acting, 
empathy, and subject formation being left to account for subjectivity in their own right, 
I re-read these themes through posthumanism, marking the differences within the 
humanist themes and posthuman ideologies. I considered different ways of re-reading 
these humanist notions (that the themes perpetuated) in posthuman ways, searching for 
the differences in understandings that humanist vs. posthumanist practices might 
provide. This allows a consideration of how we might conceive of posthuman 
subjectivity not only as a “being” but as a “doing”. 
The next chapter explores these themes in more detail, but before moving on to 
their discussion and into analysis, the final section of this chapter provides some 
explanation and justification for how the fieldnotes are presented in the following 
chapters. 
 
Presenting the data 
In terms of the presentation of the fieldnotes in the thesis this is perhaps where my own 
use of the method differs from some of the more narrative forms that autoethnography 
can be presented in (as discussed in the above section “Autoethnography”). There are 
ways of writing an autoethnography in a completely narrative way that seems to fluidly 
blend research and analysis together in an accessible form that does not jar the reader 
between two subject positions. For my own autoethnography the structure and style 
follows something more akin to Moriarty’s (2008: 20) presentation of her interview 
data, which she presents thus: 
 
[w]hat follows is the edited transcript of my interviews with ‘Alice’, 
interspersed with my own narrative and reflections on what was discussed that 
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are distinguished from our conversation in italics. The writing in italics is my 
attempt to be personal and creative in the writing up of my data. The indented 
sections that are in bold provide my analysis of the interview that evolved 
having considered the interview data and my personal reflections on the Alice’s 
answers in relation to my own experience with academic writing, thus drawing 
together my personal quest to be creative and my objective to produce 
meaningful data on the academic writing process.  
 
In a similar way in my own thesis the fieldnotes are kept within the main body of the 
text in italics. This enables them to both be easily identified as the “data” but also to be 
fully integrated into the analysis. The fieldnotes and the theory are not separate – 
throughout the text there are parts where either fieldnote or analysis merges into or 
borrows from the other. However, as, for the most part, the fieldnotes are so specifically 
written from an in-game perspective, to construct a linear and narrative piece of text 
that seamlessly integrated fieldnotes with no definition would require a thesis which 
was positioned entirely within World of Warcraft. Whilst this would be intriguing to 
see, for my own thesis I felt the need to account for the fieldnotes as contextual, 
emergent constructions, particularly given the idea that they are being used as a 
performative example of the posthuman subjectivity that emerges from the intra-action 
of Etyme and I. Outside of the specificity of that intra-action in-game, my (posthuman) 
subjectivity shifts, and the researcher analysis demonstrates this through another, 
emergent, “voice”.  
 This is similar to the layered account of Rambo Ronai (1992: 103), which uses 
multiple layers of reflection that shift ‘forward, backward, and sideways through time, 
space, and various attitudes in a narrative format’. She states that ‘[a]lthough it is not 
possible to capture the lived experience, the layered account as a form allows me to 
express the multiplicity of identities I embody when making a report’ (Rambo Ronai 
1992: 123; see also To 2015: 71 for an explanation of the multiple “I”s that occur in 
their critical, affective, autoethnographic montage). My own accounting does not occur 
in such a layered way but the ability to switch between the notes, which embody a very 
particular posthuman subjectivity, and the “analysis” or “commentary”, which embody 
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another, differently specific subjectivity – the researcher role – means that I feel that 
both are accounted for in the final thesis. It is for this reason that my fieldnotes appear 
at times in sizeable chunks – I want it to be apparent to the reader that the multiplicity 
of identities that I embody are tangible. I considered presenting the fieldnotes in a 
different way, perhaps in columns alongside the theory to make sure neither were 
viewed with a hierarchical slant. However, in much the same way as I stated that ‘the 
narrative form can be seen to be an appropriate method of communicating cultural 
experience as it is through narrative that we understand our own lives’ (MacIntyre 
1984: 212 cited in Ellis and Bochner 1992: 97) as a justification for autoethnography, it 
is also a justification for how my writing is presented.  
 I use my writing to make sense of my experiences and whilst this does not mean 
that my thoughts or experiences flow neatly from left to right, from top to bottom of a 
page it is nevertheless important that I acknowledge how much the practice of writing 
has allowed the exploration of my notes and my experiences to flow from me. This can 
be linked to various posthuman understandings of our intra-actions with our 
technologies as formative.  
 Recounting the claim of Nobel Prize-winning physicist Feynman, Clark (2008: 
xxv) writes that Feynman claimed of his notes and records that he ‘actually did the 
work on the paper’. Clark (2008: xxv) continues: 
 
Feynman’s suggestion is, at the very least, that the loop into the external 
medium was integral to his intellectual activity (the “working”) itself. But I 
would like to go further and suggest that Feynman was actually thinking on the 
paper. The loop through pen and paper is part of the physical machinery 
responsible for the shape of the flow of thoughts and ideas. 
 
In the same way it is true to say that the medium of writing (on a computer no less) has 
shaped the way in which I have presented and explored this thesis myself: the physical 





This chapter opened with an overview of game research methods in order to explain the 
difficulties of applying certain traditional approaches to this research project. Having 
identified autoethnography as a potential methodology, I have explained the key aspects 
of this approach, and the way in which it can be used to explore affective experiences. 
However, I have also identified the potentially problematic contradictions in the use of 
a methodology so focussed on subjective, individual experience when writing about the 
instability of “self”, and the multiplicity of being. Drawing on the need for accessible 
forms of research, and the inability to escape certain humanistic constructs in our 
current societies, I have instead argued for a posthuman “I”. The use of this “I” in the 
research embracing the “self” as distributed and emergent, and acts as a performance of 
posthuman subjectivity itself. Following on from this theoretical critique, the practical 
application of this methodology was explained. 
 Part of what has been so hard about writing this thesis has been the problem that 
I have repeatedly written about – the fact that each presentation is a fallacy, that each 
separation is a lie. Nevertheless, without them I would have been (at indeed at times 
have been) paralysed, unable to write, unable to make any claims – ‘[a]ny literary form 
imprisons lived experience; yet, without form or structure, it would be impossible to 
convey any experience’ (Rambo Ronai 1992: 123). Presenting my thesis this way may 
not be what is most “true” about lived experience, but it is “accurate” in that it is how I 
came to make sense of it. For me this was not a process of stitching together different 
pre-determined or pre-written snippets or segments. I write in a tirade, in a flurry, and in 
a process of discovery26. It’s only afterwards that I try and make sense of my making-
sense, and for that I am grateful for Dr. Adrienne Evans’ patience in helping me to sift 
meaning from discovery. What you now go on to read is a somewhat polished version 
of this overspill of thoughts and the key-tapping exploration of ideas, but I hope you 
can forgive its structure as the way that worked for this invention of it. The following 
																																																						
26 See for a similar experience St. Pierre (2005: 970): ‘I used writing as a method of data analysis by 
using writing to think; […] [t]hought happened in the writing. As I wrote, I watched word after word 
appear on the computer screen-ideas, theories, I had not thought before I wrote them. Sometimes I wrote 




chapter introduces each of the themes of this thesis, before Chapters 5-7 move into the 




Chapter 4: Themes, Positions and Disclaimers 
	
Introduction 
My proposal is that the MMORPG gamer is an embodiment of posthuman subjectivity 
that allows us to explore subject formation in an enmeshed and entangled way. Having 
made this claim, and having then stated my proposed method of exploring this concept 
through my own gameplay in World of Warcraft, this chapter serves two purposes. It is 
both a guide and a disclaimer: a guide through what the thesis is, and a disclaimer about 
what it is not. 
The following three chapters set out some of the ways in which my own 
experience of gaming in the MMORPG World of Warcraft has been experienced: 
through experiences that can be linked to acting, empathy, and different ways of subject 
formation. It is important to state at the outset this is not what I consider to be a three-
step approach to “immersion”, which is at best an ambiguous term. Definitions of 
immersion are widespread and are used somewhat inconsistently. Farrow and Iacovides 
offer a short review of prior definitions of “immersion” and the term emerges variously 
as “presence” (which follows attention-based engagement and emotional investment- 
based engrossment) (Brown and Cairns 2004: 1299 cited in Farrow and Iacovides 2012: 
2-3); or as describing the relation to the narrative (whereas “engagement” is used to 
describe relation to the strategy and achievement level of gameplay) (McMahan 2003: 
69 cited in Farrow and Iacovides 2012: 3). Although various authors discuss immersion 
as a transparency of technology, such as Bolter and Grusin (2000: 21, my emphasis) 
who state that ‘[v]irtual reality is immersive, which means that it is a medium whose 
purpose is to disappear’, these kinds of accounts are techno-centric. We shouldn’t 
forget, in our current Western technologically mediated climate, that we are just as able 
and likely to become “immersed” in “old media” formats such as books or paintings as 
we are in a videogame. As Ferreday (2009: 6) claims, ‘[i]mmersion is not a property of 
certain technologies, but a relation between technologies and users: hence the absurdity 
of claiming that some activities or technologies are more immersive than others’. 
A further concern with the language of “immersion” to explain technologically 
saturated societies is that immersion seems synonymous with doing something well. 
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Examples include the emphasis on immersion in gaming, achieving a “oneness” with 
the character in acting, and Csikszentmihalyi’s “flow”, all of which seem to suggest that 
a not-thinking, subconscious and intuitive state is to be privileged above any other. In 
gaming research, for example, Farrow and Iacovides (2012: 5-6) state that ‘[f]or a 
convincing and immersive experience, one should be more or less unaware of the way 
in which it is being mediated’. Theatre director Stanislavsky (1937: 13) writes that ‘the 
very best that can happen is to have the actor completely carried away by the play’ and 
that in these moments the action takes place intuitively and subconsciously. Similarly, 
in Csikszentmihalyi’s (2004) TED talk ‘Flow, the secret to happiness’ he uses the 
example of a leading composer in the 1970’s explaining ‘how he feels when composing 
is going well. And he says by describing it as an ecstatic state’. Csikszentmihalyi (2004) 
continues that being in the creative flow takes up all of one’s creative attention and 
concentration so that there is no capacity to feel anything else: ‘existence is temporarily 
suspended’.  
All of these states (and sometimes the specific quotes) have been used 
throughout this thesis to describe the feelings that I have encountered and experienced 
in-game. However, whilst chapters 5-7 of this thesis demonstrate how even problematic 
humanistic notions can be posthumanised to account for their experience differently, it 
is the role of this chapter to make clear that although these are states that we could 
assign to the experience of gaming, they are in no way all that it is.  
To attempt to achieve what Csikszentmihalyi (2004) identifies as a constant 
state of “flow”; what Farrow and Iacovides (2012) term “immersion”; or what 
Stanislavsky (1937) labels the “subconscious and intuitive moment” would be 
suggestive of a humanist level of control over such engagement with our activities. 
Whilst there are doubtless times when these feelings occur within my gaming and 
fieldnotes, I do not see these moments as indicative of a particular achievement on my 
part – certainly not on my part alone. They form a part of the gaming experience, but to 
privilege these moments and to focus only on them in the thesis would be detrimental 
and dishonest. Rather, the following chapters aim to describe and critically analyse 
these feelings in more depth, but also to acknowledge the times and ways in which 
these states or feelings are destabilised or simply not felt. To account for the aspects of 
gaming that both demonstrate as well as destabilise humanistic notions such as 
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achievement and to explore the times when gaming is encountered with boredom, 
frustration or disinterest (seen in Chapter 7: Emergent Subject Positions) is, in my 
opinion, imperative in assuring that the depiction and portrayal of the gaming 
experience or the posthuman experience is characteristic of the different events we 
encounter in life. Crucially, this does not offer a transcendent removal from that which 
is necessarily dull (see Petit 2015 for an account of “digital disaffects” such as 
boredom, detachment and ennui) nor does it suggest that posthuman subjectivity is only 
a “state” that can be “achieved” through feelings of affectionate connection with the 
machine. Put simply, I do not wish to create an account of the posthuman experience 
that focuses only on “exciting” or “engaging” moments, and avoids “the boring bits”. 
As Chapter 7: Emergent Subject Positions demonstrates, this would create a 
problematic version of the posthuman, as it would still be caught up in humanistic 
practices linked to measurement and self-betterment. 
Instead, the following chapters offer an account of how a posthuman 
subjectivity is “facilitated” or felt – or, to put it another way, different ways in which 
we can account for subjectivity in posthuman ways. Drawing on aspects of 
entanglement, intra-action, and post-anthropocentrism this thesis suggests that we are 
always enmeshed with our technologies. In a similar way, I would argue that we are 
always enmeshed in our ways of meaning-making. Rather than experiencing 
subjectivity first and accounting for it second, what is presented in this thesis is a 
performative account of the process of an emergent posthuman subjectivity (see the 
previous chapter for further explanation of this). As Kozel (2007: 9) states: ‘reflection is 
not only a secondary process or a commentary on experience, but also the process of 
thinking that transforms the doing’. Read through this lens, accounting for our own 
subjectivity is as much part of the experience of being a subject: both reflecting and 
experiencing are subjective effects and, as Barad (2007: 26) states, ‘our knowledge 
making practices are social-material enactments that contribute to, and are a part of, the 
phenomena we describe’. This said, the subjectivity that I aim to demonstrate in my 
fieldnotes is decentred – the subject is not “me” but a posthuman amalgamation of 
entangled components, compromised of gamer, avatar, game, technology, environment, 
and all other facets (both known and unknown) that contribute to that experience. This 
is made apparent through the different positions that are articulated within the 
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fieldnotes, as well as the fact that the fieldnotes could not exist without the intra-action 
with the “other”.  
However, all enactments of knowledge making are constructed to some extent 
and the same can be said of this thesis. In order to present a readable and coherent 
account of my gameplay the following analysis of my experiences within the themes of 
acting, empathy and subject formation are presented separately, even whilst they had no 
clear distinction within my own experience. In support of this disclaimer, I think it 
worth repeating the words of Markham (1998: 86) in her own auto/ethnographic inquiry 
into Life Online: 
 
[b]efore you read about these themes […] let me offer two specific caveats: 
First, these three themes can be separated heuristically, but they also are 
inseparably woven into lived experiences. Each theme is nested within and 
encompasses the others. I could not prioritize these themes into levels of 
relevance or importance for the users, or into any causal sequence […]. They are 
simply different moments of lived experiences. Second, I have separated these 
themes artificially for the purpose of presenting a somewhat coherent narrative. 
 
Like Markham, my chapters on acting, empathy and subject formation are not 
perceived or experienced during gameplay as three separate components. Rather, each 
of these experiences folds into the others, forming a part of the experience alongside the 
many other, unaccounted for instances and episodes. To help make sense and 
understand the experiences, different moments have been selected, pulled apart and 
analysed in an individual section, in an effort to demonstrate each analytically and 
somewhat distinctly. Decisions have also necessarily been made about which extracts or 
elements of my diary are represented here. The aim is to avoid unnecessary confusion 
of the argument. However, as you will read, even with this attempt the themes 
necessarily spill into one another and overlaps are at times unavoidable.  
These distinctions are akin to the idea of the “strategic I” as explained in my 
methodology (see Chapter 3: Embracing Methodological Contradictions), and the 
overall difficulties of trying to coherently present a complex and intertwined 
 
96 
experience. The “I” is chosen to make sense of something in a heuristic, imperfect way 
to distinguish something that this thesis proposes is fluid, permeable and 
indistinguishable from the other human and non-human objects in its environment. So, 
too, the “themes” are employed to create a narrative, accessible journey through the 
posthuman subjective experience of gaming. The themes were often experienced in 
parallel with one another, and there should not be any sense of hierarchy read into them 
– it is not that case that one experience has been identified as more “important” or 
pivotal than another, and it would go against posthuman ethics to believe so. The order 
of the chapters does however indicate the order in which I encountered and uncovered 
these analytics through my own gameplay. However, this is not a claim that the same 
would be true for anyone else, or that one necessarily “leads” to another or that these 
analytics demonstrate a progression of immersion in the game. 
The use of these three themes is to show how the basic structures are in place to 
allow for these particular readings of the experience and subjective feelings. These 
themes have arisen from the specific relationship between Etyme and I, and therefore 
account only for how our specific posthuman experience was created and felt. The 
entanglement that has constituted the posthuman subject at study in this thesis is one 
that is always in flux and for anyone else would always necessarily be made up of 
different (but always culturally intelligible) components. This resonates with Barad 
(2007: 58 and 74) when she states that ‘entangled practices are productive, and who and 
what are excluded through these entangled practices matter: different intra-actions 
produce different phenomena […] the specificity of entanglements is everything’. The 
phenomena at study here has been produced through the intra-action of game, avatar 
and gamer; as well as multiple other entangled components. For another posthuman 
subject the intra-action would include other components, accounting for the different 
ways in which our subjectivities are formed and the different entanglements that we are 
involved in. That said, the themes of acting, empathy, and subject formation are ones 
that can occur across a variety of entanglements, and are not game-specific. The ways 
that my account has resonance with others beyond myself demonstrates the usability 
and accessibility of such structures and how they are indicative of experiences that 
others will have had also. However, more than that, they demonstrate just a few of the 
ways we can delve into data collected around posthuman being and critically analyse 
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deconstruct the experiences and feelings therein. This allows us to “posthumanise” 
humanistic notions of subjectivity and being. Taking up the posthuman challenge, the 
rewriting of humanistic notions moves otherwise static and stable constructs (e.g. 
acting, empathy, subject formation) and shows how they rely heavily on affect, 
entanglement, and exchange. 
 
Introducing the themes: acting, empathy, subject formation 
As an actor and performance studies and drama graduate it was unsurprising that my 
interests would shape my first experiences in game. There are many echoes between 
performance and gaming, and Chapter 5: From Acting to Intra-acting therefore draws 
on my knowledge from and about the skills involved in acting and performance. In that 
chapter I draw on various acting methods to analyse the game and gameplay. However, 
as far as disclaimers go, it is also important to say what that chapter is not. It does not 
argue that the embodiment of a game character is indistinguishable to the experience of 
embodying a character for the stage, as, from my experience, this is not the case. Whilst 
there are many overlaps, these two experiences each have their own individual traits. 
In some ways, the actor could be considered as a posthuman performer, if we 
were to understand the reliance on external influences and foregrounding of a “non-
human” (fictional) other as examples of permeability and post-anthropocentrism. Whilst 
this chapter doesn’t elaborate in depth on the theatre actor as already-posthuman, the 
application of the resulting “posthuman acting” that I propose could easily be applied 
outside of game environments. It could be argued that the actor/performer already 
embodies an enactment of a posthuman subjectivity; sharing agency between actor, 
character, director, audience, and many other non-human elements. However, in many 
performances or acting techniques there is still an implied sense of mastery and control 
that the actor exerts over their performance, suggesting a much more humanistic 
attitude and approach. Whilst the theatre-actor as posthuman is a fascinating 
embodiment to be considered, and an area that I would be keen to explore further in the 
future, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to adequately analyse this without deviating 
from the main aims and objectives. What I do show in this chapter are the similarities 
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between gaming and acting through the subjective experience of performance, as an 
actor performing in various shows throughout the writing of this thesis. 
In some ways the comparisons in this chapter are more “text” based here than in 
any other chapter – by which I mean they consider game mechanics (i.e. the structures 
in place) as well as game play. I offer an insight into how the initial gameplay set up 
could be used by the gamer as a form of “script”, giving glimpses into the backstory for 
gamers to glean knowledge about their environment, race, class etc. and how this might 
go on to inform and shape their gameplay. I draw on notions such as “given 
circumstances” – the information that is contained within a script that serves as a 
foundation for a character. Considering these in a posthuman light, rather than through 
a humanistic understanding of control and mastery, demonstrates the intra-action that 
occurs between avatar and gamer. In the same way as the game requires the gamer to 
function, so too does the character require the actor, and so both “performances” are 
necessarily an enmeshment of the two. Both can only become through an ability to give 
and receive, to affect and to be affected. This allows the posthuman subjectivity that 
involves both avatar and gamer to emerge, and an understanding of the character as 
separate or “other” in either medium disappears.  
There are some basic and useful correlations when considering the performance 
of actor and gamer: for example, the desire to portray or control the character in a 
specific way is a demonstration of the desire to show and be seen. The role of an 
audience presents interesting questions that could be explored in future analysis and 
research, for example: does the involvement or presence of an audience facilitate or 
encourage the emergence of the posthuman subjectivity? Whilst my own research 
focuses on the relationship between avatar and gamer rather than gamer and 
community, the presence of a perceived “audience” in game still undoubtedly 
influenced my experience in-game.  
One clear example of the performative nature of game mechanics is evident in 
the time spent on appearance and the desire to become a “well-rounded” player through 
developing my other skills and talents aside from those required from the immediate 
gameplay. Whilst this was driven in a large way by my own sense of satisfaction and of 
“completeness” it would be negligent to ignore the implications of being able to “be 
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seen” and the impact this had on me as a gamer. The ability to customise your 
appearance through armour etc. as you progress in game is of a practical and defensive 
use. However, I was often driven by the desire to be aesthetically well put together so 
that encountering players would view me as a coherent character – just as in ‘real life’ 
(RL) the coherence and care over one’s appearance is one that is judged and valued. 
There are various overlaps between acting and empathy, as both value the 
ability to feel and respond to an “other’s” circumstances and situations, whether they 
are fictional or “real”. In fact, empathy itself has been shown to make use of the same 
neuronal pathways, regardless of whether the events are ‘fictional’ or ‘real life’ (Kemp 
2012: xviii), so that the biological body empathetically reacts in chemically similar 
ways to characters in books and films as it would to another material body. I therefore 
follow the acting chapter with the theme of empathy in Chapter 6, which takes some 
similar aspects from acting but applies them outside of a performance context to 
demonstrate an expansion of how posthuman subjectivity is evident in gaming through 
another lens. The chapter that focuses on empathy explores the entwinement of self and 
other which takes place between avatar and gamer and considers the ways in which this 
is actually experienced. Far from moving the analysis away from the performative, it 
extends ideas of how an actor can come to know his or her character. In engaging with 
the avatar and experiencing its feelings, we open ourselves up to be affected by them in 
a variety of different ways – as is also the case in acting and performance. In order to 
create a “performance” that tells the intended story the actor needs to be able to feel 
what the character is feeling in order to portray it correctly and coherently. In gaming, 
the avatar’s and gamer’s desires are aligned in order to progress through the game. If a 
game avatar is being attacked by an in-game mob and the gamer does not react and 
respond as though it were their own body, the avatar will “die” – thus impacting the 
playability of the game. Similarly, if the gamer does not take on the challenges, quests 
and tasks given to their avatar they will not “succeed” in the game27. Although these 
descriptions may sound humanist in their intention, the empathy chapter shows how this 
capacity to feel and act in unison with the avatar occurs not through conscious control, 
																																																						
27 Whilst such forms of engagement (and others that purposefully subvert the “classic” form of engaging 
with a game, e.g. speed runs) are entirely possible and do exist, they are usually considered to be 
“deviant” strategies that are not playing the game as it was designed to be played. 
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but through affective empathic encounters that demonstrate the intermingling of avatar 
and gamer goals such that they are not separate desires but agentic capacities that 
operate in relation to one another. 
The analysis in this chapter therefore explores aspects of empathic feeling with 
the avatar through cognitive, affective and embodied means. Rather than suggesting 
that it is only through experiencing viscerally both narrative and embodied empathy that 
gameplay can take place; this chapter instead suggests that empathy is one way in 
which we can account for the subjectivity which arises as a result of the relation 
between human and machine. Through the alignment of cognitive, affective and 
embodied states the entanglement of avatar and gamer is demonstrated as the desires of 
one become the desires of the other. The bodily response and reaction to the avatar 
body is in some ways beneficial for the gameplay itself – both through eliciting a swift 
response and further through embedding an emotional connection with the story.  
Again, the disclaimer is here to say that it is not necessarily “immersion”. 
Rather than an immersion in gameplay, this chapter proposes that the intra-action of 
avatar and gamer demonstrates a particular emergence of posthuman subjectivity. In 
this chapter I therefore look to some of the previous definitions of empathy and 
consider how this humanistic trait might be posthumanised. What I mean by this is that 
there are certain definitions or understandings of empathy that suggest that the 
connection with the other should always be marked by a distinct knowledge that the 
“other” is separate from the self (e.g. Coplan 2011). It is understood as empathetic to be 
able to understand and acknowledge the feelings of others; but to actively put oneself 
into the others’ position is seen is detrimental and potential leading to a psychosis 
wherein the empathiser cannot understand the difference between self and other. I argue 
that this is a humanistic understanding of empathy which is not necessarily the way in 
which the avatar and gamer subjectivity is experienced. Here, the empathic state that 
one enters into with the virtual mind and body of the avatar is specifically characterised 
through the ability to take on the bodily and motivational keys to the avatars 
“existence” into oneself in order to give it “life”. This is what Banks and Bowman 
(2016) speak of with regard to an avatar that has its own perceptible sense of self and 
thing-ness. Although we understand that the avatar is not “our self”, it is not necessarily 
a dangerous symptom that we begin to feel so much in alignment with their world that 
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we should be concerned with a psychological breakdown. However, even in this view 
that grants agency and qualities to the avatar, the notion of character attachment is seen 
through identification, control, suspension of disbelief, and responsibility. All of these 
suggest a higher degree of autonomy on the part of the “human’ actor in the relationship 
even whilst suggesting that the closest connection between avatar and gamer to be that 
of ‘unification, in which the player and avatar are indistinguishable’ (Banks and 
Bowman 2016: 1259). This chapter therefore instead argues that a posthuman empathy 
recognises that there is no primary subject, and instead demonstrates the ways in which 
empathy emerges through a network of interacting forces and demonstrates our 
entangled, malleable and fluid state of being. 
The third theme of subject formation presents a further broadening of the 
concepts that were demonstrated through acting and empathy. The first two themes 
move through more text-based interactions with the game (how the game shapes us and 
our behaviours) to more affective experiences (how empathy is viscerally experienced 
in relation to the embodied, situational experience of the avatar). Although I initially 
use these chapters to posthumanise a traditionally humanistic practice (acting) and 
feeling (empathy), the third theme broadens this to our own understandings of self. It 
also accounts for the ways in which these typical understandings of self through the 
desire to achieve, be attentive, and develop, were apparent in the game. The occurrence 
of these humanistic desires was troubling in a posthuman analysis, and I therefore used 
this chapter as an opportunity to posthumanise these themselves.  
As I continued to play the game more and began to feel more at ease with the 
role of a researcher and my own documentation of the process I began to realise that 
some of the things I failed to document were the more mundane or trivial aspects of 
gaming. In an attempt to document the lived experience of gaming I was in fact missing 
out some of the ways in which I actually experienced or navigated the game, and 
through noting these in more depth I began to document these moments explicitly. The 
ways in which the game was not always utterly “immersive”, enthralling or captivating 
allowed other activities to take place alongside gaming. Habits such as eating, having 
the TV on in the background, looking at my phone, and switching screens to look 
something up about the game online were all parts of the experience of gaming. More 
than this I realised how other seemingly “ordinary” feelings or actions bled into the 
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game, as I began to become frustrated by repetitive activities, and to experience feelings 
of nostalgia when looking back on the lifecycle of my avatar and our time in the game.  
The very fact that I had not initially written these experiences down made it 
apparent that they were “undesirable” feelings; not something I should draw attention 
to, but something to shy away from, or hide. This demonstrated the ways in which the 
expectations of the liberal human subject were still shaping my experiences and my 
understanding of self, even within this context. Some of these (previously 
undocumented) actions show the ways in which even our habits and mundane time-
wasting activities are posthumanised and demonstrate our entanglements with 
technologies – looking things up online, or reaching out through social networks. In 
other ways, through feelings of nostalgia and a reflection of the lifecycle of the avatar it 
shows how the technologically mediated versions of ourselves are experienced with as 
much of an emphasis on linearity and progression as our own physical bodies. Just 
because Etyme exists within World of Warcraft where I can revisit anywhere I have 
previously been, this does not mean that in our revisiting as that same material-
informational subject we have not changed. Whilst feelings of nostalgia and the 
lifecycle of our shared posthuman subjectivity was an unexpected part of the gaming 
experience it is in some ways nevertheless an unsurprising symptom, as the mechanics 
and narratives of the game structure – and those of many other games – work explicitly 
towards this through the way games mirror everyday experiences and emotions. Thus 
notions of the “good citizen” are transferred onto the expectations of the “good gamer” 
– both in the game and outside of the game we are expected to progress and achieve, 
and to experience the desire to better ourselves. 
These experiences create an inseparability of “game world” and “real life” and 
also has implications for the way we understand the status of gaming in real life. The 
concept of gamification, for example, suggests using game techniques in work and life 
in order to give one motivation and rewards for carrying out certain tasks. But the point 
of view that the game and real life are resolutely implicated in the creation of one 
another means revising how we understand the concept of gamification. Rather than 
viewing gamification as the process of applying game contexts to real life we should 
instead remember that the mechanics which games employ are in fact originally from 
“real life”, and the reason we do most things in life is already for some sort of reward or 
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progression and games simply follow this “real life” structure. It is also worth 
mentioning that there is nothing particular “new” about gamification either – Gregg 
(forthcoming) has demonstrated how housewifery manuals included time-based 
competitions that we would now label as gamification – this is a method that has always 
been engaged with as a part of “human nature” and “getting things done”. As games are 
therefore designed to allow us to develop, grow, achieve and earn, it is not surprising 
that the posthuman subjectivity we experience should also be felt to have a past, a 
growth, and a history, as that is exactly how the game is designed. As such a posthuman 
nostalgia is implicit within the experience – and is an intriguing aspect as it emphasises 
how much different moments impact us. By drawing on these experiences I was 
therefore able to retrospectively critique certain feelings as belonging to humanist 
expectations of self, and to therefore consider what a posthuman perspective of these 
“goals” might be. 
Whilst these three themes seem to demonstrate clear entanglements of avatar 
and gamer, whether through performative, empathic, or fundamentally subject forming 
encounters, it is important to note that this entanglement is not unproblematic. Barad 
(2003: 808) states that ‘[a] posthumanist account calls into question the givenness of the 
differential categories of “human,” and “nonhuman,” examining the practices through 
which these differential boundaries are stabilized and destabilized’. Drawing on this 
notion I suggest that a particular stabilising/destabilising is at play in the three themed 
chapters. They suggest a destabilising of the “boundaries” of human and non-human 
that are then stabilised through their intra-action with one another. Those “boundaries”, 
that were originally considered as firm, fixed borders that separate the “self” from the 
“other”, are instead re-read as performative in themselves. Rather than the avatar and 
gamer as a “being” they also quantify a “doing” in this context, and it is through our 
specific entanglements that we are re-stabilised (given our particular “individuality”) 
through what we can do. In the themed chapters of acting, empathy and subject 
formation this “doing”, this destabilising and restabilising seems to, for want of a better 
word, “work”. Whilst the chapters demonstrate that this isn’t always easy, pleasurable, 
or fun, the entanglement enacts a specific agency, a way to intervene. This rejects the 
idea of the human as a stable entity, but can clearly show how, when entangled with the 




One last caveat: destabilised subjects 
It is important at this stage to make something else abundantly clear: just as the 
distinction between each chapter is a necessary tool to artificially separate analytical 
aspects from the experience of gameplay, so too the embodied and cognitive are not 
separate, though are presented in different ways throughout some chapters. The 
distinctions here are yet another construction of the narrative, in order to make explicit 
and clear the ways in which the experience of gaming has affective capacities that 
change the subjective state of being.  
The turn to affect has been seen as one that has encouraged an expansion of the 
concept of what is integral to our being (Paasonen et al. 2015). Moving away from a 
Cartesian privileging of the mind over the body has however been met with some 
unfortunate symptoms – namely that in an attempt to re-establish the importance of the 
body and its affective capabilities, at some points there has been an opposite dualism 
employed by privileging the body over the mind (Paasonen et al. 2015: 5). In some 
ways this is an imperfect but sometimes necessary symptom of documenting experience 
– in order to account for mind and body in a coherent, structured way it is at times 
necessary to enact a “cut” in the research to separate them. It would therefore be true to 
say that there are parts of the analysis sections in this thesis that do, at times, employ a 
temporary distinction between my embodied and cognitive experiences simply in order 
to more carefully and clearly layout the process. These are the drawbacks of attempting 
to account for what we think and feel in a written document. However, my accounts do 
not attempt to privilege either; rather, throughout the fieldnotes and the analysis the 
combination of mind and body has meant a constant intermingling. The performative, 
empathic, and mundane aspects of gaming and the creation of a posthuman subjectivity 
are all experienced as a psychophysical thing – being of both mind and body.  
This is an unfortunate, yet necessary, part of the construction of a PhD thesis. 
Calls to create accounts which are more fluid in style or structure, thereby creating what 
could be considered a more “accurate” portrayal of lived experience and subjectivity, 
are hard to negotiate when in the midst of a PhD research project which requires a 
format which renders it readable, critique-able and adhering to certain guidelines. The 
 
105 
result is a construction of a clear, linear, narrative, which is not the lived experience but 
rather a post-script of imposed structure and editing. Similarly, this chapter, which lays 
out how the themes link to one another is a further construction – there is no neat 
narrative as the themes intermingled and are experienced in tandem so much, but this 
chapter looks for those links which might begin to string the themes together despite the 
lack of a neat narrative. Furthermore, whilst the themes of acting, empathy and subject 
formation demonstrate three ways in which this specific posthuman subjectivity is 
facilitated, it should be noted that these themes do not encapsulate the “whole” of the 
experience of gameplay or posthuman subjectivity.  
Haraway’s (2003) work on companion species gives us a useful frame to 
consider the avatar-gamer through: she considers the concept of species as ‘a series of 
contingent categories whose boundaries are in flux and whose substance is not essence 
but dynamic relationality’ (Hayles 2006: 16). This enables us to see how the boundaries 
that are in flux around the human coupled with Hayles’s “benign” posthuman (allowing 
‘a recognition that agency is always relational and distributed’ (Hayles 2006: 16)) can 
help us to see how the avatar-gamer might demonstrate both how species flux and 
agentic coupling or sharing are in force. When the boundaries between the avatar and 
gamer are felt to shift into a more ontologically separate being then this is not to say 
that the posthuman subject has disappeared or ceased to be, but that the distributed 
agency has shifted to a different relation, and this flux can disrupt the previously 
established subjectivity. In fact, this simply demonstrates the fluidity of subjectivity that 
I have discussed throughout this thesis and shows how our posthuman states are not 
confined to a relationship with just one “other” but that instead we are always variously 
intra-acting and creating with and through the things around us. Barad (2003: 817) 
states that 
 
[i]t is through specific intra-actions that a differential sense of being is enacted 
in the ongoing ebb and flow of agency […] The world is a dynamic process of 
intra-activity in the ongoing reconfiguring of locally determinate causal 
structures with determinate boundaries, properties, meanings, and patterns of 




In the dynamic intra-action between avatar and gamer the sense of being that is enacted 
through the themed chapters of acting, empathy and subject formation is one set of 
configurations and agency. Elsewhere, when this is disrupted, the relationship is 
perceived to be reconfigured, with the agency flowing (or apparently not flowing) 
differently. 
 I take inspiration here from Lather (2007) in her suggestion of doubled 
meanings and getting lost in the research. Citing Derrida’s charge to create a text that 
‘interrupts itself and gathers up its interruptions into its texture’ (Derrida commenting 
on Levinas), she proposes using a Deleuzian ‘plateau format to fold and layer concepts 
in ways that are multiple, simultaneous, and in flux rather than presenting them as linear 
and discrete’ (Lather 2007: 4). This is my hope also for my thesis – that although the 
chapters are a necessary construction in order to thematise and draw conclusions form 
the data, both here and in the previous chapter I highlight how such linear and “neat” 
writing does not show how the themes overlap and intermingle. Similarly, the use of the 
“strategic I” is a multifaceted I, with no specific individual to whom it refers but rather 
a constant multiplicity (see Chapter 3: Embracing Methodological Contradictions, for 
more discussion). Lather (2007: 12-13) advocates getting lost in the research: 
 
the concept of getting lost functions as a paradox. It is a means of critiquing a 
certain confidence that research must muster in the audit culture. It is a 
metaphor for a new generation of postcritical work (Hoy, 2004). It is a way to 
engage a new interdisciplinarity that is able to question not just the nature of 
knowledge but its grounds of practice in postfoundational times. […] Given 
Derridean theories of the interminability of knowing in the face of the 
ineffability of the known, new losses are incurred by the necessary stabilization 
of science. 
 
I have drawn inspiration from the above quote to question and query the conclusions 
from my research. This is the distinction that Lather (2007) makes between “lovely 
knowledge” and “difficult knowledge”, where lovely knowledge represents neat 
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narratives and coherent structures that have been passed onto us from our humanist 
constructs of self and research. Difficult knowledge, by contrast shows us how 
impossible our representations of knowledge are. But, according to Lather, it’s only by 
giving up lovely knowledge that we experience ‘the promise of thinking and doing 
otherwise’ (Lather 2007: 13). 
I hope that the initial chapters of this thesis (Chapters 1-4) have demonstrated 
my awareness that the following three themed chapters (Chapters 5-7) depict a coherent 
yet complex (and partial) telling of the experience and justification of its philosophical 
conclusions – that we can posthuman humanist concepts but also that posthuman 
subjectivity “works” even when complicated. This could also be related to Lather’s 
notion of “doubled” deconstructive logic, which recognises that ‘[a]uthority becomes 
contingent’ (Lather 2007: 14). She therefore advises interrogating our own writings in 
order to “unmaster” our conclusions – critiquing our original ideas in order to present 
an opposing reading28. Lather also cites this approach as a way of circumventing the 
representation of a unified, humanist subject – the “difficult” chapters, disclaimers and 
contradictions in my own thesis are at times necessary in troubling the authoritarian, 
humanist voice which might appear to seep through the rest of the chapters. They 
emphasise my not-knowing and the knowledge of at least some aspects of the un-
individualised understandings which might be at play in and amongst not only the data 
but in my reading of them. 
	
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the themes that have arisen through the gameplay and have 
been applied to an analysis of the fieldnotes. Posthumanised, these themes of acting, 
empathy, and subject formation aim to offer tangible examples of how a posthuman 
subjectivity might be both facilitated, and made sense of. As I have discussed in this 
chapter, these themes are not perfect, and enact a specific entanglement of avatar and 
gamer. However, they demonstrate how humanistic practices might be posthumanised, 
																																																						
28 ‘Doubled logic […] endorses a problematic attitude, a double reading that is both critique and 
complicity, a way to move beyond inside and outside. Key to a different logic, it is “the double necessity 
of working from within the institutional constraints of a tradition even while trying to expose what that 
tradition has ignored or forgotten” (Nealon, 1993a, p. 101)’ (Lather 2007: 14). 
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so that a posthuman subjectivity might not only be a being but also a doing. This 
framework therefore paves the way for further humanistic practices to be reconceived in 
order to embrace a posthumanly ethically way of being. Further, this chapter has also 
served as a disclaimer to state that these themes do not account for all of the experience 
of the specific avatar-gamer subjectivity under consideration, and that aspects of 
posthuman experience can have a jarring affect and effect. 
Embracing these moments, and accounting for them in this thesis is necessary in 
order to avoid presenting a techno-utopic account of the MMORPG or the posthuman 
experience. Being posthuman can be performative, can be empathic, and can even be 
caught up in humanistic understandings of subject formation – as Badmington (2003: 
21) states “the ‘post-’ of posthumanism does not (and, moreover, cannot) mark or make 
an absolute break from the legacy of humanism’. These experiences are in constant 
conversation and flux with one another. The next three chapters offer a particular view 
of this posthuman experience, but one that I hope is as honest as a constructed, 





Chapter 5: From Acting to Intra-acting 
	
Introduction 
I have claimed that the MMORPG avatar-gamer demonstrates one of the many ways in 
which our bodies are entangled with non-human “others”. In doing so I have argued 
that to see the avatar merely as an extension does not account for the complexity of this 
relationship between human and machine. Instead, by taking a posthuman perspective 
we can consider the disruption that occurs between the notions of “self” and “other” in 
this example of an augmented body or bodies. The entanglement between avatar and 
gamer has many counterparts through different intra-actions of non-human and human, 
and is therefore only one example of how we can view posthuman subjectivities as our 
lived experience. My question is, how can we understand posthuman subjectivity as 
emergent and distributed, and how can we analyse the ways in which it is experienced? 
In the following chapter, I draw on specific acting theories to analyse the avatar-
gamer and consider what these theories can tell us about being posthuman, and forming 
new subjectivities. I examine fieldnotes and consider these in light of various ideas and 
techniques taken from Stanislavskian and Chekhovian acting practices. My background 
in performance and acting has allowed me to see the potentials in these often 
humanistic theories’ to be reconceptualised in a way that aligns with posthumanist 
approaches. I therefore discuss how we might begin to “posthumanise” such techniques, 
drawing on entanglement and post-anthropocentrism. This is the first theme that I 
demonstrate has the capacity to be “posthumanised” in this thesis.  
In doing so, I recognise that although there are problems viewing certain types 
of performance as posthuman, there are also many potentials. I therefore demonstrate 
how performance helps illuminate posthuman entanglements and vice versa, how 
posthuman ideas can illuminate performance practices29. This also allows a 
reconsideration of the relationship between actor and character, and could therefore 
have further implications within theatre studies. 
																																																						
29 I do not use the word practices here to denote a sociological meaning, but instead to identify acting as a 
particularly specific profession or engagement. 
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I begin by offering a brief overview of other forms of posthuman performance 
that have previously been explored. As Kroker (2012: 1) states, ‘[w]e are literally 
drifting through many different specular performances of the body’ and I suggest that 
the embodied gamer represents one such performance. However, in order to examine 
this notion of performance in more depth, this chapter seeks to address posthuman 
performance from a different perspective, specifically focusing on the idea of a 
posthumanised acting theory. I therefore then move on to explain my own 
posthumanising of traditionally humanist acting theories, before applying this to 
fieldnotes that demonstrate an analysis of the posthuman subjectivity experienced in the 
game. 
 
Previous explorations of posthuman performance 
The concept of “posthuman performance” has gathered attention from various fields in 
the past few decades, as performers find new ways of disrupting the sanctity of the 
“self” in various ways. Examples include works that question authorship, and focus on 
process (see Wood 2012 for her work on a collaborative method of devising); the 
fragmentation of self and our inherent strive for wholeness (see Scheer 2012 for an 
analysis of Scenario, an immersion in an Advanced Visualisation and Interactive 
Environment); and those that augment and adjust the body of the performer through 
machinic interventions (see Paul 2002 for analysis of Eduardo Kac’s Time Capsule 
where Kac implanted a microchip into his leg and registered himself as both “animal” 
and “owner” in an online animal identification database originally designed for tracking 
lost pets). There has been a recent swathe of performances that integrate advanced 
technology into their productions, and these range in style and substance across both 
large and small theatre companies. Examples include the Royal Shakespeare 
Company’s 2016-2017 production of The Tempest, produced in collaboration with Intel 
to present the first ever holographic character of Ariel, to smaller companies such as 
Pipeline Theatre’s show Spillikin. Spillikin features a “robothespian”, a ‘life sized 
humanoid robot designed for human interaction in a public environment’ (Engineered 
Arts 2017) as a device to explore our increasing intimacy with machines by presenting 
the subject matter of a man who creates a robot replica of himself to keep his wife 
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company when he dies. Theorists and practitioners have explored everything from 
extreme physical augmentations (Stelarc’s Ping Body as an obvious example, which 
played with the notion of distributed agency; Stelarc’s body was attached to a robotic 
device that converted “pings” from internet users who interacted with the art online into 
physical movements) to their digital counterparts (such as Orlan’s Self-hybridation 
series, see Gomoll 2011 for discussion). Causey’s (2006: 51) work discusses the 
potentials of posthuman performance through virtual spaces whilst arguing that 
‘[p]erformance theory fails postorganic and posthuman performance […and] 
[p]ostorganic performance fails performance theory’. Accordingly, Causey (2006: 51) 
invites us to rethink the ontology of performance to extend it into virtual domains, but 
to remain critical of postorganic performance. 
Further links between technology and performance have been made by a variety 
of practitioners in insightful ways, exploring aspects such as liveness and presence (e.g. 
Auslander 1999), space and time (e.g. Brooks 2010) and virtual and physical 
embodiment (e.g. Broadhurst 2012; Ford 2007; Kozel 2007). Some have argued that the 
integration of certain forms of media distort the very ontology of performance; Phelan’s 
1993 text Unmarked: The Politics of Performance argued that ‘[p]erformance’s only 
life is in the present’ and that to record or document performance betrayed and lessened 
it’s promise (Phelan 1993: 146). Meanwhile, others have demonstrated the very 
effective (and affective) integrations that have been created between performance and 
technology, from Blast Theory’s Can You See Me Now, an online and offline “chase” 
game where runners in the physical world would try and track those who were 
navigated a map of the same space online, to Chunky Move’s Glow, an interaction 
between dance and response projection technology (see Klich and Scheer 2012; 
Giannachi 2004; Chapple and Kattenbelt 2006 for more examples and analysis). 
In his book Digital Performance, Dixon (2007: 601) considered aspects of 
overlap between digital games and performance and surmised that it was possible to 
‘draw close correspondences readily between theater [sic] and videogames’. He argued 
that the similarities extended through aspects of narrative, character development, and 
tasks or missions that are time based and in specific environments (Dixon 2007: 601-
602). Elsewhere, Parker-Starbuck’s (2011: 4) work on cyborg theatre ‘provides one 
mode of analysis for these integrations’ between performers and technologies, drawing 
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on the subject as an already fragmented and hybridised being. Her work is influential in 
that rather than focussing on the technologies as the focal point of “cyborg” 
performances she is instead intrigued by the relationships that occur when bodies and 
technologies are in close proximity to one another (Parker-Starbuck 2011).  
These latter works are similar to my own work using posthumanism to theorise 
the relationship between avatar and gamer. However, in theorising the posthuman I am 
drawn to explore how we can analyse posthuman subjectivity in a way that sheds light 
on how our intra-actions operate and are experienced on a more “individual” scale 
(whilst equally arguing such individuality is a problematic proposal). Where Parker-
Starbuck (2011), for example, examines the relationality that different forms of cyborg 
theatre embody in their work, my focus is on how such relationality is experienced from 
within those intra-actions. Causey (2006: 47) asks pertinent questions, such as ‘[w]hat 
are the processes of performance and performativity in virtual domains?’ but in the 
following chapter I examine my own autoethnographic fieldnotes to instead consider 
“what are the processes of posthumanism in virtual domains?” and suggest performance 
might be one answer to this complex question. 
Popat and Palmer (2005: 50) suggest that in collaboration between performance 
and digital technology, ‘if the technology is integrated into the performance (and vice 
versa) then the two will be simultaneously readable through their creative synthesis’. 
This suggests a rhizomatic treatment of different components; rather than viewing 
technology as a gimmick or as a separate entity in performance we should ‘experience 
such work as a fusion, not a con-fusion, of realms, a fusion that we see as taking place 
within a digital environment that incorporates the live elements as part of its raw 
material’ (Auslander 1999: 42). This “creative synthesis” and “fusion” is the aim of 
both the actor in synthesis with their character (aiming to integrate the “technology” of 
the script and stage into their performance), and the gamer in synthesis with the avatar 
(and the mechanics of the game). 
This synthesis can be viewed in posthuman terms, acknowledging and 
embracing the inseparability between notions of self, other and environment, and 
displacing the boundaries and differences that are implied between “binary” categories 
of human and non-human (Braidotti 2013: 89). The ‘displacement of the lines of 
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demarcation’ that Braidotti (2013: 89) refers to could easily be applied to, for example, 
the lines that “separate” avatar and gamer, but also the lines that separate actor, 
character, script, director and so on. 
As previously stated, situating a study of posthuman performance in an 
MMORPG gaming environment is important in accounting for a form of digital 
augmentation that is widely accessible and available, yet has strong potential for deep 
philosophical explorations. Furthermore, exploring gaming as an example of posthuman 
performance has much potential, and a variety of examples and angles could be 
employed. Whitlock (2004; 2005), for example, explores the comparisons between 
forum theatre and MMORPGs and MacCallum-Stewart and Parsler (2011) look 
specifically to the role playing aspects of World of Warcraft. 
In my research, rather than focussing on the interaction between performer and 
audience the focus is instead the intra-action between avatar and gamer as a posthuman 
entanglement, and (in this chapter) how acting theories might help to analyse this 
experience and demonstrate what practices facilitate the emergence of this specific 
subjectivity. Drawing on acting theories, I examine the ways that the avatar-gamer 
provides us with an example to clearly consider the entanglement of “self” and “other”, 
in order to demonstrate how these categories are not ontologically distinct. By applying 
the work of theatre practitioners Stanislavsky and Chekhov to fieldnotes gathered from 
my autoethnographic immersion in World of Warcraft I am able to analyse this 
(posthuman) gaming practice in performative terms, and in doing so demonstrate how 
we might rework traditionally “humanist” approaches such as acting theory (focussing 
on, for example, mastery, autonomy, and control; explored in more depth below) in 
order to account for and analyse entangled relationships. I draw mainly on the work of 
theatre practitioners Stanislavsky and Chekhov not because they are the only 
practitioners whose work is relevant or applicable – far from it – but because 
considering my fieldnotes in response to their work allows for an analysis that 
demonstrates the complexity of the entanglement that occurs between intra-acting 
agents. It could also be argued that such an analysis could enable posthumanist ideas to 




Below I aim to provide a theory of posthuman acting that negotiates the agency 
that “performers” experience as being both beyond and between the self, inseparable 
from the context in which they operate.  
 
Posthumanising acting 
Constantin Stanislavsky (1863-1938) and Michael Chekhov (1891-1955) were two 
theatre practitioners whose work on acting methods were among the first to explore the 
work of the actor as one that incorporated the character they wished to portray in a 
“psychophysical” way. Stanislavsky is hailed as the father of modern acting techniques 
for his work in moving acting towards a more “naturalistic” style. Requiring his 
students to draw on their own “emotion memory” in order to embody particular states 
of mind, his later work then followed with the “Method of Physical Action” which 
incorporated the importance of a physical dedication to a particular role (Gordon 1987). 
All of his techniques were designed to create a synthesis between actor and character, 
such that the performance became a culmination of their commitment to the part (see, 
for example, Stanislavsky 1937). Stanislavsky hailed Chekhov as his ‘most brilliant 
pupil’ (Merlin 2001: xx), and Chekhov’s work continued to explore the possibilities of 
the creativity afforded through a physical and psychological commitment to embodying 
a particular role.  
What do these techniques have to do with posthumanism, and what can they tell 
us about the avatar-gamer? It is my suggestion that these examples of the consideration 
of acting theory from the late 19th and early 20th century can be used to analyse 
comparatively what is taking place between the avatar and gamer and thus shed light on 
how posthuman subjectivity is experienced as distributed and intra-dependent. In the 
following, I outline my approach to posthuman acting as an analytic device. 
To consider approaches to acting as posthuman is not without its problems, due 
to their historic placement in a humanistic culture, embedded with ‘the values of liberal 
humanism – a coherent, rational self, the right of that self to autonomy and freedom, 
and a sense of agency linked with a belief in enlightened self-interest’ (Hayles 1999: 
85-86). However, I believe there are certain potentials that make it worth pursuing. As 
Causey (2006: 51) states, ‘[w]hat the mediated technologies afford performance theory 
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is the opportunity to think against the grain of traditional performance ontology’ and as 
such, this chapter reconsiders certain ideas inherent within performance studies and 
acting theories, whilst drawing on others. For example, certain acting philosophies draw 
heavily on the influences of external stimuli and train an actor to be open to the 
stimulus provided by audiences, environments and others. In his advice to those 
creating a character, for example, Chekhov (2014 [1953]: 31-32) instructs actors to 
follow the characters’ ‘emotions, desires, feelings, thoughts; open yourself to it so that 
its inner life will influence your own inner life’.  
These methods, therefore, begin to capitalise on some of the aspects of 
posthumanism discussed above, embracing the entanglement of the actor and actively 
asserting that a performance is the culmination of a variety of intra-acting elements. 
Stanislavsky’s work could also be considered to have some posthuman characteristics 
as he states that ‘[t]he fundamental aim of our art is the creation of this inner life of a 
human spirit, and its expression in an artistic form’ (1937: 14). To draw on Hayles’ 
(1999: 3) definition of the posthuman as an ‘amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous 
components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous 
construction and reconstruction’ (1999: 3), we might consider the “creation of this inner 
life” as the amalgam of “material” body of the actor and the “informational” script 
being brought together with the actor ‘consciously creating the character’s 
circumstances that are suggested by the playwright and director […] unconsciously 
placing himself in the character’s world, feeling his real feelings, […] embodying the 
physical and emotional character’ (Gordon 1987: 53-54). This suggests a sense of the 
intra-dependence between actor and character that might be ideally sought in 
performance. 
However, one of the main problems with a view of performance or acting as 
posthuman is that although the actor is guided to draw on and incorporate aspects 
beyond the “self” (as above, incorporating the character’s circumstances, suggestions 
from the director, and embodying specific emotions), there is still a sense of the actor 
being in control, a rational subject at the centre of this negotiation, consciously creating 
the character: ‘all action in the theatre must have an inner justification, be logical, 
coherent and real’ (Stanislavsky 1937: 46). There is a sense in acting that the desired 
state is a performance that comes “naturally”, a synthesis of each element of 
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performance seamlessly integrating or, I would suggest, intra-acting. We can see this 
through Stanislavsky’s (1937: 13) assertion that ‘it all moves of its own accord, 
subconsciously and intuitively’. On the one hand, Stanislavsky (1937: 13) declares that 
‘[w]e cannot enter into that [subconscious] realm’. However, there is a suggestion in 
actor training that certain techniques can be applied to ‘elements which are subject to 
consciousness and will’, and that ‘[t]hese accessible parts are capable in turn of acting 
on psychic processes that are involuntary’ (Stanislavsky 1937: 13, my emphasis). 
Stanislavsky (1937) therefore proposes that the work of an actor is partly controlled by 
the conscious decisions and actions that the actor takes, but is also open to 
subconscious, involuntary creativity. Furthermore, Chekhov (2014 [1953]: 2-6) states 
that one of the requirements of the acting profession is ‘complete obedience of both 
body and psychology to the actor. […] Only an indisputable command of his body and 
psychology will give him the necessary self-confidence, freedom of harmony for his 
creative activity’ that again suggests an emphasis on more humanistic approaches. 
Elsewhere, Stanislavsky (1937: 267) suggests that when acting it is: 
 
necessary to have a pilot to direct us. As you become more experienced you will 
find the work of this pilot largely automatic. Suppose an actor is in perfect 
possession of his faculties on the stage. His mood is so complete that he can 
dissect its component parts without getting out of his role. They are all 
functioning properly, facilitating one another’s operations. Then there is a slight 
discrepancy. Immediately the act investigates to see which part is out of order. 
He finds the mistake and corrects it. Yet all the time he can easily continue to 
play his part even while he is observing himself. Salvini said: “An actor lives, 
weeps and laughs on the stage, and all the while he is watching his own tears 
and smiles. It is this double function, this balance between life and acting that 
makes his art.” 
 
This idea of a pilot, able to dissect the component parts of a performance and 
acting in perfect possession of one’s faculties is, of course, a highly humanistic view, 
suggesting rational and conscious control: an actor able to correct and regulate their 
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performance. This demonstrates the somewhat contradictory sense of autonomy that is 
prevalent throughout some acting theories – the actor both reliant on their subconscious, 
but attempting to “control” it – ‘[o]ur subconscious power cannot function without its 
own engineer – our conscious technique’ (Stanislavsky 1937: 15). 
A conception of posthuman acting would, therefore, complicate this idea of the 
actor being the master of their art and instead focus on and extend the aspects that 
destabilise notions of “self” and “other” between the actor and their character and 
environment. This enables a reading of Stanislavsky that views his ideas of the creative 
work of an actor as an emergent posthuman subjectivity, an intra-action of character, 
actor, environment, director etc. where each entity influences and is influenced by the 
intra-actions that have formed them and the performance is an emergent embodiment of 
these entities in harmony. For example, Fauconnier and Turner (2008: 266) state that 
dramatic performances are deliberate blends of the life of the actor and the life of the 
character. This “deliberate blend” could again be considered to constitute Hayles’ 
(1999: 3) posthuman amalgam. 
In the below sections I utilise the potentials of posthuman acting. Drawing on 
particular instances of gameplay that demonstrate the enmeshed and extended sense of 
being of the avatar-gamer entanglement, I analyse these in relation to specific examples 
of acting theory and demonstrate how we can “posthumanise” these theories further. 
This enables an analysis that doesn’t simply claim the gamer-as-posthuman, but that 
begins to consider how we can make sense of such experiences. Drawing on the ways in 
which the avatar-gamer relationship goes beyond merely objective interactions between 
“self” and “other” I show how the subjectivity that arises is instead a complex, 
embodied, intra-action between different components. In a posthumanised view of 
performance, the avatar is more than a tool or external counterpart, it is an implicit 
component in the agency that is possible. This is an important aspect of understanding 
the subjectivity between character/actor or avatar/gamer not as components wherein one 
entity “represents” the other on stage or in game, but where these entities rely on one 
another for ‘the conception and birth of a new being – the person in the part’ 
(Stanislavsky 1937: 312) or the posthuman subjectivity that emerges from and through 
this phenomenon. In the second part of the analysis I then consider how the fieldnotes 
demonstrate the “blurring” between the roles that each component embodies. Viewing 
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the capabilities of avatar and gamer as only arising through their intra-action with one 
another I therefore demonstrate how the complication of “self” and “other” in this 
relationship is an apt example of how these bifurcations are false. 
 
Entangled with Etyme 
My own experience in performance began at a young age when I performed in a series 
of variety shows and pantomimes from around the age of 10, before going on to study 
for graded LAMDA (London Academy of Music and Dramatic Arts) accredited exams 
in ‘The Speaking of Verse and Prose’ and ‘Drama’. I continued with these exams for 
around 10 years, completing the LAMDA Certificate in Speech and Drama: 
Performance. Alongside these exams I undertook firstly my GCSE in Drama, then a 
National Diploma in Performing Arts at college, and a degree in Performance Studies 
and Drama. I have performed with various theatre companies over the years and during 
my PhD. The experience that I have spanning over 15 years and my performances of 
roles on stage grants me some embodied understanding of the relationship between 
actor and character, and taking part in both acting and gaming alongside one another 
has allowed me particular insights on how the two practices relate to one another. 
However, beyond this natural inclination, I have tried to provide explicit examples that 
demonstrate an analysis of the posthuman practice of gaming in performative terms. 
There are some basic and useful correspondences that should be mentioned 
when considering the performance of actor and gamer (see Laurel 2013 for a 
comprehensive overview of the performative aspects of human-computer interaction). 
For example, although, as stated above, I do not specifically explore the interaction (or 
intra-action) between the audience and the performer, in an MMORPG that comparison 
is possible. Whereas single-player games are often played in isolation (although this 
trend is changing with the increasing popularity of channels dedicated to footage of 
“play-throughs” that follow a gamer’s journey through a game) the MMORPG allows 
real-time spectatorship of other players, as you inhabit the same (virtual) space. The 
MMORPG environment therefore allows an “audience” to view the portrayal of an 
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avatar30. There is evidently an element of “performance” from this perspective too 
when avatar-gamers stand in front of avatar-gamers and enact certain pre-defined 
“emotes” in game, such as dancing or laughing. Furthermore, the initial gameplay set 
up could be used by the gamer as a form of “script” – it offers insights and information 
about the “backstory” for gamers to glean knowledge about their environment, race, 
class etc. and how this might go on to inform and shape their gameplay. 
The “RPG” of MMORPG refers to role-playing game, and in World of Warcraft 
different playing styles are accommodated in different “realms”. In player-versus-
environment (PvE) realms the player is, as the name suggests, playing against the 
environment – monsters and non-playing characters. The second playing style is player-
versus-player (PvP), where players of opposing factions can attack each other at 
random within certain areas of the gameworld and without having to formally challenge 
one another or enter battlegrounds or arenas that are specifically designed for that 
purpose. In role-playing (RP) realms there are extra social rules for players to adhere to 
that are specifically in place to enhance the sense of consistently acting out or 
performing a character. My own gameplay takes place in PvE realms, with extra 
involvement in PvP battlegrounds. However, as I discuss below, the integration of 
different histories, geographies and aesthetics afforded to different races and classes 
within the game provides ample backstory for the avatar’s role, without the use of a 
specific “role-playing” realm. 
Another overlap between theatre and games is the phenomenon of “pronoun 
play” that occurs between character/actor, avatar/gamer slipping between referring to 
the character or avatar variously as “I”, “she”, “we”. Hand (2005: 215) explains this 
blurring of objective and subjective as  ‘how the multiple dialects – external versus 
internal, objective versus subjective, active versus passive and so on – are complicated 
in the worlds of performance and gaming’ thus demonstrating again the ways in which 
these positions are reliant on one another31. The below fieldnotes expand on these initial 
overlaps to analyse the gaming experience through specific themes that relate to acting 
theory. 
																																																						
30 This therefore demonstrates the applicability of Goffman’s (1990 [1959]) dramaturgical analysis of the 
presentation of self to online contexts. 




Knowing the part 
Another of the initial ways in which both game mechanics and gaming experience are 
similar to the work required to perform a role on stage are the ways in which both 
gamer and actor must familiarise themselves with the part they are playing. 
In order for an actor to be able to play a part “correctly” one of the most 
important things, according to Stanislavsky (1937), was for them to first of all study the 
text in depth to understand their character’s “given circumstances”. These are the 
circumstances given within the script of the play, and tell both actor and audience the 
situation in which the story of the play takes place. They are ‘the facts, the details for 
which there is no discussion. They are your foundation for building a character’ 
(McGaw et al. 2007: 154). The actor will also go through the script in order to learn 
more about their individual character, judging by what they say and how they act, as 
well as gleaning information from what other characters say about them. These “given 
circumstances” give the actor an insight into the world of their character, their 
temperament and personality. 
We can see how this relates to the initial foray into World of Warcraft through 
the character choices that you are given at the beginning of the character creation. The 
opportunity to choose from a series of different races and classes is facilitated through 
the on-screen information available from the game which gives an initial insight into 





The way in which Stanislavsky discusses the engagement with the given 
circumstances for a particular role when acting can be considered in relation to gaming. 
Stanislavsky (1937: 51-52) states that the given circumstances provided by the play and 
the specific production you are are a part of provides a general outline of the character 
and their circumstances, and that in order to perform “sincere” emotions for that 
character you must believe in their life ‘and then become so accustomed to it that you 
feel yourself close to it’. In the same way, when a gamer is confronted with the initial 
information provided by the game this shapes the whole playing style that is enabled 
through those choices. Whilst it may not be necessary to embody the whole backstory 
of a race (as we will see later in this chapter) it is nevertheless essential that the player 
understands the different roles that those races and professions play in order to choose a 
character that embodies a particular playing style (for example whether one wants to 
play as an attacker, a healer, a magical being, etc.).  
The initial choices of what and how to play were something that I was unsure 
about myself and this is apparent in my fieldnotes. The below extract is from the first 
fieldnote that I wrote, and briefly explains the way I chose my avatar race and class: 
 
As I log in and the game begins I am prompted to create a new character. 
Already the story begins to surround me, as I read the different specifications of 
This item has been removed due to Data Protection.This item has been 
removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can 
be found in the Lanchester Library, Coventry University
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character types and class. I feel sure that some players carefully research their 
character choice, reading up on the abilities of them all. I, however, have read 
Johnstone’s (1981) book, Impro, and after a cursory read of character 
specifications, I decide to go with my initial instinct, rather than thinking things 
through too heavily. […] I decide on a Blood Elf, and customise my character, 
editing skin colour, face, hair style, hair colour and even earrings. I am pale 
with green slightly glowing eyes, and I take on the class of “Hunter”, a ranged 




I’m not even sure if I am lying to you. I’m terrible at making decisions; for every 
decision I make, I know I will have the worry of whether it was the right one. 
Improvisation promotes spontaneity as a rejection of society’s expectations of 
you which make you question the legitimacy/appropriateness of your choices 
and actions (Johnstone 1981: 75-108). I would like to think I go with my gut. In 
fact, the process is probably more heavily influenced by society than I care to 
admit. 
 
As Stanislavsky (1937) states, the study of the script and the given 
circumstances is in order to come to know the part an actor is playing intimately. As the 
above fieldnote suggests one of the ways in which the concept of given circumstances 
differs between performance play and gameplay is that through performing a play you 
already know the situations that you will navigate as a character, whereas in gaming 
there is no immediate way of knowing this. You are given some initial information and 
much visual stimuli but the act of getting to know the character in gaming differs from 
the traditional choosing of a role in most acting experiences as the role is not already 
laid out. In the type of acting I am discussing here, the script is already laid out, the 
main events are already set in stone and therefore the characters’ journeys are pre-
defined. There are choices to be made for each performer to consider how they might 
enact the given circumstances and embody them, and each performance will adjust in 
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line with a particular artistic vision from director, producer, environment etc. (for 
example, some theatrical productions may choose to update the time or place that a play 
was originally set, such as many Shakespeare performances that are reconceived for a 
contemporary audience). Nevertheless, the events remain the same. In World of 
Warcraft, the potential events may be fixed by the game mechanics, but the choice as to 
which you will engage with, and where you might end up, are much more open – there 
is ‘a greater capacity for emergent action in the contingent space opened up between the 
player and rules of the game as they play’ (Ash 2012a: 12). Whilst some things must 
progress in a linear fashion, the open world style means that no two journeys will be the 
same. Therefore, although there are certain “given circumstances” available much of 
the circumstances evolve throughout gameplay, and the gamer cannot know all of the 
circumstances as, unlike in a play, they are not yet fixed, and constantly evolve with 
game updates. However, the importance of the basis of the circumstances you are given 
in the game are still fundamental – as stated above, choosing to play as a Blood Elf 
Hunter enables a particular playing style and range of quests that another race or class 
would not experience. 
In order to understand World of Warcraft and the game that you are engaged in 
it is necessary to understand your role. Gaining knowledge about the world, the game, 
the class and race of your avatar and the background of World of Warcraft is something 
that many players continue to do throughout their gameplay, via forums and avenues 
outside of the game itself as well as in game. The notion of given circumstances is an 
intriguing aspect of acting to consider from a posthuman perspective. On the one hand 
this notion might be seen to demonstrate humanist ideals of knowledge and self-
mastery, however, it could also be considered as an example of being open to influence 
from “external” factors, thus demonstrating a permeable being that could be conceived 
as post-anthropocentric through its intra-action with these “non-human” factors. We can 
see this fluctuation between the ways that the actor is either in control of, or constrained 
by, the character in the following statement: 
 
[i]n the analysis phase, you are making conscious decisions about every aspect 
of your character. In rehearsals, however, you simply know who “you” are. This 
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leaves you free to explore objectives, to work against obstacles, and to make 
tactical decisions through the eyes of your character. (McGaw et al. 2007: 155) 
 
To consider this from a posthuman perspective, I draw on Pepperell. Pepperell’s 
analogy is that “the human” has a “fuzzy” edge, ‘profoundly dependent into its 
surroundings’ (2003: 20). He states that ‘where humanists saw themselves as distinct 
beings in an antagonistic relationship with their surroundings, posthumans regard their 
own being as embodied in an extended technological world’ (Pepperell 2003: 152). By 
arguing for an acknowledgement of our reliance on and intra-action with our 
environments, Pepperell (2003: 22) claims that ‘we can never determine the absolute 
boundary of the human, either physically or mentally. In this sense, nothing can be 
external to a human because the extent of a human can’t be fixed’ (original emphasis). 
The above fieldnote is also interesting in its illumination of the multiplicity of 
selves that are experienced in the game as it begins to move between different positions 
– initially exuding a certain confidence, it then moves into a more reflexive style, before 
acknowledging that the idea of improvisation being free from societal bounds is 
problematic. Whilst these sections do not illuminate a particular aspect of posthuman 
performance, they nevertheless demonstrate the multiple subject positions that occur in 
and throughout the fieldnotes, and the impact of external influences on the “choices” 
that are made in-game. This therefore demonstrates the same ambivalence between 
analysis and performance raised above. 
 
Blending roles beyond the script  
The relationship that I have built with my avatar is one that acknowledges our ability to 
act within the game as arising from our entanglement. The fluctuation between the 
“me” and “she” is constant, a we/she/me/I negotiation that never quite stabilises, and I 
have written about these experiences elsewhere (see Wilde 2015; Wilde and Evans 
2017). From a posthuman perspective, and drawing on Barad’s (2007) work in this area, 
the sense of difference that occurs when an “I” or “she” is employed is not something 
that separates “subject” from “object” or “self” from “other” but is in fact implicit 
within the entanglements of components. As Barad (2007: ix) states, ‘[i]ndividuals do 
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not preexist their interactions; rather, individuals emerge through and as part of their 
entangled intra-relating’. As such the idea of the “human” as being a separate entity, 
removed from or “pre-existing” society, culture, others, technologies etc. is flawed. 
However, through our specific intra-actions with other entities in specific contexts, a 
particular set of potentials emerges and this creates a sense of “individuality” amongst 
components. Thus, the sense of agency I experience is contextual: ‘distinct agencies do 
not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action’ (Barad 2007: 33). What I can 
do in game is only possible through the avatar, and vice versa. Our capabilities 
therefore emerge through our intra-action with each other.  
The subjective relationship between avatar and gamer is also interesting in the 
way that it develops. These relationships are specific to the entities that form them, and 
my own imagination plays a vital part in personalising that experience as I creatively 
read characteristics into the avatar32. This is demonstrated in the following fieldnote: 
 
When I log in I watch Etyme for a while, not for the first time inspecting her 
animate body. The avatars in World of Warcraft aren’t usually completely still – 
if you stop “controlling” their actions they do not freeze, statue-like, but instead 
stop, human-like, with some small movements, some restless presence at play 
behind them. Etyme always strikes me as somewhat haughty when I watch her, a 
bit aloof with a somewhat bored demeanour. In a way I find her actions kind 
of… cute. It’s kind of like she is waiting for me to come and adventure or play 
with her. She’s not keen on the standing around admiring how good we look – 
there are things to be done out there! As I write this I realise just how much of a 
character she is to me, the kind of life she has taken on of her own. 
 
Reading this in performance terms it is illuminating to consider how Stanislavsky 
(1937: 52-53) theorised the work of an actor: 
 
																																																						




we bring to life what is hidden under the words; we put our own thoughts into 
the author’s lines, and we establish our own relationships to other characters in 
the play, and the conditions of their lives; we filter through ourselves all the 
materials that we receive from the author and the director; we work over them, 
supplanting them out of our own imagination. That material becomes part of us, 
spiritually, and even physically; our emotions are sincere, and as a final result 
we have truly productive activity – all of which is closely interwoven with the 
implications of the play. 
 
These ideas are indicative of the process by which my relationship with Etyme 
develops. Taking on board the story of her Blood Elf race as a proud people, resilient 
and ruthless, and the requirements of her class (Hunter) could be considered as the 
“words” and “lines” of the game, the “script” and in our incorporation certain aspects 
have been “brought to life”. Linking this to Stanislavsky’s above quote suggests that I 
have “worked over” the integration of certain physical moves and gestures that the 
game has provided the avatar with, for example tilting her head or shifting her weight, 
and I have “supplanted” them with a “haughty”, “aloof” and “bored” demeanour, and a 
personality33. For me, this negotiation between the avatar, gamer, game mechanics, and 
game narrative is akin to the negotiation between the character, actor, director, writer, 
and script. Both create the epitome of the posthuman subject – Hayles’ (1999) 
amalgam, an assemblage of different parts that are interwoven and come together both 
through materiality and information that are in constant flux and negotiation. However, 
it could be argued that such an analysis again falls back into humanist ideals, as 
Stanislavsky’s words suggest a rationality and mastery over these incorporations of the 
“other”. Again this demonstrates the tension within the analytic of posthuman acting 
that I acknowledged above. Some aspects of Stanislavsky’s (1937: 52) work seems to 
rely heavily on our entwinement with stimuli (e.g. ‘that material becomes a part of us’) 
but still embeds an anthropocentric view of these incorporations. 
If we instead consider the characterisation of Etyme as that which has arisen 
																																																						
33 This is representative of Stanislavsky’s earlier work that focussed more on the mental analysis and 
preparation of an actor, whereas his latter work moved to more embodied methods rooted in adopting the 
physicality of a character. 
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from our entanglement, we can view this in a posthuman way. In a similar way that 
Blackman (2012: 46) proposes the ‘self has been decentred and distributed, 
destabilized, disrupted, fragmented and aligned with process, rather than the 
localization and organization of inner structural determinants’ (my emphasis), so too is 
the posthuman subjectivity emergent and based within particular contexts and intra-
actions. Although referred to as separate from the self in sections of fieldnotes (through 
the use of “her”, “Etyme”, “she”) I also refer to how good “we” look. Furthermore, as 
Barad (2007) argues, phenomena are the intra-action between elements, but without the 
one, the other one does not exist. It is through their intermingling that certain qualities 
come to light. As such it might be suggested that the shifting of the avatar body that is 
read by me as a “bored” and “haughty” demeanour demonstrates one way in which the 
character becomes an enactment or posthuman subjectivity that ‘emerge through and as 
part of their entangled intra-relating’ (Barad 2007: ix). This posthuman subjectivity is, 
therefore, an example of “phenomena” – the ‘ontological inseparability of agentially 
intra-acting components’ (Barad 2007: 33).  
This sense of the adjustment of avatar and gamer in alignment with one another, 
building a subjectivity or “character” that arises from their intra-action, continues 
throughout gameplay in a variety of ways. In gaming, there has to be a sense of the 
avatar and gamer’s goals being incorporated, and elsewhere in this thesis (Chapter 6: 
Enacting Empathy) I consider this as an empathic flow between the desires of avatar 
and gamer (see also Wilde 2015; Wilde and Evans 2017). My own experiences of these 
goals being aligned are often most evident when there is a sense of proficiency within 
the game: 
 
In anticipation of entering the battleground, standing around with the other 
players I switch my helmet, gearing up for the battle ahead. This act somehow 
heightens my anticipation, making me feel more prepared and eager. When we 
are able to cross the threshold and enter the battleground, it takes me a moment 
to get used to it, to the mayhem of running around and attempting to attack 
enemy players. Warsong Gulch is a capture the flag type battleground and so 
there are no bases to be fought over. […] What strikes me during this 
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battleground is how long it takes the enemy players to take me down when they 
attack me. Usually I fall quickly, seemingly, as other players flood to attack me. 
But in this instance I seem to be holding my own somehow – oh of course 
inevitably I die, don't get me wrong. But there is a significant pause as I stride 
purposefully backwards, shooting my attackers with swift blows and unleashing 
my beasts upon them. I “disengage” by hitting the “=” button and leaping 
backwards away from those who hound me, putting crucial distance between us. 
 
We could consider this as a form of what Stanislavsky terms “living the part”. He 
states: ‘[t]o play truly means to be right, logical, coherent, to think, strive, feel and act 
in unison with your role’ (Stanislavsky 1937: 14). Although this could be viewed as 
problematic through its apparently humanist execution (being rational, and seemingly 
“in control”) we can nevertheless see posthuman potential here. Viewing the part not as 
an “other” but as an entity whom the actor is entwined with, the artistic “performance” 
demonstrates the inability to separate actor and character. Stanislavsky (1937: 14) 
continues that the actors’ 
 
job is not to present merely the external qualities to the life of this other person, 
and pour into it all of his own soul. The fundamental aim of our art is the 
creation of this inner life of a human spirit, and its expression in an artistic form. 
 
Again, although the idea of a “human spirit” could be perceived as problematic to a 
posthuman reading through its anthropocentrism, the acknowledgement of the 
importance of this “non-human other” (i.e. a fictional character tangible only through 
the script) could be explored as an example to understand the potentials for the way in 
which ‘[p]osthuman subjectivity reshapes the identity of humanistic practices, by 
stressing heteronomy and multi-faceted relationality, instead of autonomy and self-
referential disciplinary purity’ (Braidotti 2013: 145). 
Such stresses on heteronomy and multi-faceted relationality are demonstrated by 
the ways in which the gamer is influenced and implicated in the webs of connection 
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with “others” within the game, guided by quests, non-playing characters, and affects. 
This is akin to Stanislavsky’s analysis of a “fully creative actor” as one who 
consciously incorporates the suggestions of the playwright and director, and embodies 
the character physically and emotionally (Gordon 1987: 53-54). I suggest that such 
work embodies an entangled, distributed, post-anthropocentric and therefore posthuman 
performance. Furthermore, the “I” that occurs in the fieldnote here refers to an “I” 
arising from the avatar-gamer entanglement, and does not indicate any sense of 
separation between “human” or “non-human” elements (in the same way that the 
theatrical entanglement of character and actor becomes an emergent “I” that is an 
incorporation of both). In comparison to the earlier fieldnote this demonstrates the 
multiplicity of selves or “non-unitary identities” that the fieldnotes incorporate. 
Read through performance terms, in acting, all of the work on the character and 
the engagement in their life, feelings, moods, rhythms and ways of navigating the role 
can, in an ideal scenario, lend the actor to feel a sense of kinship and “oneness” with the 
character. They will say whether or not they feel that their character would do this or 
that, and feel themselves intimately connected with the role: ‘[y]ou will be able to 
detect in your characters those fine but fugitive features which nobody but you, the 
actor, can see and, as a consequence, reveal to your audiences’ (Chekhov 2014 [1953]: 
5). The above fieldnote demonstrates the ways in which I have found Chekhov’s 
“fugitive features” within Etyme, accepting and embracing these and incorporating 
them into a construction of “self” that arises between material and immaterial entities. 
In the same way as an actor distinguishes these features in a character, opening oneself 
up to such influences is readable as a form entwined, post-anthropocentric 
posthumanism. By viewing our entanglements as the lack of an ‘independent, self 
contained existence’ (Barad 2007: ix) we can see how posthuman subjectivity is a 
mutual construction. More than just inter-acting with an “other” this builds a 
subjectivity that is intra-dependent on other components, without judging their part as 
less worthy because they are “less human”. 
In the same way, the lines that divide script and actor, actor and director, 
character and actor in the performance of a character in the theatre might also be 
considered to be unhelpful separations. Posthumanising performance in this way has 
interesting implications for our understanding of acting theories, which have called for 
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a blurring between “self” and “other” in performance even without the label of 
“posthumanism” being applied. As McGaw et al. (2007: 155) state: 
 
[s]tage productions that contain living, vital characters result from a melding of 
the creative talents of the actor and the dramatist. Any argument over which of 
the two is more important is fruitless because they are completely 
interdependent. The actor relies on the character created by the dramatist to 
provide an essential, continuing stimulus and source of inspiration. On the other 
hand, without the actor to bring it to life, the dramatist’s character will remain 
dormant on the pages of the script. The final creation is the result of a true 
collaboration – a marriage of sorts – between actor and dramatist. 
 
Although this suggests a more anthropocentric approach – focusing on dramatist rather 
than character per se – it does demonstrate some sense of the intra-dependence at play. I 
would extend this argument to the actor and the character as its own entity. The theatre 
performance might also therefore be considered an example of ‘entangled material 
agencies’ (Barad 2007: 56) where actor and character and dramatist are intra-dependent 
on one another. To explore the entanglement of the actor and character in the theatre 
along these lines would trouble the notion of a pre-existing subject-object divide of “the 
performer” and “the performed”. Instead, it is only through performance that a 
boundary-drawing practice occurs, ‘that make some identities or attributes intelligible 
(determinate) to the exclusion of others’ (Barad 2007: 208). If, as Barad (2007: 208) 
states, ‘[p]henomena are inseparable from their apparatuses of bodily production’ then 
we might extend the above analysis in order to demonstrate that the phenomena of the 
character is inseparable from that of the performer. However, this is then equally 
applicable vice versa, as what makes the “performer” intelligible in their own right is 
also a form of relational ontology that produces ‘“objects” and “subjects” and other 
differences out of, and in terms of, a changing relationality’ (Barad 2007: 93). Future 
research might therefore further explore the application of posthuman subjectivity and 
the relevance of Barad’s (2007) notions of intra-action in the entanglement of the actor 
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and character (and other entities included in the performance, such as write, director, 
costume, make-up, props etc.) in theatre. 
 
Story and circumstances 
One aspect of gaming that adds an interesting dimension to the experience and can be 
considered in relation to given circumstances and the performance of an acting role is 
the level of engagement with the narrative. As I will explore in the next chapter that 
considers empathy with the avatar as a driving factor of what creates the posthuman 
subjectivity, the engagement with the narrative can lend a different quality to the 
experience. 
 
I play in a dungeon, which is one that I haven’t played in before. It has an 
interesting narrative where you are accompanying a human and fighting mobs 
[monsters] that attack him. Everyone is forced to stand around as the human 
delivers his narrative, unable to continue until he (the NPC) is ready to. It is 
quite refreshing in this way as having played in a new dungeon yesterday, where 
I was unsure what was going on as I did not have time to read the story, this 
makes a change. I get the impression that other players do not appreciate this in 
the same way as another player writes in the chat box “he has a lot to say 
doesn’t he?”. It is hard to know when other players have less interest in the 
story whether they have simply played the dungeons before, and are therefore 
less interested in hearing things for the 50th time. For myself, I know that 
wanting to hear the story the first time around, or read it, is very important to 
understanding the objectives and the motivation for the level. However, once I 
have done the level once, listening to it again holds little interest. This goes back 
to what makes a play session feel meaningful, and whilst the narrative can 
contribute to this when it is the same narrative repeated it has the same effect as 
when mobs regenerate after defeating them – it serves only to highlight the 
futility of the quest and reminds the player that they have no lasting effect on the 
game world. […] The dungeon has also been interesting as although 
the narrative was led by the NPC who we followed the initial quest giver 
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introduced it and I was unable to read the full blurb as the rest of my group had 
already run off. 
 
As the above fieldnote demonstrates, the engagement with the narrative differs for 
many different players, and for me is an important part of the experience to understand 
why I am doing what I am doing. From this it is apparent that I am attempting to engage 
with the avatar and the story in a way which echoes Stanislavsky’s (1937: 46) statement 
of playing truly by being “logically” and “coherently” involved in order to know my 
part and be in unison with my role. This is often discussed in relation to justification 
and the idea that ‘[e]verything that happens on the stage must be convincing to the actor 
himself’ (Stanislavsky 1937: 129). Although I do not necessarily agree that such a 
“commitment” to the role is necessary in gaming, or, indeed, in posthuman subjectivity 
where commitment, logic and coherency would be seen as more humanist constructs, it 
does demonstrate some of the humanistic desires for rationality that still pervade certain 
parts of our existence. Whilst I believe these humanist desires for coherency proliferate 
our everyday experiences, a posthuman reading needs to complicate these and question 
whether such coherency can ever be achieved, or whether it is simply a fallacy. 
An example of a Stanislavskian practice that demonstrates this tension is that 
magic if: 
 
as an actor breathing life into a character in a completely fabricated “secondary” 
reality, you must enter into the magical world of “if.” You must say to yourself, 
“If these clothes upon my back were real, if this space actually existed at this 
particular time, if I were this person with this distinct personal history who had 
these perceptions, biases, desires, fears, and relationships, this is what ‘I’ would 
say. This is what ‘I’ would do.” […] With the help of this “magic if,” however, 
you can suspend your disbelief and enter into this new world with greater 
enthusiasm than you believe in your own reality. If allows you to part from your 
own plane of truth and enter into your secondary reality as a new person. You 





On the one hand the creation of this other existence could be considered to be a 
posthuman subjectivity, moving beyond the “boundaries of the self” to incorporate 
different reactions to external stimuli, environments, and situations, and understanding 
how they affect you. As the above fieldnote demonstrates, my own entanglement with 
the avatar seems to be experienced more richly if I feel that I become entwined not only 
with my avatar, but also with the narrative and the gameworld. This might suggest that 
the notion of the “magic if” requires me to know what the story is so that I can consider 
how to respond accordingly (in order to answer “how would I respond to this 
situation?” the more information you have about that situation, the better equipped you 
might be to answer the question). However, from a posthuman perspective we must 
complicate this further, focussing not only the permeability that the “magic if” suggests, 
but also troubling its inherent anthropocentrism and its focus on a more cognitive 
process. 
Rather than viewing the role of the “magic if” as an individual’s willing 
suspension of disbelief and application of a conscious and controlled thought 
experiment, we can instead consider this as an example of the affective capabilities that 
are shared between entities. If we acknowledge that we do not always control and direct 
the “magic if”, but instead that the possibilities and potentials of an “external” 
character’s situation have affective and empathic (as we shall see in the next chapter) 
qualities, we can view this as a demonstration of how entangled we are and how 
different agentic possibilities emerge. The “if” is therefore experienced in a way that 
does not only locate the conclusions to the scenarios of ‘[i]f these clothes upon my back 
were real, if this space actually existed at this particular time, if I were this person with 
this distinct personal history’ (McGaw et al. 2007: 2, original emphasis) in the “self” of 
what “I” would say or do, but also outside of the self. 
 
Being “caught up” in the game 
 
Having previously decided to move on from my current location and travel to 
higher (level) ground (what an awful joke) this is the exact opposite of what I 
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actually find myself doing. That almost literal draw backwards captures me in 
its current and when, upon completing one quest, I am offered another I am 
drawn in. This one seems to be the completion of this string of quests though (or 
so I tell myself) as I am offered the chance to ride into battle alongside the 
creatures I have been working with for some time now... Of course I accept, and 
on completing that quest am offered another... It’s nearby so of course I am 
tempted. I leap onto my wind rider (there is no leaping, only “summoning”, a 
careful mustering movement of my hands and the wind rider appears, Etyme 




I enter a new zone on the map and realise that not too far away there is a quest 
awaiting me... I hover my mouse over it and realise it is defeating Cassandra 
Kaboom [a non-playing character] in a pet battle – a low level quest that I 
never managed to complete, as my pet battles were not good enough and at the 
time I was more focussed on levelling myself than levelling them. What was that 
I was saying about needing to get on to other places and higher levels? Looks 
like I will be distracted once again, the lure of completing this quest that is so 
near working its way on me... 
 
This fieldnote demonstrates my involvement with the game and the avatar and 
shows my subjective experience in both the circumstances of the world, the quests, and 
my involvement with Etyme. ‘When true theatre is taking place (and this is the goal of 
Stanislavski’s new method of acting), “the actor passes from the plane of an actual 
reality into the plane of another life”’ (Fortier 2002: 48) and these notes from gaming 
demonstrate how this happens too to the gamer. I am drawn into my involvement with 
the game and again my agency is not a possessed quality but an intertwined set of 
potentials arising through the game and the avatar. 
Furthermore, it’s also interesting how the interpretation of the agency of the 
avatar is perceived in terms of their characteristics, and the ways in which as a gamer 
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you can either contradict this with your actions or you can work with it. The choices of 
the game are limited by the programmer/designer/hardware/game mechanics/narrative 
etc. to name but a few. I would suggest that the game narrative and game environment 
have agential affects upon my experience as a user that guide me towards particular 
decisions and choices and away from others. This is in keeping with not considering 
agency to be a possessed quality, but rather as a series of intra-acting intra-dependent 
notions each influencing each other. This, therefore, accounts for the ways in which the 
production of the game, the environment and sounds and aesthetic of where Blood 
Elves start their World of Warcraft journey, and the narrative of the game, have all 
stayed with me and almost guided my opinion of Etyme. I cannot claim that these 
“opinions” are my agentic choices. Instead, I have been influenced by all of the other 
intra-acting components. This demonstrates another way of understanding the intra-
action between different performative entities in a posthuman conception of acting. 
Rather than viewing the actor as a carrier of agency, exerting their control over the 
character, we instead see that the choices of the actor are precisely emergent through 
the equal “agency” of the character. If we understand agency as a doing or being, or an 
enactment that is enabled through different entities intra-acting, we can see performance 
as precisely this. Performance enables “action” through a negotiation and emergence 
between different possibilities for “becoming” when actor and character entwine. 
An example of this is demonstrated in the below fieldnote, which reflexively 
considers agency in the game and with the entangled avatar-gamer: 
 
It’s also interesting how the interpretation of the agency of the avatar is 
perceived in terms of their characteristics, and the ways in which as a player 
you can either contradict this with your actions or, what is more likely, you can 
work with it. I’m thinking of the ways in which I view things as being 
appropriate or not to Etyme. On the one hand that could be considered as my 
agency overpowering that of the avatar, but I don’t experience it that way or 
feel that to be the case. Instead, I suggest it is an agential intra-action amongst 
entities. So the production of the game, the environment and sounds and 
aesthetic of where Blood Elves start their World of Warcraft journey, along with 
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the narrative of the game which tells a complementary story to this, have all 
stayed with me and almost unconsciously guide my opinion of Etyme being quite 
at one with nature. This is reflected in my own choices – e.g. clothing Etyme in 
browns and greens and greys, organic colours, but under closer inspection I 
cannot claim that these are my agentic choices. Instead, I have been influenced 
by all of the other intra-acting components. 
 
Whilst this analytical fieldnote could demonstrate the ontological inseparability of the 
avatar-gamer, the incorporation of different influences might also be related to 
Stanislavsky’s (1937: 14) proposition of an actor needing to feel and act in unison with 
their role. I suggest that such work ‘stresses radical relationality, that is to say non-
unitary identities and multiple allegiances’ (Braidotti 2012: 144) to embody an 
entangled, post-anthropocentric and therefore posthuman performance. Although in 
some ways the performativity of the avatar is limited (it is not completely 
customisable), in other ways this makes players more inventive with them, and makes 
even small moves significant. Stanislavsky’s (1937: 15) work highlights the need for 
both internal and external commitment to the role, stating that ‘[a]n actor is under the 
obligation to live his part inwardly, and then to give to his experience an external 
embodiment’ and the negotiation between these is obvious in the above extract. 
Tronstad (2011: 250) has discussed the importance of appearance in terms of 
“identification”, ‘how we perceive a character is how it appears, and vice versa […] 
appearance is not something that is static but is fundamentally connected to 
performance’34. 
In acting the focus on appearance is not about “identifying” with the character 
as a separate entity, but more an embodiment of the character that is often one that 
becomes apparent through the performance of the role, taking on certain physical 
characteristics and considering how their visual portrayal of the character is as 
important as their vocal or emotional one. As Stanislavsky (1937: 15) explains, an actor 
																																																						
34 Whilst Tronstad (2011) uses an analysis of appearance and capacity to consider how much player’s 
“identify” with their avatars, in the following chapter I view this as an empathic relationship. Rather than 
considering identification as a process that either occurs through empathy with an “other” or through 
considering that “other” as “self” my own, posthuman empathy aims to disrupt these distinctions, in much 
the same way as this chapter has. 
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must always give an externally visible performance, therefore the actor must focus as 
much on their outward portrayal of a character as their inner understanding of that role. 
In gaming this is experienced differently, as part of the embodiment of the 
character is made manifest through the avatar, a highly customisable and visually 
performative element. As such the aesthetic plays an important part: 
 
I constantly review Etyme’s costume/armour choices. It’s treading a fine line 
between aesthetic vs. tactical. I don’t want to look clumsily put together – there 
needs to be some level of consistency. This feels like as much for our benefit as 
for anyone else’s. Just as in RL we dress to impress and gain confidence in our 
own construction of costume appropriate to the role we are trying to portray 
(performance of self), in much the same way the careful construction of 
appropriate attire here is both to afford myself confidence in my appearance 
and also to demonstrate to anyone who might encounter Etyme that we are 
taking this seriously. And in games we do need to take ourselves seriously. 
 
Another fieldnote indicates similar experiences: 
 
I made various changes to Etyme’s outfit yesterday and when I log in today I get 
the chance to actually admire them. She is mainly wearing deep rusty tones of 
red tinged with flashes of silver. I removed the helmet she was wearing – it 
provides good armour and is useful for battlegrounds but essentially looks 
ridiculous. Some of these new choices seem somehow sleeker too, less like she is 
dressing up in someone else’s clothes. She looks more grown up, a real warrior 
rather than just playing at being one. Of course then I log back in and I’m a 
Noblegarden bunny for the Easter themed event. 
 
There is thus demonstrated an awareness of being looked at, and wanting to look well 
put together. In acting the importance of the incorporation of these “external” features is 
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also heavily involved in the realisation of the character. McGaw et al. (2007: 119) state 
that: 
 
[y]ou must also learn to relate to your character’s clothing and to the imaginary 
environment. The character’s clothing must be a part of your very existence. 
You must not treat your clothes as mere costumes that were recently hanging in 
the dressing room but rather as if your character personally selected them. Your 
work with your character’s clothing will, in fact, communicate directly how 
your character feels about himself and his surroundings. 
 
From a posthuman perspective, this focus on clothing is indicative of one of the very 
basic ways in which we do not stop at the boundary of the skin, and instead incorporate 
“other” materials into our sense and performance of “self”. Moreover, it demonstrates 
an engagement with stimuli that disrupts a subject-object or internal-external binary. 
Such binaries might conceive of the costume or the avatar as a representation of the 
character (either theatre or game), whereas to extend Barad’s (2007) notions of 
performativity over representation we instead see these “representations” as 
performative in themselves. This is not only a theatrical performativity, but a 
performativity through a doing or being. Clothing, costumes, or avatars each become a 
particular embodiment and enactment that enable certain subjectivities (such claims will 
be familiar to those who have studied the historically performative constraints of 
women’s clothing). Clothing the avatar is an apt demonstration of this phenomenon – as 
the above fieldnote demonstrates, this is an “aesthetic vs. tactical” choice as what the 
avatar is wearing specifically enables different defences and attacks as they are not 
merely clothes but also armour and weapons. Similarly, the clothes we wear in 
everyday life enable certain subject positions and constrain certain abilities. In theatre, 
the costume plays a similar role. Costume is therefore another entity and aspect that a 
performance emerges through – it contributes to the available agency in terms of 
denoting what a character can be or do, and how it must be enacted. Whilst a full 
analysis of clothing as a demonstration of posthuman subjectivity is not possible here, 





This chapter has explored how we might begin to analyse the lived experience of 
posthuman subjectivity in order to consider what practices and processes facilitate our 
intra-actions. Utilising acting theories to unpack the intra-action between avatar and 
gamer has shed light on how entwinement and post-anthropocentrism can be practised 
through performative collaborations where notions of “self” and “other” are abandoned 
in favour of an entangled posthuman subject. 
We are shaped by our intersubjective experiences, as is the avatar, as is the 
character, as is, of course, the posthuman. The avatar as extended body has given us 
less that is “new” or unique than many would argue. As Tufekci (2012: 45) states, 
‘[d]igital mediation changes everything, and yet it changes so little’. The avatar has 
simply provided a new form for our (posthuman) subjectivities to take, and new 
elements to analyse. However, these digital technologies have provided us with new 
motivation to understand our intra-actions with elements beyond the “boundary” of our 
skin. In analysing these in a context where the components seem obviously “external” 
only to uncover how entwined they are, perhaps we are then better equipped to turn 
these conclusions back to their non-technological counterparts and analyse other intra-
actions in a similarly posthuman way. 
This chapter offers an alternative and updated conception of performance, a 
“posthuman acting” that draws on some elements of acting theories but challenges 
others, accounting explicitly for performance as occurring from a de-centred subject 
(actor/script/director/producer) without the need for asserting the actor as the “master” 
of their art. Instead, viewing the performance as a complex entanglement of intra-acting 
components asserts a post-anthropocentric view, and therefore utilises posthuman 
acting as an analysis of the practices and processes through which posthuman 
subjectivity emerges. This has therefore demonstrated the ways in which we might 
perceive the work of Stanislavsky and Chekhov as historically shaped by their own 
(humanistic) circumstances, but that the principles behind their work can be re-applied 




This chapter does not argue that the embodiment of a game character is 
indistinguishable to the experience of embodying a character for the stage – whilst there 
are many overlaps these two experiences each have their own individual traits, and the 
gameworld is experienced differently to the stage. However, in the same way that the 
game requires the gamer to function, so too does the character require the actor, and so 
both “performances” can be seen as entanglements, where neither “gamer” nor 
“avatar”, “actor” or “character” can be viewed in isolation from the other. Both can 
only come to be through an ability to give and receive, to affect and to be affected. 
When we consider these as traits that acknowledge our entanglements, we destabilise 
anthropocentrism. In doing so a view of our subjectivities as posthuman is made 
possible, and an understanding of the avatar/character as separate or “other” in either 
medium disappears. 
In the following chapter I aim to extend these ideas further, considering not only 
how the performative practice of acting can be posthumanised, but also how we take 
these ideas and view them through the affects of empathy. Firstly, I will demonstrate 
some of the overlaps between performance and empathy, showing how the ability to 
engage with an “other” demonstrates the intra-dependence of “self” and “other” in the 
affective experience of empathy. I then move on to a critical engagement with the 
concept of empathy itself, considering how it too might once have been considered 




Chapter 6: Enacting Empathy 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I considered the potential of “posthumanising” certain acting 
techniques and therefore enabled an analysis of the posthuman subjectivity experienced 
by the avatar-gamer entanglement. Whilst that chapter provided an example of how a 
particular practice can be posthumanised, and how we might take some humanist 
examples of interactions and reflect on them instead as intra-actions, the following 
chapter considers how we might view this outside of a performance context and move 
the exploration into a broader argument. There are links between empathy and acting 
that I explore at the beginning of this chapter, and this is why the analysis begins to 
move in this direction. Rather than only viewing the posthuman possibilities within a 
performative practice, this chapter considers how we might posthumanise empathy 
along similar lines. 
 In theatre there is an empathic relationship between the actor and the character 
and also between the audience and the characters. As we saw from the previous chapter, 
the ideal scenario in acting is for the actor to empathise with the character in order to 
deliver their experiences and emotions in the most “believable” way possible. To make 
an initial link to empathy, we could consider how this practice corresponds to the 
meaning of empathy as ‘entering the private perceptual world of the other and 
becoming thoroughly at home in it. […] It means temporarily living in his/her life’ 
(Rogers 1975: 4). This is precisely the job of the actor who ‘passes from the plane of 
actual reality into the plane of another life’ (Stanislavski 1980 [1924]: 466). In the 
previous chapter some of the ways in which gaming can be considered similar to theatre 
were explored. Dixon (2007: 601-602) discusses the correspondences between the two, 
including aspects of time, narrative, characters and emotional responses. In this chapter 
I study these affective and emotional responses further, and consider: what are the 
shared qualities of the empathic connection with character? Having explored how 
acting can be posthumanised, I then consider the capacity of empathy to be 
posthumanised. I therefore initially discuss the empathic connection between avatar and 
gamer in relation to the actor/character and audience/characters in theatre, in order to 
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Empathy is a concept that explains how we relate to each other in the world. Finlay 
(2006: 4) states that, ‘[w]hen applied to the human world, empathy is generally 
understood as ‘entering another’s world’ or ‘stepping into their shoes’. Empathy allows 
us to understand other’s thoughts and emotions, and it has been theorised and used in a 
variety of ways. Rogers was a psychologist who began to make the initial links between 
empathy and psychotherapy. In one description he surmises that empathy 
 
means entering the private perceptual world of the other and becoming 
thoroughly at home in it. It involves being sensitive, moment to moment, to the 
changing felt meanings which flow in this other person, to the fear or rage or 
tenderness or confusion or whatever, that he/she is experiencing. It means 
temporarily living in his/her life, […] in order to enter another’s world. (Rogers 
1975: 4) 
 
This definition is illuminating for the concept of empathy in and of itself, demonstrating 
the affective-cognitive involvement involved in this relating. However, empathy is also 
an essential tool in acting. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Stanislavsky’s 
work on acting methods emphasises the importance of feeling in attuned with the 
character. Stanislavsky (1937:14) states that the actor should ‘think, strive, feel and act 
in unison with your role’ and he highlights how an actor must come to know the 
character she is portraying intimately, moving beyond relaying words in the script to 
understand the motivating factors behind their character’s words, actions and overall 
aim. Stanislavsky believed that it was the actor who emotionally identified with the 
experiences on stage who was fully creative (Gordon 1987: 53). This actor prepared by 
consciously and unconsciously incorporating all aspects of the character as suggested 
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by the script, the playwright and the director, and embodying the character (Gordon 
1987: 53-54)35. 
One of the ways in which we can make sense of what occurs between actor and 
character is therefore through an empathic relationship36, where the actor considers the 
situation that their character is in and thinks and feels in response to those “given 
circumstances”. Therefore, in both empathy and acting there is a dual importance of 
affective and situational understanding and depth of feeling, which I return to below as 
the intra-dependent empathic experiences of affective encounters and narrative 
engagement through my own fieldnotes. 
We might also consider empathy in theatre emerging through the audience intra-
action with the performance. The audience should empathise with the characters and 
their situation in order to be carried into a willing suspension of disbelief: they should 
‘experience vicariously what the characters in the action seem to be feeling’ (Laurel 
2013: 145). This form of empathy is just as important as the empathy between actor and 
character, as the audience can still experience an affective response to the situation the 
characters find themselves in through the understanding and recognition of the 
characters’ circumstances and emotional states (Wilde 2015: 141). 
I believe these initial overlaps between acting and empathy demonstrate how we 
might begin to move some of the practices of acting, as a specific but narrower practice, 
to something more widely interpersonal such as empathy. 
Further to “performing” the posthuman (as per the previous chapter), in this 
chapter I argue that empathy is one of the affects that emerges through posthuman 
subjectivity. Through the perspective and affective flow and exchange that takes place 
between the avatar and gamer (and character and actor) we can begin to problematise 
some of the more “humanistic” notions of empathy. What is meant by the “humanistic” 
attributes of empathy are the conceptions of empathy that are presented that suggest a 
rational, stable, autonomous individual takes part in “other”-oriented perspective, 
																																																						
35 See the previous chapter for an analysis of the problematic, humanist, aspects of this instruction. 
36 Some work has been done to explore the empathic potentials in acting, for example, Goldstein (2009: 
6) tests ‘the hypothesis that acting training fosters strength in reading others’ mental states, feeling others’ 
feelings, and regulating one’s own emotions in an adaptive manner’ and Verducci (2000) considers the 
potentials for utilising acting techniques to cultivate empathy in moral education. 
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nevertheless with no “loss” of self taking place in the action of considering this 
“other’s” perspective or situation. For example, whilst some perspectives suggest a 
fusion between the empathic subjects (such as Lipps’ version of “feeling into”), other 
approaches suggest this to be problematic, as they believe empathy should not 
involvement a loss of self (such as phenomenologists Husserl and Stein’s accounts) 
(Coplan and Goldie 2011: xiv). In this regard the self/other divide in some definitions 
of empathy is still problematic, as different views of empathy theorise different ways of 
being with and through the “other”. 
Such conceptions provide an interesting basis for a posthuman understanding of 
this affective experience. Rather than viewing fusion between participants as 
problematic, a posthuman conception would understand that “humans” are always in 
fusion with “others”. The concern over a “loss of self” speaks from a very particular 
liberal human standpoint that suggests there was ever a “self” to “lose” in the first 
place. Furthermore, it clings to a “rational” self that has an autonomous agency. From a 
posthuman perspective this seems implicitly flawed when concerning the visceral 
nature of empathy, the unexpected way that it can affect us and move us. Affects such 
as empathy are one example that demonstrate that we are not entities that exist in 
separation or isolation. Our bodies are constantly being affected by our surroundings, 
atmospheres, or other bodies around us and we are therefore constituted by and through 
our responses to “external” stimuli, such that “external” becomes “internal” and such a 
binary therefore becomes unfeasible. Affect has always played a large part in acting 
technique, working hand in hand with embodiment of the role. Sensory perceptions are 
key to embodying a role and bringing it to life, and many acting exercises serve to 
highlight these links – such as Stanislavsky’s (1937) methods of “Affective Memory” 
(also known as emotion memory), a process of an actor remembering a time when they 
felt something akin to the experiences of the situation their character is in and trying to 
relive those visceral affects when playing the part. It is through the sharing of affective 
experience that the empathic experience and acting experience is formed – it must be 
embodied. This therefore requires exploration of affective empathy and what could be 
conceived as Blackman’s (2012: 82) ‘instances of affective transmission’– automatic or 
involuntary bodily affectivity – and acknowledging that if ‘[l]ife is defined by the flow 
or exchange of a vital force – an élan vital – that connects rather than separates and is 
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felt and registered within the body through a subtle sensing’ (Blackman 2012: 85) then 
this is precisely what occurs between avatar and gamer.  
To a certain extent these forms of empathy can already begin to indicate one 
aspect of posthumanism at play. As Pepperell (2003: 20) states ‘the apparent separation 
between the human and the environment is invalid in the posthuman era and, therefore, 
needs revision’. As such, when the actor empathises with their character and ‘enter[s] 
the private perceptual world of the other’ (Rogers 1975: 4) and the audience vicariously 
experiences the characters’ feelings on stage, these practices begin to demonstrate the 
apparent invalidity of the separation between human and environment and other. Our 
ability to engage in such empathic practices, be they through acting or observing, 
therefore demonstrates the ways in which ‘[o]ur bodies consist in a complex matrix of 
senses that perpetually respond to the stimuli and demands of the environment’ 
(Pepperell 2003: 20). From Pepperell’s (2003: 21) perspective then, empathy would be 
just one of the many indicators of the instability of the concept of the “human”, as it 
demonstrates that we are ‘neither bounded by our skin nor isolated from the 
environment we are woven into, and woven of’. 
As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, the gamer of today sits somewhere 
between “actor” and “audience”, as they have the capacity to both act in and view the 
action that takes place. This is particularly true of the MMORPG gamer – where the 
majority of the other inhabitants of the gameworld are other real life gamers, all capable 
of both watching and being watched (Wilde 2015: 141). From this perspective we might 
argue that empathy experienced by the gamer is more multifaceted than for an actor or 
an audience member, as it combines multiple aspects of both enacting the experiences 
of the avatar but also watching them unfold on screen. 
The player develops a ‘virtual persona that is something “other” than him/her 
represented onscreen’ (Whitlock 2005: 199), and in this thesis I have already examined 
how we can consider that persona as an example of posthuman subjectivity (see 
Chapter 2: Proposing the Posthuman Gamer and Chapter 5: Acting to Intra-acting). In 
this use of the “other” Whitlock (2005) is not so much stating that the avatar is other – 
which would refute a posthuman view – but instead that what is co-created between 
avatar and gamer is not simply a representation and is more complex. For Whitlock 
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(2005), the time invested and the choices made when creating a character in 
MMORPGs is similar to that of the spect-actor of Forum theatre. In Forum theatre the 
audience become active parts in the performance, taking the place of actors and thus 
becoming spect-actors: a ‘meld of audience and actor, […] an active participant in 
drama, influencing the narrative and altering it’ (Whitlock 2005: 194). If we view the 
experience of the gamer as an empathic connection with their avatar, we could consider 
this “gamer empathy” both in terms of how the gamer views the action and how they 
perform the actions (Wilde 2015: 141). 
Empathy has been explored in games previously, for example, Martin (2013) 
explores empathy in relation to experiencing a body in space. Smethurst (2015) 
considers the ways in which empathy in videogames might lead the player to 
experience a sense of trauma when realising they have committed, or been subject to, 
certain acts in-game that have affected them offline. Belman and Flanagan’s (2010) use 
of empathy is more focused on an aspect that can be written into the design, usually of a 
“serious game”, for use as a pedagogical tool. Elsewhere, Jin (2011: 1176) has 
‘hypothesized that people playing a prosocial character’s role would experience greater 
empathy with the character than would those playing a violent character’s role’ as these 
character’s might be seen to represent peoples goals or wishes, or their morality and 
obligations. These explorations, though interesting and insightful in terms of the 
capacities of what empathy in gaming might do, are not the aim of this chapter. In these 
studies empathy is usually considered as a tool that fosters immersion with the avatar as 
a wholly separate “other”. In this chapter, I instead discuss the ways in which empathy 
emerges and ask: how we can consider this through a posthuman perspective? 
I problematise empathy in relation to a bounded, wholly separate, specific 
“other” and consider how we can instead view it as an intra-active affect. By analysing 
a posthuman subjectivity through empathy, we can consider another possibility for how 
posthuman subjectivities are facilitated, as well as how we might posthumanise other 
practices. 
In this chapter I therefore explore the visceral subjective nature of empathy in 
gaming; and the ways in which it arises naturally through World of Warcraft, viewing 
the avatar as a co-producer in the emergent posthuman subjectivity. The specificity of 
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the entanglement that I am exploring is again worth reiterating37 – the humanoid avatar 
could be argued to facilitate such subjectivities in a more anthropocentric way. Martin 
(2013: 319) explains that ‘the human form means the avatar retains the capacity to 
arouse pathos, admiration and identification’, meaning we are able to empathise with 
the avatar as a character involved in a particular situation. Accordingly, the gamer’s 
own body is then implicated in the action as ‘[e]mpathy caused by the response of 
mirror neurons to the game’s audio-visual information activates the player’s motor 
systems, recreating the conditions of the virtual world in the body’ (Martin 2013: 317-
318). This is not to say that such empathy does not or could not occur elsewhere, indeed 
a posthuman form of empathy as it is conceived of below most certainly could, but only 
to highlight that the way in which that is facilitated and experienced is contextual. 
 Empathy is therefore experienced both in relation to the situations characters 
(“real” or “fictional”) find themselves in, and also in relation to said characters’ 
affective and emotional responses. Tronstad (2011: 251) uses a continuum of empathic 
experiences derived from Vaage to encompass these feelings of involvement. In this 
model true empathy occurs between emotional contagion and perspective taking with 
aspects of both, and can be considered both in terms of embodied empathy, where the 
body of the gamer vicariously experiences what the body of avatar is subjected to, and 
narrative empathy, where the gamer’s involvement in the situation and story of the 
avatar elicits an empathetic response (Tronstad 2011: 251). Although such conceptions 
might appear problematic through a perceived separation of such capacities, this is not 
the aim. As Vaage (2006: 32-33 cited in Tronstad 2011: 252) states: ‘[t]o some degree 
both embodied and narrative empathy are needed for an experience to be empathy’. 
Empathy is therefore conceived of as a spectrum of experiences. The emphasis on the 
importance of intertwined affective and cognitive experiences are similarly discussed in 
acting theory, as Chekhov and Stanislavsky continuously discuss the importance of the 
psychophysical: 
 
[i]t is a known fact that the human body and psychology influence each other 
and are in constant interplay. […] the actor, who must consider his body as an 
																																																						
37 As per Barad (2007: 74) ‘entanglements are highly specific configurations’. 
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instrument for expressing creative ideas on the stage, must strive for the 
attainment of complete harmony between the two, body and psychology. 
(Chekhov 2014 [1953]: 1) 
 
The affective, empathic moments that are explored in the following chapter are 
therefore both visceral and situational. Whilst the pre-discursivity of some 
understandings of affect might be criticised for imposing an apparent dualism between 
body and cognition, as the fieldnotes demonstrate this is not the case. Visceral 
encounters are cognitive and situational also – for example, falling would not be 
alarming were if not for the fear of harm or death and in this way ‘rather than being 




In the following sections, I address the need for a posthuman account of empathy. I 
draw on a particular line of thought in posthumanist theory that suggests a constantly 
permeable, fluid and extended subjectivity, which blurs the boundaries between human 
and non-human. In doing so, I ask, what might a posthuman concept of empathy look 
like? How can it be applied to fieldnotes produced through the intra-action of avatar and 
gamer? In doing so I show how empathy allows us to understand this subjectivity as 
constantly negotiated, producing visceral reactions in the intra-connected avatar-gamer 
subject. I explore moments of co-produced in-game action that require ‘affective 
matching’ between subjective and embodied experiences. 
 I believe a closer analysis of empathy could deepen accounts of the subjective 
effects of gaming, especially when applied through a posthuman lens. My aim in 
providing such an account is to reveal how the avatar-gamer relationship is a 
subjectivity created through an intra-dependence between subject and screen. 
 As stated at the beginning of this thesis, the definition of gameplay as 
posthuman does not make sense of the very visceral emotions that take place. In the rest 
of this chapter, I propose that a posthuman concept of empathy might be one analytic to 
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help analyse the posthuman condition and offer us ways of understanding these 
relationships in more rhizomatic terms.  I argue that empathy is a useful concept in 
exploring the simultaneously imaginative, embodied and cognitive in our connection 
with the non-human “other”. As I have begun to explore already, this understanding of 
empathy is therefore based on a more fluid application, whereby the binary between the 
cognitive and corporeal break down and intertwine.  
However, as with acting, empathy is not an unproblematic concept to bring to 
posthuman analysis, as it similarly has humanistic traits. Below I consider how empathy 
can both reinforce and resist a posthuman reading, and I attempt to complicate its 
humanist foundations. 
  A recent shift in critical theory to notions of “affect” has emphasised the 
importance of empathy as an emotional interaction with another. Elsewhere, Braidotti 
(2013: 78) has written about the potentials for empathy to encompass posthuman ideals, 
through its morality and potential as a selfless quality, as well as through its focus on 
the emotional rather than the “rational” being of humanism. However, I would suggest 
that in defining a posthuman empathy we need to be wary of the problematic humanist 
traits that the term “empathy” might indicate (Wilde and Evans 2017: 6). For example, 
Coplan’s (2011: 5) account suggests that common uses of “empathy” have made 
definitions ambiguous, often co-existing with similar terms and states. With this in 
mind, she aims to provide a clarification in terminology that is, as she terms it, 
‘conceptually cleaner’ (Coplan 2011: 6). Informed by psychological and neuroscientific 
research, Coplan (2011: 5) defines empathy as a ‘complex imaginative process in which 
an observer simulates another person’s situated psychological state while maintaining 
clear self-other differentiation. To say that empathy is ‘complex’ is to say that it is 
simultaneously a cognitive and affective process’. 
Coplan’s (2011) definition of empathy has been a useful starting point. The 
simultaneity of cognitive and affective processes is demonstrated in my own fieldnotes, 
and is appealing through its resistance to the singularity of cognitive or affective 
processes. Equally, I was drawn to Coplan’s (2011) definition of empathy given the 
centrality of imagination, which I recognised in my fieldnotes. However, it could be 
argued that certain conceptions of empathy are fundamentally at odds with posthuman 
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subjectivity. Coplan (2011) states that empathy is a ‘human-to-human’ concept that 
requires ‘simulating’ the other’s ‘psychological state’ but ‘maintaining clear self-other 
differentiation’. This means that the empathic subject would remain distinct, 
maintaining the problematic discrepancies implicit with the concept of the liberal 
human subject (Wilde and Evans 2017: 7).  
From this perspective empathy might be considered a human “essence”, and it is 
at this point that what I term posthuman empathy in gaming diverges most radically 
from Coplan’s definition, as this disrupts Coplan’s (2011) suggestion that self-other 
differentiation is essential to empathy. According to Coplan (2011: 15), ‘when there is 
insufficient self-other differentiation due to a breakdown of the boundaries between the 
self and others’ true empathy cannot occur because ‘[t]he observer recognizes that the 
other is a different person and successfully adopts the other’s perspective but ends up 
experiencing the other’s perspective as his own’. Coplan (2011: 16) believes that clear 
self-other differentiation is important as 
 
[w]hen we lack this awareness [of our own selves as separate agents], we lack 
clear self-other differentiation, which in this case results in a kind of fusion or 
enmeshment. As Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman [1996: 116] explain, 
when individuals are enmeshed, ‘boundaries between them are too porous or 
nonexistent, each is too caught up in the life of the other, too involved and 
overly concerned with that person’. 
 
However, this “enmeshment” is perhaps most accurately what occurs in games that the 
player finds themselves immersed in – each is entirely dependent on the other in order 
to take any action within the game and therefore bring caught up in one another’s life is 
almost a necessary prerequisite. This makes the notion of self- or other-oriented 
perspective taking in empathy somewhat troublesome. Coplan (2011: 9) argues that 
self-oriented perspective-taking is when ‘a person represents herself in another person’s 
situation’ (my emphasis), whereas in other-oriented perspective-taking we imagine 
being that other person undergoing their experiences, rather than involving our “self” 
or imagining our own experiences and characteristics to be involved (Coplan 2011: 13). 
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This clear cut definition between self and other is problematic to the 
conceptualisation of empathy in gaming, as in gameplay the avatar is often not 
experienced in such definite and simple terms. Quite clearly the avatar is not entirely 
“self” – yet it is not entirely “other” either. 
Posthuman subjectivity offers a way to conceptualise enmeshment as the 
boundaries between self and other are accepted to be complex or indeterminate, and that 
subjectivity is emergent and distributed, integrated within the world rather than 
operating from an established position outside of it (Hayles 1999: 291), whereas 
Coplan’s version of self-other differentiation implies a fixed, stable perspective. 
Linking this to Barad’s (2007) suggestion of relational ontology that explores 
how entities only emerge from, and are defined by, their intra-actions, the previous 
chapter demonstrated how we can begin to conceptualise the posthuman subjectivity 
which arises between avatar and gamer as an entanglement, a phenomenon which 
indicates ‘the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting components’ (Barad 
2007: 33). Such an explanation disrupts the notion that a clear self/other differentiation 
is necessary, and instead promotes the exploration of the amalgam. This amalgamated 
self is facilitated by the fact that the gamer is an active participant and contributor to the 
world and action around them. Returning to empathy, we could therefore argue that a 
sense of having empathy with the narrative is facilitated in this intra-action, as the 
gamer-as-avatar must action the events that unfold. 
What would this mean for a posthuman empathy? Although empathy is an 
imperfect analytic, my definition of a posthuman empathy would include a) recognising 
the empathetic capacity of others who are non-human, including the empathetic 
capacity of the avatar, which is in keeping with my discussion of posthuman 
subjectivity, and b) acknowledging that such empathy only works through the network 
along a complex range of entanglements in multiple relationships with other actors (in 
this case avatar-gamer entanglements) (Wilde and Evans 2017: 7). It is worth stating 
that I am not suggesting that the avatar is an empathetic subject with the capacity for 
imagination in and of itself. This capacity is emergent, and only exists in relation to 
other parts of the entanglement, including the avatar-gamer one. A posthuman empathy 
would mean recognising that there is no primary subject, but that empathy is always 
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already an intra-connected network of dynamically intra-acting forces. This aligns well 
with traditional concepts of empathy, where empathy can occur viscerally between 
subjects, while sympathy, for example, might be understood as more one-directional 
(Wilde and Evans 2017: 7). 
The recognition that there is no primary subject also complicates traditional 
definitions of empathy as ‘the imaginative projection of a subjective state into an object 
so that the object appears to be infused with it’ (Merriam-Webster 2017). Such a 
reading of empathy is again heavily humanistic, implying some sense of control over 
the empathy that is experienced38 and granting all agency, imagination, and projection 
to the human and ignoring the qualities of the “object” that is in question. This chapter 
does not aim to enact such binaries, and instead views posthuman empathy as affective, 
embodied, and emerging from our intra-actions. 
Whilst empathy can be enhanced, that is not to say it can be controlled, and a 
posthuman empathy refutes such anthropocentric qualities. Furthermore, although Gee 
(2008: 259) argues that avatars are “projective beings” and whilst he states that the 
avatar ‘becomes a reservoir that can be filled with your own desires, intentions, and 
goals’ he, significantly, elaborates that ‘things work the other way round as well’ as 
‘players inhabit the goals of a virtual character in a virtual world. […] you, the player, 
act in the game as if the goals of your surrogate are your goals’ (Gee 2008: 258). 
Gaming is therefore an experience that is (at least) a two-way exchange between 
character/avatar and gamer. 
Therefore, the notion of more than one empathetic subject engenders my first 
criteria of posthuman empathy. Although previous research has focused on our capacity 
to empathise with biological others (see, for example, Rogers 1975; Hoffman 2000; 
Coplan and Goldie 2011), my focus here is empathy that emerges through the material 
human-gamer and the informational technological-avatar (Wilde and Evans 2017: 7). 
As suggested above, my concept of posthuman empathy is not complete, fixed 
or static. Nor would I argue that the empathy I explore in this chapter is limited to the 
																																																						
38 Elsewhere Blackman (2012: 37) explains that in social psychology there was a shift ‘between 
suggestion, as a form of contagious communication, and sympathy, understood as a form of conscious 
judgement and deliberation’. This seems to be a similar attempt to maintain a sense of rationality and 
control in order to “make sense” of affective encounters. 
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avatar-gamer relationship. Context necessarily shapes the cognitive-affective construct 
of empathy and different environments and entanglements create a different relationship 
(or form different phenomena) than the one in gameplay (Wilde and Evans 2017: 7). 
This could also be aligned with Bennett’s (2010) analysis of the vibrant life of matter. 
Rather than the historical understanding of different materialities as passive in their 
engagement with the world, Bennett (2010) proposes a vitalism where objects are able 
“to act”. Although not necessarily intentional or conscious agents, objects nevertheless 
have an affect on the world: the human and non-human ‘always perform an intricate 
dance with one another’ (Bennett 2010: 31). Considered in this light, a posthuman 
empathy might include, in the case of gameplay, the intra-action with a specific device, 
and the wired and non-wired technologies that enable online play. My argument 
therefore isn’t that empathy exists between the avatar and gamer but that it emerges 
through the avatar-gamer entanglement39. However, as per the aims of this thesis, I 
focus specifically on the empathy that emerges through the avatar-gamer subjectivity as 
an example with which to explore these concepts in more depth. 
In exploring empathy as avatar-gamer, I adopt Sundén’s (2012) position of 
inseparable sameness and fascinated difference, but I view this as a horizontal and intra-
dependent relationship, where both avatar and gamer coexist. The complex experience 
of empathy emerges in a variety of ways. At times, empathy is experienced as complete 
incorporation. For example, as discussed in the previous chapter, at times in my 
fieldnotes the self/avatar become inseparable, with I/Etyme being used interchangeably. 
But at other times the “I” makes observations about Etyme, and vice versa. For 
example, Etyme responds when the keys are pressed; and yet at other times she 
seemingly “separates” from me by complaining that there’s “nothing to target” (when I 
have not chosen a specific enemy to attack) or proclaiming “I’m not ready” (when 
attempting to make an attack without enough “focus”, a Hunter resource that must be 
regenerated). In total incorporation, we might not find these effects. But if we 
understand empathy as a posthuman affect, we can read it as distributed, meaning that 
empathy is no longer a concept to explain “putting ourselves in someone else’s shoes” 
only to return to the “safety” of our own bodies. Posthuman empathy instead 
																																																						
39 This aligns with Ash’s (2013: 29) assertion that ‘affect does not simply operate between body and 
world on an unconscious level, but actively creates associations’. 
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demonstrates how humans and non-humans are entangled through their ability to affect 
and be affected by circumstances, environments, and feelings (Bennett 2010). Citing 
Deleuze, Bennett (2010: 21) suggests that ‘the power of a body to affect other bodies 
includes a “corresponding and inseparable” capacity to be affected’. Likewise, my 
understanding of the avatar as active, agentic, and empathic recognises the vibrancy of 
non-human agency as an emergent capacity.  
I use this concept of posthuman empathy below. In the first section of the 
analysis, I explore how a posthuman empathy creates moments of embodied 
experience, which appear to take place almost-instinctively. The second section 
describes how these empathetic relations are connected to others within the gaming 
environment. I then consider how aspects of cognitive matching do not always operate 
in ways we might expect through the game mechanics and game narrative. Finally, I 
suggest that this concept of posthuman empathy can be put to use when understanding 
the avatar-gamer relationship as a continuum, where the interaction between self and 
machine is more than incorporation of body and subjectivity. Where Sundén’s (2012) 
work has shown how the player empathises with another player through the body of the 
avatar, I aim to take empathy further, through the empathetic relationship that is shared 
within the avatar-gamer subjectivity (Wilde and Evans 2017: 8). 
  
Empathy as embodied experience 
Empathy can be broadly understood as an affective response to what another is 
experiencing. In gaming this is often an “immersive” act in that the avatar body 
becomes what we navigate the world through. It is therefore felt not only to be an object 
of perception, but also a means of perception (Martin 2013) that involves an empathetic 
relationship where our eyes, for example, see through the avatar, but where equally the 
avatar sees through us (Clough 2000). An example of this would be how the avatar’s 
position in gameplay highlights the potentials in the gameworld landscape that are 
interactive (e.g. objects, avatars, NPCs etc.) and “sees” the value and prospects that 
engagement with the interactive elements of the game could provide. Put simply, the 
player cannot act on or progress in the game without the avatar, but neither can the 
avatar without the player. The visual field is therefore intra-dependent, opening up the 
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complexity and heterogeneity of the perceptual and agential circuits through which 
posthuman subjectivity is experienced (Wilde and Evans 2017: 8)40. Similarly, when 
the gaming environment or mobs affect this avatar body, we find our own bodies 
affected along those channels of feeling: ‘[a]s any player knows, the rush you get from 
a good game is not confined to the space of the screen; it is a subrational, bodily thing 
as well’ (Shinkle 2005: 22). 
My fieldnotes demonstrate the intra-dependence of embodied experience. For 
example, the extract below captures a sense of the intra-connectedness of the avatar-
gamer’s embodied experience. Empathy emerges at the most instinctive of “human” 
acts: holding your breath underwater. 
  
I’m completing a quest underwater, diving for relics in a deep, wide lake. I’m 
absorbed in my task, deep beneath the water where the colours and sounds are 
dulled and I am lulled into that ethereal state of being. Etyme’s air supply seems 
ample – until suddenly it doesn’t and I am forced to ascend. I begin to worry 
when I don’t break the surface – I hadn’t realised I was so deep. I need to get 
Etyme to the surface and I find myself holding my own breath, a worried look 
adorning my face as I watch the air supply dwindle and watch her body rise… I 
make it, and breathe again. 
  
In this extract, the avatar was experienced through a visceral reaction through my body. 
We could make sense of this embodied empathy in two ways. One way we can analyse 
this form of empathy would be through Blackman’s (2012: 82) description of affect as 
nonconscious mimicry or ‘attunement’, which is ‘not about conscious recognition but 
about forms of bodily affectivity’41. When one human smiles at another, the “instinct” 
is to smile back; likewise, in gameplay Etyme’s experience of being underwater is 
enacted through mimicry on the body of the gameplayer. The avatar-gamer 
enmeshment creates the space to react in ways that are not only imitation, but happen 
																																																						
40 I would like to thank the reviewers of the journal article ‘Empathy at Play: Posthuman subjectivities in 
gaming’ co-authored by Dr. Adrienne Evans and I for their helpful comments here. 
41 This is supported by the definition Ash and Gallacher (2015: 70) propose, that ‘[a]ttunement can be 
understood as a basic way of sensing the world before we organise it through internal self-narration’. 
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beyond conscious recognition. More than this, my experience is one of being 
underwater – I’m absorbed in my task, deep beneath the water – while re-emerging 
similarly provokes a shared avatar-gamer reaction – I make it, and breathe again. 
Similar experiences occur elsewhere in relation to my concern over the avatar 
body in ways that demonstrate the swift switch between subjective and objective 
analysis. I recognise the incorporation of “self” and “other” in my own fieldnotes, and 
attempt to make sense of the visceral responses that occur in game: 
 
When gaming I ran into a fire and therefore got set on fire which transmits 
damage. In a panic I ran into the water. What weird application of logic is 
this?! I can’t tell who is at fault, me or the game. The game decides the logic 
that if you walk into a fire you get set on fire and if you get set on fire it hurts. It 
doesn’t recognise the logic of water+fire though, and instead the pain is 
programmed to last a certain period – a matter of seconds as shown in the top 
right of the screen. I wrote pain. What I mean is damage. No one is in pain. I 
must keep telling myself that. (Wilde 2015: 142) 
 
These feelings of being “freaked out” and “panicking” show my loss of 
(perceived) control over the situation and the concern that I felt towards the damage that 
was being inflicted. The first sentence describes the events in objective unconcerned 
tones, but the feeling was truly of confusion, concern, and – as the fire continued – 
panic. The language reflects this in the switch to the description of “suffering” (echoed 
in the following sentences with “hurt” and “pain”). This is not objective but subjective 
and whilst I felt no pain the panic was a visceral feeling. This moment signifies the 
intra-action between the avatar, the gameworld and myself. As I panic, viscerally, for 
the well-being of my avatar I apply “Real Life” logic to this virtual world and try to 
save myself, or her(?) through submerging my/her body in water. When this doesn’t 
work I am frustrated and confused (Wilde 2015: 142). 
Farrow and Iacovides (2012: 4) assert that ‘we never experience the physical 
pain of a wounded avatar; only a representation of it’. However, I contest the idea that 
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we do not experience the avatar subjectively42. Although we necessarily experience the 
avatar differently to our own physical body; the above is one such example of the 
involuntary physical and visceral reaction to the experience of the avatar (Wilde 2015: 
143). 
We could also draw some interesting conclusions regarding the perceived 
“reality” of the situation in the above fieldnote. It is as if the visceral nature of the panic 
has accentuated a belief in the danger, which is presented by the fire. This example 
shows the extent to which gaming experience becomes both a cognitive and bodily 
activity of immersion in the game (Wilde 2015: 142-143). The fieldnote also provides 
an interesting twist with regards to the post-digital treatment of “real” vs. “virtual”, 
which acknowledges that ‘digital technology is deeply embedded in “everyday life”. It 
serves to emphasize that “the digital” is not as definite as we might assume: that it is no 
“virtual reality” distinct from our everyday world, but a constitutive part of it’ (Kwastek 
2015: 79). Accordingly, the game experiences are not felt as a “virtual” (and therefore 
“unreal”) domain, but elicit reactions that would fit with our “everyday world”. In the 
affective reality of this moment there is an instinctual desire to apply ingrained, logical, 
“real life” solutions of water to douse the flames. Rather than the detached unemotional 
engagement online that sceptics such as Turkle (2011) might assume, instead what is 
indicated with the avatar here is an ethics of care that extended beyond the physical 
“self” and into an online environment. Whilst Turkle’s (2011: 6) concern is that in 
caring for a technological other we are somehow diminished, I side with Pepperell’s 
(2003: 172) claim that ‘the recognition that none of us are actually distinct from each 
other, or the world, will profoundly affect the way we treat each other, different species 
and the environment. To harm anything is to harm oneself’. Accordingly, empathy and 
care for an avatar could be considered as a step towards a broader empathy and care for 
all “others” beyond the “self”. This could be aligned with Braidotti’s (2013: 49-50) 
posthuman ethics that emphasises an ‘enlarged sense of inter-connection between self 
and others, including the non-human or ‘earth’ others, by removing the obstacle of self-
																																																						
42 It is also potentially problematic to suggest that the ways in which we experience the pain of our own 
physical bodies is in isolation from external perceptions. Researchers at Harvard University have found 
that our experience of pain can depend on whether or not we think it is being caused intentionally, with 




centred individualism’ (I return to notions of posthuman ethics in more depth in the 
following chapter). 
A second way we could explain the complex forms of empathy at play when the 
avatar-gamer extend into one another is Coplan’s (2011) ‘affective matching’, which 
she lists as an essential feature of empathy. In Coplan’s (2011: 7) definition, ‘this 
matching must come about in a particular way, namely through other-oriented 
perspective-taking’. In her view, this perspective taking is more than nonconscious 
mimicry, so that emotional contagion alone does not constitute empathy (Wilde and 
Evans 2017: 9). Instead, ‘affective matching occurs only if an observer’s affective states 
are qualitatively identical to a target’s, though they may vary in degree. The observer 
must therefore experience the same type of emotion (or affect) as the target’ (Coplan 
2011: 6). She continues: 
 
[o]ne of the key differences between emotional contagion and empathy is that 
contagion is a direct, automatic, unmediated process. Empathy is never fully 
unmediated since it requires perspective-taking. Roughly, perspective-taking is 
an imaginative process through which one constructs another person’s 
subjective experience by simulating the experience of being in the other’s 
situation. (Coplan 2011: 9) 
 
Gameplay empathy, by its nature, is never unmediated. And although the fieldnotes 
certainly demonstrate instances of emotional contagion, such that there is automatic 
imitation of one another in the avatar-gamer relationship, I argue that the extracts above 
demonstrate more than this. One might argue that holding one’s breath (in the fieldnote 
underwater) or trying to put out a fire (in the extract above) is instinctive; however, in 
those instances there was also concern and panic. In the empathetic blurring of 
embodied, affective and cognitive, such fieldnotes demonstrate a reaction to the 
situation, including recognition of what the consequence of the immediate danger is: for 
instance, drowning or burning. I expand on how this perspective-taking is facilitated 
through the game below. In this extract, empathy emerges directly through the 
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mechanics of the game, which produces an embodied reaction in the avatar that directly 
affects the gamer. 
 
I am “disorientated” – this is both a spell that hits me and an actual feeling! 
The disorientation spell forces the person hit with it to run off in the wrong 
direction, changing suddenly at a tangent, and then again, and again. It is a 
brilliant “spell” for the fact that it is subjectively experienced exactly as 
intended – it is completely disorientating and I’m totally thrown by it, having no 
idea where I have ended up when the spell is over. (Wilde and Evans 2017: 9) 
 
As I have discussed above, empathy is more than the impulse to repeat affect, but is a 
deeply felt perspective-taking that produces affective reactions and extends the feeling 
of self. In the above, this shared perspective between Etyme and myself is enhanced by 
a sudden change during gameplay.  
The “disorientation spell” creates a seamless experience between avatar and 
gamer, whereby one, the avatar, physically reacts to it (moving around the gamespace), 
and the other, the gamer, feels it. The account given refutes any boundary between 
human and non-human and the lines between the physical reaction and the feeling of 
disorientation merge, shaping the holistic experience of the disorientation spell. We 
could take this analysis even further: while we cannot ever know what Etyme feels, this 
is true of all other human and non-human objects (Wilde and Evans 2017: 9). At the 
very least, the intra-action between avatar and gamer demonstrates a distributed 
empathy, whereby the body has the capacity to affect and to be affected, so that both 
have a vibrancy that deems the relationship between the two horizontal, non-
hierarchical and heterogeneous (Bennett 2010). 
Reading the concept of empathy through Coplan’s (2011) notion of ‘affective 
matching’ and Blackman’s (2012) nonconscious mimicry, I would argue that the 
embodiment of gameplay represented by the extracts above is a post-biological one: 
‘both organic and inorganic, living and non-living, material and immaterial’ (Blackman 
2012: 13-14). This takes gameplay beyond the view of the avatar as a tool, as we begin 




Empathetic connections in pride, skill and achievement 
  
I realise I feel really proud of these achievements, like me and Etyme have 
become a more formidable team, working together and eliminating our foes. 
 
The empathetic relationship therefore goes beyond moments of shock or bodily affect, 
but also occurs through a cognitive matching. In the note above, distributed cognition 
experienced by the gamer becomes clear (e.g. “me and Etyme”) and the empathetic 
lines less so. Is the player experiencing empathy for the avatar’s achievement, or vice 
versa? Just as Boulter (2015: 65) asks ‘who is playing? Who is being played?’, we 
could ask “who is achieving? Who is being achieved?”. The sense of achievement is 
distributed, and the source of either achievement or rightful “ownership” of the 
achievement is unclear, becoming in “human” terms an example of “good teamwork” 
(see Chapter 7: Emergent Subject Positions for further exploration of achievement and 
“good” behaviours as humanist constructs that need destabilising in a posthuman 
account). 
Therefore, in addition to empathy facilitating the experience of an extended 
body, the narrative of the game also elicits emotional responses that engender 
imaginative empathy, especially in the shared experiences of the avatar-gamer as the 
two co-develop. Although “imaginative” might suggest these empathetic connections 
are fictional, I would argue that a posthuman empathy would not require a distinction 
between the “real” and the “imagined”43. The broad field of posthumanism has already 
identified the problems that occur from creating or enforcing binary positions such as 
machine/human, real/virtual, man/woman to name but a few (see for example Braidotti 
2013; Halberstam and Livingstone 1995; Boulter 2015), and to consider gaming as an 
experience outside of “real life” ignores it as a situated, embodied practice. In gaming, 
																																																						




the emotional reactions that empathy provokes are experientially real, although 
admittedly with less longevity or consequence44.  
As with my analysis above of shared embodiment, this imaginative empathy 
between avatar-gamer can at first occur as affective embodied reactions to events in 
ways that demonstrate the interconnections between mind, body and cognition. The 
extract below retells a moment where Etyme and myself experienced something 
unexpected, which provokes a desire for retribution. 
  
I round a corner at one point, climbing a tower, and suddenly encounter a mob 
which, for one reason or another, I wasn’t expecting. “Whoa, fuck!” I 
involuntarily gasp, my heart lurches and I quickly scramble to regain 
equilibrium and kill off the offending mob. It is unlikely that it would actually 
succeed in killing me but there is a particular kind of vengeance I feel towards it 
for having taken me by surprise and I dispatch it quickly – in my mind brutally. 
It panicked me, disrupting my equilibrium and shaking me from my perceived 
skill and feeling of prowess. I take a moment, and vow to be more diligent as I 
scrutinise the remaining enemies below. I drop down on them from above, and 
unleash my anger in efficient blows. (Wilde and Evans 2017: 11) 
  
In the above, a seamless and nonconscious reaction to the game produces a visceral 
affective response – “Whoa, fuck!”. In addition, however, there is also an imaginative, 
emotional engagement with the game, which cannot be reduced to the body alone. 
Instead cognitive and affective experiences expand our embodied awareness through 
their different operations (Braidotti 2013; Hayles 1999). Here, for example, the avatar-
gamer reaction to this moment of gameplay produces an emotive reaction, retold in the 
fieldnotes as vengeance, pride and anger. The perception of anger being unleashed in 
“efficient blows” seems to indicate a projected empathy from the part of the avatar, 
responding to the anger of the player and externalising it through action. Part of these 
																																																						
44 Additionally, in the traditional sciences, empathy itself has been shown to make use of the same 
neuronal pathways, regardless of whether the events are ‘fictional’ or ‘real life’ (Kemp 2012: xviii), so 
that the biological body empathetically reacts in chemically similar ways to characters in books and films 
as it would to another material body. 
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emotions are facilitated by the affordances of MMORPGs, which enable both player vs. 
environment and player vs. player gameplay, meaning that the experiences of the game 
are in some way mediated by the existence of other avatar or avatar-gamer bodies. The 
further categorisation of these “others” as either Alliance or Horde creates a social 
context through which various power relations are shaped (Chen 2009; Williams et al. 
2006). The recognition of the avatar-gamer self, expressed above as being skilled, 
having “prowess” and an ability to land “efficient blows”, means that, like all forms of 
subjectivity, self-awareness is formed through recognition (and misrecognition) of the 
self as separate to others (both human and non-human), thereby imagining these others 
to also have self-awareness. 
Emotions during gameplay are therefore not asocial or individual, but are 
constituted through the intra-action with “objects” in the game. For me, the emotional 
entanglement of avatar-gamer has been most evident in fieldnotes collected during 
player vs. player scenarios and battlegrounds. These battlegrounds are events that occur 
outside the “normal” gameplay, and players have to join a queue to wait their turn to 
enter them. When ready, you are transported from your position within World of 
Warcraft to a battleground location that is a specific environment for Alliance and 
Horde factions to meet and combat one another in teams. These battlegrounds facilitate 
empathetic relations to emerge between avatar-gamer and other avatar-gamers, and 
encourages the feeling that gameplay has a real, meaningful impact on the environment. 
  
I enjoy the sense of achievement which I get in battlegrounds, as it makes your 
proficiency public. It’s basically an opportunity to show off, highlighting how 
much of a performance it is as it serves as an opportunity to display to others 
how skilful you are, how good you look. You are rewarded by conquering your 
foes and collecting on the achievement points, ultimately winning the battle. At 
the end of each battleground the achievements for each player are displayed, 






There is such a level of pent up excitement on these battlegrounds, and even 
when you spend much of your time dead (as I do) this is made more obvious 
through the forced procedure of waiting the allotted amount of time before you 
can resurrect and get back to the fight. At one point I engage in one-on-one 
combat with another hunter: we both circle each other slowly, our awareness of 
the space reduced to that which flows between us and ignoring all of the other 
players who flow around us. Our ranged attack on each other is interrupted by 
the end of the battleground. 
  
Above, I recount the affective feelings of pride, excitement, glory and impatience in 
gameplay, which are again coupled with affective embodied reactions such the temporal 
feeling of time passing when waiting to “resurrect”, or in losing spatial awareness and 
getting lost in the moment. Unlike earlier extracts from the fieldnotes, the narrative 
retelling often appears without “Etyme”, with both avatar and gamer becoming “I” and 
the events within gameplay affecting this “I”. This has already been noted in the 
previous chapter in relation to the phenomenon of “pronoun play” (see, for example, 
Hand 2005; Burn and Schott 2014). Moreover, the former extract also demonstrates the 
potential emotional payoffs within social interaction, as well as through the publishing 
of the “results”. As Ash (2012a: 18) has stated, the display of user points amplifies the 
potential for affect ‘beyond the original event in which the achievement was gained’. 
These feelings of achievement are further facilitated through the story that sets Alliance 
and Horde in opposition to each other, so that your own “work” belongs to a wider plot. 
 
Narrative engagement 
Although the elements of cognitive matching that are discussed in the above section 
demonstrate an engagement with the overarching storyline it is nevertheless worth 
considering how this matching varies. It would appear common sense to assume that 
part of what facilitates an empathic experience and cognitive matching between avatar 
and gamer would be engagement with the narrative, as the interactive medium of games 
require that any story or situation given to the avatar must be enacted by the gamer 
(assuming they are playing according to the rules – Mortensen (2011) has written about 
 
164 
deviant strategies that demonstrate some subversive styles of play that challenge such 
conformity). As previously discussed (see Chapter 5 Acting to Intra-acting) this means 
that agency is enacted through the entangled entities – the gamer’s capacity to act is 
channelled through the avatar and for the avatar to progress with the in-game quests the 
gamer must allow the avatar’s motivations to be projected onto themselves. However, 
this is not necessarily through an emotional engagement with the World of Warcraft 
storyline. 
Whilst in the previous chapter I shared some fieldnotes that demonstrated my 
own desire to understand the narrative in the game, I have also been surprised by how 
easily the “formal” narrative structure of the game can be neglected. For example, when 
given a quest by an NPC (non-playing character) in World of Warcraft the gamer is 
presented with a pop-up box of the NPC’s speech about that quest. The brief includes a 
summary of the details of the task (e.g. ‘NPC wants you to kill 10 spiders’) and under 
that are the buttons to accept or decline. In dungeons, which usually involve five 
gamers working together towards a specific goal, it becomes immediately apparent that 
gamers are accepting the quests as quickly as possible in order to get on and complete 
them; no one is actually stopping to read the whys and wherefores or getting involved 
in the narrative: 
 
playing dungeons is a completely different experience. There is no time to 
actually read the instructions or get to grips with the story that you’re actually 
trying to follow or complete with being in the dungeon. Because I have recently 
realised that this is precisely what imbues a level of “immersion” in my own 
gaming experience this is quite disruptive because if I don’t listen to what the 
NPCs are saying and don’t read their text I miss out on the story aspect but if I 
do I get left behind. So there is no time to read and figure out what it is that you 
are actually supposed to be doing and you simply accept objectives without 
necessarily reading them. I end up leaving a dungeon because the party has 




Whilst this fieldnote demonstrates my own interest in narrative it also 
demonstrates the highly subjective experience of gaming and the difference in potential 
playing styles that gamers can move between45. Engagement with narrative can be a 
highly “immersive” activity in some forms of gaming, however, I would suggest that – 
for some gamers – it is more of an optional quality and their focus is on progression and 
achievement rather than story46. However, this isn’t to say that empathy with an avatar 
isn’t being experienced, only that what drives people’s engagement in the game is 
highly variable – the examples in the above section demonstrating pride and skill are 
affective and empathic, but do not relate to specific mini-narratives within the game. 
In my own gameplay I have felt most engaged with the overarching competitive 
narrative, either through the battlegrounds or through a feeling of pride in my 
achievements as discussed in the above section. Elsewhere, optional involvement when 
various locations in world have been “under attack” from players of the opposite faction 
have provided motivation to engage with the fight. 
In game you are alerted when a location nearby is under attack by the statement 
appearing in the chat box on the “Local Defence Channel” whenever a member of the 
opposing faction enters a territory that is not theirs and begins attacking the NPCs there 
(Wilde 2015: 144). 
 
I receive notification that a territory near me is under attack and quickly make 
the decision to go to its defence. After flying furiously and silently urging my 
mount on faster (an action which is only perceptible by my finger pressing the 
“forwards” key harder on the keyboard) when I finally arrive at the place I am 
suddenly cautious and somewhat tentative. I notice the invading players ahead. 
Instead of the number indicating their level, a small skull with glowing red eyes 
appears in its place, which strengthens the feeling of foreboding within me. 
Unsurprisingly, I’m killed almost instantly. When I resurrect I swiftly summon 
																																																						
45 As seen in Chapter 3, Bartle (1996) has most famously written about different player types, however it 
is important to note that the way in which a player engages with a game need not necessarily be stable or 
fixed, and they may play different games in entirely different ways. 
46 It may be that this is more prevalent in MMORPGs due to the open world structure – where single 
player games usually follow one narrative, the possibilities for exploration are wider in MMORPGs, 
which can lead to non-linear storylines (Wilde 2015: 144). 
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my flying mount and launch myself into the air away from the enemy players. 
Initially I expect pursuit but when it isn’t immediately forthcoming I edge closer 
– though still a safe distance away. The enemy players are standing in a loose 
circle and I can only presume are in deep discussion. I am ignored, or unseen, 
and eventually skulk off, a little abashed for having attempted something 
obviously beyond my ability. There has been a depth of feeling in this quest 
which has been absent from the PvE (player versus environment) quests from 
NPCs and I wonder at the way in which the human involvement has changed 
that. I wonder also whether it is to do with the difficulty level, and the potential 
to fail. Most of the PvE quests are easily achievable; it is not hard to outwit the 
machine. This in turn means that the achievement itself feels hollow. There 
needs to be some sense of a challenge in order to make the quest resonate as a 
REAL quest, a REAL victory. Other RL players provide this touchstone with 
reality which seems to facilitate a deeper sense of affect. I think it links back to 
the notion of there being a sense of consequence. (Wilde 2015: 144-145) 
 
This fieldnote demonstrates another moment of reflexive engagement with the game 
experience, questioning the affects that move between determination, hesitance, and 
humiliation. Although this fieldnote might be criticised for implying a preference to 
playing with “humans” rather than outwitting the “machine” and thereby imposing a 
dichotomy that this thesis aims to avoid, it is actually the level of difficulty that I note 
as being of the utmost importance for facilitating a sense of “real” achievement. Farrow 
and Iacovides (2012: 9) suggest that ‘[a] more immersive or convincing sense of 
embodiment within digital worlds may also depend on experiencing a convincing, 
meaningful world within which the player has a sense of choice and responsibility’47. 
Whitlock (2004: 124) presents another view; that the “reality” of playing with 
others facilitates adrenaline: ‘[c]hallenging and outwitting another human as opposed to 
the artificial intelligence of the computer increased the sense of ‘winning’ adding to 
player satisfaction’. Whilst this view seems to implicitly impose a real/virtual binary 
																																																						
47 Interestingly these definitions can again bring us back to theatre by way of Aristotle’s Poetics, where 
he states that imitated actions should be ‘an action which has serious implications, is complete, and 
possesses magnitude’ (2004 [c. 335 BCE]: 99). 
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that I want to avoid, I would suggest that the empathetic connection between avatar-
gamers are so intertwined as to create another form of empathy, where the avatar-gamer 
joins into the phenomena of other avatar-gamers. The empathy that is being 
experienced between my avatar-gamer entanglement is implicated in another’s avatar-
gamer entanglement, so that each of these intra-actions are made more affective through 
their intra-action with one another. This creates a sense of an intensified empathy as it is 
experienced as more meaningful through the incorporation of more entities. I would 
therefore suggest that in this intra-action there is a continuous affective flow, where the 
avatar-gamer are not only one posthuman subjectivity, but are actively affective and 
affecting other objects (including other avatar-gamers) in their environment, creating a 
vast network of posthuman subjectivities (Wilde and Evans 2017: 12). 
 
Human-non-human 
So far I have argued gameplay empathy creates a range of posthuman subjectivities by 
shaping cognitive and affective extensions of the avatar-gamer entanglement; emotional 
perspective-taking with other players; and the engagement with the story and world 
provided by the game. The avatar-gamer subject is integral: they feel together through 
the body, while the existence of other feeling avatar-gamers means that this posthuman 
embodiment is shared, distributed and connected, creating the space for emotions such 
as pride, skill and achievement, within a particular context that, whether gamers engage 
with it fully or not, nevertheless provides motivation for the action to take place. I 
would suggest this is both a conscious and nonconscious extension in a human-machine 
world that has co-evolved (Hayles 2006), so that the two “objects” – avatar and gamer – 
become inseparable subjects. In my fieldnotes, this is provoked when empathy connects 
one subject to another through the very human fear of death: 
  
Etyme falls from a great height and I gasp. It is completely involuntary, I am in 
that moment, her, falling, perhaps to her/my death. It is a ridiculous concept 
because even if Etyme were to die I would be fine, and it would take just 
moments to run my spirit through the graveyard to find her body and resurrect. 
Note the my/her complications. The boundaries are blurred. She is not me but 
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she is not not-me. Just as Daboo (2007: 264 and 271) notes as actors create 
characters who they ‘both are-and-are-not [...] It is both me-and-not-me at the 
same time’. (Wilde 2015: 143) 
  
Although “I” as gamer am in no danger, the perceived threat against the avatar is felt 
empathetically through the holding of a breath, a gasp, a “lurch” in the heart. Such 
instances demonstrate the blurring of boundaries that occurs in gaming, where avatar-
gamer are experienced as enmeshed, because they put into practice the fundamental fear 
of impermanence. Such experiences allow for a body-subject that operates with and 
through technical entities and enables a flow of bodily being, whereby: 
  
[t]he term ‘body’ is usually replaced by the concept of body-subject […] which 
displaces a mind-body dualism but does not reduce bodies to material 
(physiological, neurological, biological) processes. The incorporations enacted 
by a body-subject include technical, material extensions which articulate the 
body in new ways. (Blackman 2012: 9) 
 
  I would take Blackman’s (2012) suggestion of the body-subject further, and 
would argue that empathy allows for a state that is neither wholly about distributed 
embodiments nor distributed emotions, but a concept that allows for the dynamic intra-
action between the two: an ‘ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting 
components’ (Barad 2007: 33). In my own self-reflections on gameplay, this dynamic 
also means that to be both me-and-not-me involves something more than becoming 
Etyme, demonstrating that posthuman subjectivity is not only about living in the body 
of the machine. Etyme herself is a necessary part of this emergent empathy. At times, 
Etyme dying can be experienced as the player dying (or provoking the fear of death); at 
other times, gameplay can feel like a negotiation (or even struggle) between two 
separate-but-connected subjects. By refusing the boundary between human and non-
human and rethinking this relationship as one which is constantly in flux, we can 
conceptualise the avatar differently, capable of an affective exchange with the gamer, 





In this chapter I have suggested that we could consider empathy to be a posthuman 
concept that disrupts the idea of the human as a bounded and fixed self and instead 
emphasises relationality, intersubjectivity and permeability. In gaming this is made 
apparent through the affective and cognitive involvement of avatar and gamer, and 
these affective flows which transcend the boundaries between human and non-human. 
This allows for a space where specific posthuman subjectivities are formed from intra-
acting components. These subjectivities are emergent and require an equality of bodies, 
both virtual and physical. This is a posthumanism which acknowledges the importance 
of embodiment and affect along Braidotti’s (2013: 90-91) lines: ‘[a] posthuman notion 
of the enfleshed and extended, relational self’, which ‘allows us to respect the bond of 
mutual dependence between bodies and technological others’. The avatar-gamer as 
posthuman subjectivity is an empathically connected construction of avatar and gamer 
through both perspective-taking and embodiment, and demonstrates an intimacy 
between material and immaterial.  
If we read empathy as a posthuman affect, which follows Braidotti’s (2013: 26) 
values that ‘object to the unitary subject of Humanism, including its socialist variables, 
and to replace it with a more complex and relational subject framed by embodiment, 
sexuality, affectivity, empathy and desire as core qualities’, our concept of subjectivity 
becomes one that resists the idea of the human as a fixed and bounded entity by 
demonstrating the ways in which human beings are enmeshed through their ability to 
affect and be affected by circumstances, environments, and feelings beyond what is 
housed in the “boundary” of their skin. The posthuman model understands that ‘human 
functionality expands because the parameters of the cognitive system it inhabits 
expand’ (Hayles 1999: 290-291) and that rather than transcending the body we instead 
extend our embodied awareness. This way of thinking of our way of being could also 
allow us to consider what Blackman (2012: xxiii) terms ‘the problem of being “one yet 
many” […] how we can be “more than one and less than many”, or how we can “hang 
together” in light of the multiple possibilities of becoming that exist’. Blackman (2012: 
xxiii) goes on to explore ‘[t]he paradoxes and puzzles that this creates in offering a 
relational and processual account of corporeality and subjectivity’ and this thesis 
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follows her lead, considering gaming as one way in which we can examine relational 
and processual subjectivity. We could therefore suggest that empathy is an affect that 
facilitates Hayles’ expansion of awareness, or Blackman’s ‘relational subjectivity’, 
which could be considered as ‘psychological attunement’ (Blackman 2012: xxv).  
For the gamer, the “posthumanising” of empathy is made more apparent 
precisely through the fact that the body that one is empathising with and the 
environment in which it navigates its experience is a digital construction, a virtual 
world. This does not, however, serve to disrupt the affective flow – as demonstrated by 
the fieldnotes discussed above, the digital experience of gaming is very much felt to be 
one which does not bifurcate the experience as “real” vs. “virtual”: Broadhurst (2012: 
9) puts it, ‘[r]ather, than being separate from the body, technology becomes part of the 
body and alters and recreates our experience in the world’. In this way there is a sense 
of empathic connection as the objectives of avatar and gamer emerge through their 
specific intra-action in the gameworld. 
My concept of a posthuman empathy is therefore decentralised: it is not 
“owned” by either gamer or avatar or game. I have explored how the empathetic 
relationship between avatar-gamer actively problematises any clear distinctions 
between human and machine. I have deployed the use of empathy in a more fluid 
understanding of the experience, expanding the concept of empathy to include an 
acknowledgement of the empathetic capacity of non-human elements in an 
entanglement and a rhizomatic understanding of the different agencies at play. My 
“posthuman empathy” blends the principles of posthumanism (e.g. in a post-
anthropocentric acknowledgement of the permeability of beings) with the principles of 
empathy (e.g. a dynamic interaction of cognitive and affective responses) (Wilde and 
Evans 2017: 13). 
In my analysis, the relationship between Etyme and I is one of care, concern and 
connection, despite the avatar’s digital form. Such avatar-gamer relationships are 
testament to the deep connections between human and machine. My empathetic 
relationship with the avatar is indicative of the very real experience of connecting with 
non-human others, in ways that do not fight for dominance of human over machine but 
accept the equality of both avatar and gamer: a principle central to posthuman ethics 
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(e.g. Braidotti 2013; Bennett 2010). What emerges is ‘a more relational ontology that 
explores how entities emerge from intra-actions consisting of human and non-human 
agencies’ (Blackman 2012: 174). 
The shifting flows between self and other are complex yet easily apparent in the 
fieldnotes – for example in the switches between “I”, “we” and “Etyme”. The 
relationship is a constant negotiation between the avatar and gamer, as the desires of 
one cannot be achieved without the actions of another, so that each part must be 
receptive to the goals of the other. This empathy is further facilitated by the game 
mechanics which constantly seek to bring the avatar and gamer together and allow a 
spectrum of feelings to proliferate, demonstrated above through feelings from 
disorientation to pride48. Connecting with the avatar demands an emotional and 
embodied attachment in order to succeed at the game, and using empathy I have been 
able to acknowledge these particular moments in order to demonstrate the intra-
dependence at the centre of avatar-gamer relationships (Wilde and Evans 2017: 14). 
Empathy has therefore been used as one analytic for how posthuman 
subjectivity has arisen from the avatar-gamer in World of Warcraft. I have 
demonstrated how empathy helps to conceptualise the connection between a human and 
non-human “other”, in a way that shares perspectives and bodies along channels of 
affective feeling. The experience is one that is undeniably fuses human and machine, 
retaining emotional and embodied feelings in a permeable way. 
Having moved from acting as a specific, performative practice, to empathy as a 
broader emergent capacity experienced through different intra-actions, in the following 
chapter I take this work further to consider not only specific practices that could be 








Chapter 7: Emergent Subject Positions 
‘The human being is not the eternal basis of human history and human culture but a 
historical and cultural artefact.’ (Rose 1998: 22) 
	
Introduction 
The first theme of this thesis (Chapter 5: From Acting to Intra-acting) looked at the 
practice of acting, and complicated this through posthumanism. Drawing on my own 
knowledge of acting theory from a background in performance and my work as an 
actor, I used Stanislavskian and Chekhovian acting techniques and considered how 
these were apparent in the intra-action of avatar and gamer. By re-reading these themes 
using posthuman theory I was able to trouble notions of self-mastery and control that 
some acting practices promote, and showed how some of the more “textual” elements 
of the game (including aspects of character choice, backstory, and appearance) could be 
“posthumanised”. 
From there I moved to more affective aspects of MMORPG gaming, 
considering moments of high intensity (Chapter 6: Enacting Empathy). Reading these 
as empathic experiences, I then explored the ways in which “dangerous” embodied 
encounters evoked a visceral response; how I could broaden aspects of narrative 
engagement from a performative perspective into an empathic one; and how feelings of 
pride and skill were linked to the game. Critically analysing the notion of empathy and 
troubling the notions of “self” and “other” differentiation, I proposed a “posthuman 
empathy”. 
Having moved from the more “textual” engagements with the game to a focus 
on the affective experience, the following chapter looks at another sphere of posthuman 
subjectivity, broadening those ideas still further to review how our “sense of self” is 
constituted.  In this chapter I consider how subject forming notions are experienced by 
posthuman subjectivities by extending humanist notions uncovered in the previous 
chapter, such as aspects of “achievement” and how this lends itself to a sense of 
progression and betterment. To do so I borrow from various understandings of how the 
human subject is formed, which at times lean into a more psychological perspective. 
However, as with Rose (1998: 2) before me, it is important to note that I ‘do not claim 
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to provide even the sketch for a history of psychology’ as summarising such a long 
history would not be doable in a single chapter, and would not advance the specific 
argument of this thesis. Instead, I explore how certain aspects of how we understand 
ourselves are historically contingent and therefore need “posthumanising”. 
Psychology has been tied up with how we understand ourselves in the 20th 
century – it is central to humanist conceptions of self (Polkinghorne 1991). 
Traditionally, as Blackman (2012: 185) explains, the notion of the autonomous self 
allowed an exploration of the ‘normative image of personhood that became embedded 
and produced within psychology’. This autonomous self is an inherent aspect of the 
liberal human subject. Humanism only makes sense if we understand ourselves in 
certain ways suggested by psychology – as motivated, attentive, progressive creatures. 
Whilst Sey (1999) makes some initial links towards a posthuman psychology in 
Cyberpsychology, these were based on an imposition of a technological order on the 
psychological subject. He suggests two potential outcomes of cyberpsychology in a 
posthuman culture (Sey 1999: 38-39). Firstly, that a subject “liberated” from the 
constraints of the body through cyberspace would allow for a metaphysical 
anthropology, and accordingly there would be more scope for freedom of expression 
and identity construction (Sey 1999: 38-39). Conversely, the alternative outcome would 
be a ‘lament for the passing of the human which the information era might imply’ (Sey 
1999: 39). In either scenario, Sey’s (1999) posthuman is more in line with a tele- and 
technologically deterministic version. It therefore approaches posthuman psychology in 
a somewhat machinic manner, rather than from the position of destabilising the liberal 
human subject. In this chapter I instead propose that in order to consider posthuman 
subjectivity we need to return to psychological humanist perspectives and rethink them.  
This chapter’s purpose is twofold. On the one hand it demonstrates how certain 
humanist notions of subject formation are prevalent even within the posthuman context 
of the avatar-gamer subjectivity, thus demonstrating humanism’s strong grip on our 
understandings of “self”. On the other hand, it critically engages with these notions of 
motivation, attention, progression and what our histories mean to us. I complicate these 
taken-for-granted ideals, and show how certain emotions and affects (boredom, 
nostalgia, frustration) have been neglected in the conception of self proposed by the 
liberal human subject. Focussing on these more “negative” feelings sheds light on the 
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As I explained in Chapter 3: Embracing a Contradictory Methodology, I am still using 
the notion of subjectivity, despite some questions as to whether this is a radical enough 
use of posthumanism (see, for one discussion, Callus and Herbrechter 2012: 249). I laid 
out my argument for the use of the “I” – as Herbrechter (2012: 332) states: ‘anything 
human (including the post-, trans- or inhuman) is […] unthinkable without a notion of 
subjectivity’. From this perspective, and in my own view, the subject therefore remains 
integral to the paradigms in which we operate (Callus and Herbrechter 2012: 259). 
 Nevertheless, as this thesis has demonstrated thus far, notions and protocols of 
the liberal human subject and subjectivity itself are ‘critiqued or at least critically 
extend[ed], implicitly but also quite explicitly in places’ (to borrow from Callus and 
Herbrechter 2012: 255) in posthumanism. But what are some of the overarching aspects 
of subjectivity that shape our understanding of self? Hayles (1999: 3) provides an 
insight as to the disruption of humanism through posthuman subjectivity: 
 
[t]o elucidate the significant shift in underlying assumptions about subjectivity 
signaled by the posthuman, we can recall one of the definitive texts 
characterizing the liberal humanist subject: C. B. Macpherson’s analysis of 
possessive individualism. “Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the 
individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing 
nothing to society for them. ... The human essence is freedom from the wills of 
others, and freedom is a function of possession.” The italicized phrases mark 
convenient points of departure for measuring the distance between the human 
and the posthuman. 
 
The notions of free will and individuality are ones that I will explore in the following 
chapter through aspects of motivation, attention, and progression, as I try to make sense 
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of certain experiences that demonstrate the very entangled practices that we engage in 
and how open to influence we are. However, more than that I argue that there are 
certain affects and feelings that have also been written out of the conception of 
subjectivity to instead emphasise what it is to be a good, liberal human subject. It is my 
suggestion that posthuman subjectivity should therefore necessarily focus on these 




As Danziger (1997: 39) has explained, ‘[m]any of the fundamental categories of 
twentieth-century psychology are, to all intents and purposes, twentieth-century 
inventions’, and we should therefore be critical of the ways in which we understand 
ourselves, our subject formations, and what affects we pay attention to. Danziger (1997: 
40) continues by explaining that modern psychology was associated with a 
‘revolutionary restructuring of the network of categories employed in the 
conceptualization of human experience and conduct’. Accordingly, the notions of 
“human nature” should be understood as culturally and historically contingent – as we 
have seen in Chapter 2: Proposing the Posthuman Gamer the human subject as a 
“rational” being privileged those in power – the educated, white, male (see also 
Danziger 1997: 40; Rose 1998: 9). Danziger (1997) explores the shift from passion to 
emotion, and the rise of “reason” and “action” as individually negotiated (this focus on 
rationalism is often linked to the Age of Enlightenment, see, for example, Gergen 
1991). Whereas the “pre-modern” individual experienced themselves as being a part of 
the world and a higher order, this began to shift as humans saw themselves as distanced 
from their surroundings and environments. According to Danziger (1997: 49), this 
meant: 
 
a new conception of the self could become established. The self now became the 
subjectively localized point of origin from which each individual experienced 
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and acted on a world that had become no more than a source of those 
experiences and of the raw material for the individual’s actions49. 
 
We can immediately draw some interesting conclusions from Danziger’s analysis. 
Firstly, posthumanism critiques the liberal human subject that this shift in psychological 
thinking bears strong links to. At this point it is worth considering how posthumanism 
critiques notions of the “self” in a way that differs from post-structuralist anti-
humanism. According to Callus and Herbrechter (2012: 254), whilst post-structuralism 
has ‘approached the question of “subjectivity by design” only theoretically […] [i]t is 
posthumanism that is singular in pushing that question in the light of the praxis – not 
least theory’s own – that follows upon the question not being, any longer, merely 
hypothetical or speculative’50. Posthumanism therefore aims to interfere more radically 
in our conception of what it is to be a self or a subject than post-structuralism, by 
proposing different ways of being through more distributed and post-anthropocentric 
understandings of self. As Pepperell (2003: 172) suggests, posthumanism’s recognition 
that we are all entangled rather than distinct ‘will profoundly affect the way we treat 
each other, different species and the environment. To harm anything is to harm oneself’. 
Furthermore, where post-structuralist anti-humanism has been be considered a 
less hopeful paradigm (see, for example, contributions to Ramazanoglu 1993), 
posthumanism offers a more ‘affirmative’ framework, as Braidotti (2013) posits. As 
Pepperell (2013: 171) suggests, ‘posthumanism is about how we live, how we conduct 
our exploitation of the environment, animals and each other’. Likewise, my own work 
aims to go beyond ‘rhetoric’ and instead considers the ways in which we can make new 
conceptions of subjectivity matter (see also Braidotti 2013: 37). As the previous two 
chapters have shown, we can conduct ourselves in ways that embrace our distribution 
rather than battle it for a sense of mastery. In the following chapter, I therefore draw on 
post-structuralist thinkers such as Danzinger and Rose, but shift their critiques beyond 
post-structuralist analysis and into the posthuman domain by moving towards a more 
																																																						
49 A similar argument is made by Blackman (2012: 33) regarding the way in which crowd mentality and 
mental touch were written out of mainstream psychology, and were seen as ‘an exceptional, abnormal 
phenomenon’ that threatened ‘the boundaries of the atomized individual’. 
50 Although many of the creative approaches to writing that post-structuralists use could also be 
considered a form of praxis. 
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practical consideration. More than just “being” posthuman, I consider how are we 
“doing” posthumanism through our approaches to acting, or empathy, or, as this chapter 
will show, through boredom, frustration, or nostalgia. Reconceptualising ‘the values of 
liberal humanism, a coherent, rational self, the right of that self to autonomy and 
freedom, and a sense of agency linked with a belief in enlightened self-interest’ (Hayles 
1999: 85-86) is of utmost importance when exploring the posthuman condition, and 
these values will be some of the initial facets of subjectivity I will explore below. 
 Danziger’s (1997) analysis demonstrates the humanist conception of “self” as 
separate from surrounding as an historical shift – moving from pre-modern relationality 
to modern separation. As Braidotti (2013: 29) explains, liberal humanism has supported 
‘individualism, autonomy, responsibility and self-determination’ and these notions have 
therefore become deeply ingrained within our discourse and practices. It is therefore 
essential to explore how entrenched our perceptions of these “traits” are, to the extent 
that they are apparent even in our entangled, posthuman practices, in order to consider 
ways in which we may then go on to destabilise them. 
 In the game, the avatar-gamer subjectivity demonstrates our need for a separate 
subjectivity, and our humanistic aim for individuality, as I explore below with the 
example of personal space. Even whilst we experience the self as multiple through the 
relationship with the avatar, the desire to see the “self” as individual is experienced. 
Consider the following fieldnote: 
 
In World of Warcraft you can stand in exactly the same place as another player 
(by this I mean that although there are certain solid objects in a game which 
you cannot walk into, avatar bodies are not a part of this). It is interesting 
therefore, that when I am in a dungeon I find it completely off-putting when 
someone stands in exactly the same space as me. There is no disruption to my 
action, and Etyme fires off her killing blows just as efficiently. However, I do not 
like it. I can’t quite put my finger on what the problem is. There is some sort of 
an invasion of personal space, even though that space is not needed, or 
personal. I have to move Etyme out of the way, even just by a few steps. It 
disrupts the reality of the world for me, the reality of the space. I do not like to 
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see it so crowded, and I am aware of giving my avatar that personal bubble in 
which she is free to move in, obeying the conventional laws of space. I do not 
like not being able to see her myself, even though this doesn’t affect gameplay. I 
do not need to see her to “control” her actions. Interestingly, even when I can 
see her, I do not look at her. So it is odd, then, that when she is mixed in with a 
blur of bodies, I do not like it. It makes me feel uncomfortable. I have to move 
her to find a clear space for her to stand in, to claim as her own, for me to view 
her from. 
 
In the above extract, the desire for “personal space” for the avatar is experienced 
as something that allows the “reality” of the subject, “obeying the conventional laws of 
space”. Not having sight of Etyme is something which problematises the subjectivity 
that I have with her. It is “offputting”, “I do not like it” and it “makes me feel 
uncomfortable”. During these moments I felt very troubled by the “loss” of Etyme, and 
a strong desire to catch sight of her again – there was a strong affective and emotional 
reaction of feeling disturbed in some way. Jeffrey (1998: 1) states that invasions of 
personal space in social contexts ‘produce signs of discomfort prior to eventual flight’, 
and this is demonstrated above in the way that I am moved to move Etyme. Despite the 
fact that the gameplay is not impeded by sharing the space with other avatars it disrupts 
my sense of “self” – my sense as an autonomous being. This echoes the above analysis 
of the human understanding itself as separate from its surroundings. It is reiterated in 
the following fieldnote: 
 
When I get into the battleground I’m reminded again about how, when everyone 
spawns in the same place, it makes you feel somewhat uncomfortable to not see 
your avatar. I’ve noted previously how this seems odd – I don’t spend all of my 
time looking at Etyme so why should it bother me to not have that view of her? 
But it does. I’m obviously not the only one that feels this way: everyone moves 
themselves, their avatar selves, slightly away from the spawn spot, entering their 
own space, to create this non-disrupted view of their avatar selves. Maybe it’s 
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that same discomfort of running through other people (this happens with NPCs 
who are marching for example). It seems incongruous, like you are a ghost. 
 
In this second extract I not only seek reassurance that my response is “rational” 
(through justification that “I’m obviously not the only one who feels this way”), but I 
also question the legitimacy of the “self” when it is lost, feeling “like you are a ghost”. 
These demonstrate the ways in which the subject as individual actually lend it its 
legitimacy and “life” – to liken the sharing of space to being ghost-like demonstrates a 
loss of self, and life. Personal space therefore becomes more than only a spatial 
configuring. It is what defines me as “me”. DiPaola (1997: n.p.n.), writing about his 
experiences in designing effective avatar-gamer relationships (a concept he terms 
‘binding the pair’), notes personal space as indicative of a positive avatar-gamer bond. 
He states that users ‘can feel uncomfortable when another avatar comes too close and 
“invades their personal space”’, and that the uncomfortable feeling occurring also in 
virtual worlds indicates that users ‘perceive at some level that they are really there with 
other people – avatars are perceived as beings not as objects being manipulated by other 
users on their home computers’ (DiPaola 1997: n.p.n.). I would agree that this 
demonstrates avatars are perceived as beings rather than objects – if Etyme were an 
object why would it matter what space she occupied? Etyme being lost in other avatars 
doesn’t affect gameplay; I can still target different individuals or monsters to attack and 
there are no ill-effects, so this desire for space is not linked to functionality. The desire 
for personal space therefore seems indicative of an understanding of her as subject, 
earning the affordances of respectful distance.  
Following a study of personal space invasion in virtual worlds, Jeffrey and Mark 
(2003) discuss the implications of user’s discomfort and suggest practical implications 
(if the player is playing in first-person perspective, standing too close impedes their 
view) and aspects of social etiquette (it may be perceived as “getting in someone’s 
face”). However, I would suggest that more than this, the notion of personal space can 
be attributed to the humanistic desire for a separate subjectivity. 
Jeffrey (1998: 1) defines personal space as ‘an invisible area surrounding an 
individual which functions as a buffered comfort zone during interpersonal interaction’. 
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He explains that ‘[w]ithin physical environments, guidelines outlining appropriate 
behaviour and societal norms regulate individual behaviour during social interaction’ 
(Jeffrey 1998: 1). This focus on a buffered comfort zone that denotes social norms also 
speaks to a sense of separation from one’s surroundings, a desire to see the self as 
individual, unblurred from the environment. Returning to Pepperell (2003: 77), we 
previously saw his argument that ‘[i]n posthuman terms, […] humans are essentially 
indistinguishable from their environment. This is in contrast to the humanist view, 
which sees humans as essentially distinct from, in opposition to, and predominant 
within nature’. The performance of avatar “personal space” bizarrely echoes a humanist 
view where we desire to see the avatar as ‘essentially distinct’ from its environment, 
even whilst we do not always experience it as essentially distinct from ourselves as 
gamers. Thus even in an acknowledged posthuman subjectivity we cannot escape the 
overthrows of our humanistic upbringing, and we still desire the ‘ideal of the unified, 
coherent, self-centered subject’ (Rose 1998: 4). From this perspective our posthumanity 
is still entangled with our humanist history. 
 
Motivation and achievement 
How else can we view the implications of humanism at play in World of Warcraft? 
Whilst the above extracts demonstrate our visual desire for coherency and autonomy 
even within the gameworld, in the following section I trouble this reliance on 
individuality by demonstrating multiple ways to posthumanise the humanist notions of 
motivation and drive. 
In Danziger’s (1997) text Naming the Mind he devotes a whole chapter to 
Motivation and Personality, which chronicles the emergence of ideas concerning 
motivation. According to Danziger (1997: 102), ‘[b]oth the psychology of motivation 
and the psychology of personality were instructions of the inter-war period, the twenties 
and thirties of the twentieth century’. He explains that prior to World War I there was a 
dearth of psychological knowledge pertaining to notions of rewards and incentives 
(Danziger 1997). But from the 1920s onwards conceptions of character and interest, 
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satisfaction, work, desires, and the conflict of motives all began to appear (Danziger 
1997; Rose 1990)51.  
Conation had been used to understand the notions of will and desire as internally 
dictated (Danziger 1997: 106). However, the appearance of “motivation” as a concept 
capitalised on how humans were objects open to manipulation (Danziger 1997: 106). 
An attribute that had previously been perceived as “internal” was therefore reconceived 
as a force that was open to, and guided by, “external” factors (Danziger 1997: 106). 
This shift was focussed on the idea of using motivation as an apparatus for social 
control – “personal direction” became the object to be manipulated by external 
influence (Danziger 1997: 106). However, this was not to suggest that motivation could 
be achieved by inflicting or forcing manipulation. Instead this manipulation had to 
occur in dialogue with the individual’s desires and wishes that needed to be influenced 
and channelled in the right directions (Danziger 1997: 106). This enacted a dialogue 
between notions of internal and external, as ‘[d]esires and motives may be objects for 
the exercise of influence and control, but they also remain anchored into a discourse of 
subjective purposes and intentions. Bridging this duality was the fundamental 
theoretical task faced by the new psychology of motivation’ (Danziger 1997: 106). 
According to Danziger (1997), this constituted a significant shift in psychology. 
Whilst words such as will, desire, and wish had always been used in reference to human 
intentions, the notion of motivation grouped all of these ideas together, in order to 
imply that ‘all action, no matter how trivial or habitual, is motivated, according to those 
who were selling motivation’ (Danziger 1997: 105). 
This claim is familiar to our subjective sense of self – the liberal human subject 
is conceived of as a rational entity that is both in control of their own actions but also 
responsible for their own desires. As Rose (1998: 1 and 12) explains: ‘[i]t is in terms of 
our autonomous selves that we understand our passions and desires […] ‘free’ 
individuals are enjoined to govern themselves as subjects simultaneously of liberty and 
of responsibility – prudence, sobriety, steadfastness, adjustment, self-fulfilment, and the 
like’. Where a humanist perspective might inscribe an ‘autonomous individual striving 
																																																						
51 Rose (1990) additionally notes that the end of the War also signified the emergence of consumer 




for self-realization’ (Rose 1998: 17), a posthuman perspective on such desires would 
seek to embrace our goals and desires, our surroundings, and our “selves” as all being 
mutually entangled. The notion of motivation as being internally dependent and 
‘anchored into a discourse of subjective purposes and intentions’ (Danziger 1997: 106) 
is therefore complicated by posthuman subjectivity. In this view, “motivations” emerge 
from an intra-action between “selves” and “situations”: there is no anchor point. 
Furthermore, in gaming our motivation for betterment of “self” is also entangled with 
the betterment of the avatar, and I complicate this further below. Pepperell (2003: 140) 
suggests that our motivations for behaviour are always responsive, and to view our 
subjectivity as entangled is also to consider our motivations as emergent within that 
space. This is evident in gaming from the reward systems that are provided by the 
game, in terms of experience points, objects, or financial reward52. 
Castonova (2001: 14) links these reward systems to the notion of avatar capital 
– ‘an enhancement of the avatar’s capabilities through training’. As Castronova (2001: 
14) explains: 
 
the avatar faces the same sort of social reward systems as are found in Earth 
society. The leveling and integration system also draws on the basic human 
tendency to get self-esteem from the opinions of others, and the result is that 
users are powerfully motivated to increase their avatars’ abilities. Like the 
humans who imbue them, avatars find themselves on something of a treadmill 
of social success through avatar capital accumulation: they must work to 




52 There are nevertheless those whose desire is to circumvent the traditional structure of motivation and 
reward as imposed by the game, by instead paying real money for in-game currencies, objects, or even 
avatars that are already of a high level (Nakamura 2009). This has led to a rise in “digital sweatshops”, 
where players in poorer nations such as China or Korea are in fact worker-players, “farming” the game 
for goods to sell online (see Nakamura 2009; Goggin 2011; Tai and Hu 2017 for discussions). Often, 
these worker-players are subject to oppression and discrimination, both on and offline (Nakamura 2009). 
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If we compare the work that goes into the avatar-gamer subjectivity to the work that 
goes into the liberal human subject we can see many of the same structures are in place: 
‘inspecting oneself, accounting for oneself, and working upon oneself in order to realize 
one’s potential, gain happiness, and exercise one’s autonomy’ (Rose 1998: 17). We can 
therefore see that even whilst this thesis has drawn on gaming as an example of 
posthuman subjectivity, the game is nevertheless based on (and for) a particular concept 
of “human” as someone who will work towards goals, striving to achieve progression 
and development. This indicates the way in which gaming itself is actually quite 
humanist. As Rettberg (2001: 25) states ‘[t]he World of Warcraft is a world in which 
work is valued as an end in it’s own right’.  
In videogames ‘progress is largely about creating a sense of development […] 
Typical examples of progress in videogames revolve around level systems’ (Ash 2012a: 
14). “Levelling” (progressing through the levels in the game) is itself an example of the 
entangled form of motivation and reward that emerges through this subjectivity. I am 
driven to progress, but the “rewards” I reap are not only for “me”53. They are intra-
actively experienced through the avatar: 
 
At some indefinable point, things change. All of a sudden I am completely 
committed to gaining a deeper sense of “immersion” and understanding of this 
culture. Already the desire to “level up” is within me, and I am encouraged to 
hear from a guild member that once you reach Level 15 Level 30 is just around 
the corner. Level 15 means I can choose my specialisation, and I select Beast 
Mastery which means I can tame creatures. At Level 20 I choose a talent, and 
learn to ride a Hawkstrider. I am eager to reach Level 30 so that I can wear 
mail armour. I approach people in game and use the chat to appeal to other 
players for help in quests. 
																																																						
53 At a certain point during the PhD process there was an idea that I would continue to play until I reached 
the top level of the game. However, at the time of submission I have not reached it – it became an abstract 
goal, and was “humanistic” in nature. As a goal it demonstrates a certain desire for progression, as well as 
for a neatness to conclude the research that is elusive. This was also complicated through the expansion of 
the game during my studies that meant the top level shifted from 90 to 100. Furthermore, the game 
doesn’t “end” at level 100 but instead signifies a shift in focus (see WoWPedia 2016 for further 




The fieldnote shows the ways that different levels signify a range of options for the 
avatar – expanding our skillset, through specialisations and talents, as well as gaining 
new armour (changing both aesthetic and ability, as well as being an acquisition of 
more possessions to demonstrate our success to other players) and learning to ride a 
new beast (signifying a change in how quickly we can travel around the world). These 
new options are therefore enacted through the avatar-gamer’s progression as entwined. 
This desire to “work on myself” goes beyond the aesthetic choices and the “levelling” 
within the main body of the game: I also express a desire to become a “well-rounded” 
avatar-gamer subject through bringing my other skills “up to scratch”, such as fishing, 
skinning, and leatherworking: 
 
I continue to fish and progress to level 75, and then decide that my other 
“professions” should be brought up to scratch as well. The leatherworking was 
becoming increasingly difficult and then I realise in the low level (1-10) area I 
am in I can progress to learn journeyman leatherworking! I also learn first aid 
and cooking, which are basic skills like fishing. I’ve been stuck on 185 
experience for skinning for some time now, and I realised that if I am 
progressing with the other skills, I might as well try and pick this one up again 
too. Leaving my laptop running the game, I use my mobile phone to look up 
online how to progress with skinning beyond the level I am at. I discover a very 
useful skinning guide, made by a World of Warcraft player, which indicates 
which areas I can travel to to hunt and kill mobs of the correct level to then skin 
their hides and increase my skill in skinning. One of the areas is close by, so I 
travel there and I’m pleased to progress beyond the skill experience of 200. 
Flying back to where I came from I am now able to learn expert skinning. 
Working on these skills is peaceful: it isn’t hard, but still feels like you are 
achieving something, easily racking up the points and in the process making me 




These experiences demonstrate the inherent desire for progression and betterment, 
wanting to excel even in areas that are not “necessary” to the main progression in the 
game. Rettberg (2011: 20) argues that the precise reason World of Warcraft has such a 
devoted audience is that it ‘offers a convincing and detailed simulacrum of the process 
of becoming successful in capitalist societies’. This links to Castronova’s (2001: 16-17) 
analysis that 
 
[t]he process of developing avatar capital sees to invoke exactly the same risk 
and reward structures in the brain that are invoked by personal development in 
real life. [...] Constraints create the possibility of achievement, and it is the drive 
to achieve something with the avatar that seems to create an obsessive interest in 
her well-being. 
 
However, this analysis demonstrates a very humanist conception: the gamer sees the 
avatar more as an external “object” of value than an entangled being. This can be 
likened to the notion of our actions and bodies as “properties”. In such a view, ‘abilities 
and personal qualities, as well as my actions and their products, are part of me only in 
the way that my house and my garden are part of me. They may be very dear 
possessions, but I will deploy them so as to gain the most benefit from them; in other 
words, I will use them instrumentally’ (Danziger 1997: 47). This view is inherently 
flawed, and historically contingent as it again suggests an external vs. internal binary 
and I therefore consider below what it means to posthumanise this. 
I would argue that we could consider “avatar capital” in posthuman terms. 
Rather than seeing the avatar as only a “possessed body” we could view it as an 
example of our entangled practices of achievement and capital: it is precisely through 
the levelling of the avatar, the myriad of emotions and affects which it solicits, the 
labour and the frustration, that posthuman subjectivity emerges. Between Etyme and I, 
then, we become our own life and life-force, with our own history. The “capital” worth 
or value that we accumulate is not, and never can be, “mine” alone. I can never claim 
my progression as individualised as it is distributed in the intra-action of “me” and 
“her”, and the ways our posthuman “self” forms its own bonds to other places, times 
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and things. The posthuman lifecycle that Etyme and I have been through could be 
viewed as an example how our motivations and achievements are non-unitary (Braidotti 
2013), and so working on the “self” is therefore more than individual. The posthuman 
subject is not master of its own life but ‘is a transversal entity, fully immersed in and 
immanent to a network of non-human (animal, vegetable, viral) relations’ (Braidotti 
2013: 193). 
The culmination of the work, effort and emotion that is expended in World of 
Warcraft is something of a Sisyphean task – there is no “end” to the game, unlike in 
more linear, narrative-based games. There is, however, a sense of pride and belonging 
as your proficiency in the game increases (see also Chapter 6 – Enacting Empathy). The 
“work” that you do is therefore always rewarded in some regard, whether publicly or 
privately, and this serves to “motivate” us. The following fieldnote demonstrates one of 
the ways in which the publication of achievements for others to view is particularly 
affective:  
 
After the battleground finishes I’m aware of wanting to track my achievements – 
whereas many other (I expect more PvP experienced players) leave swiftly I 
loiter, trying to make sense of the statistics and understand this gameworld a 
little better. I am chagrined at the number of times I died, but buoyed by the 
number of killing blows I have dealt and the damage I have inflicted. This is not 
to do with a lust for violence, but for the opportunity for Etyme to be 
acknowledged as a valid and valuable member of a group. I feel sure I would 
feel much the same if I were a healer who had swooped in and saved another 
player from death. It is about your worth. Even in this fictional world we are 
creating contributing members of society. 
 
Danziger (1997: 113) explains that privileging historically contingent conventions and 
deeming them as “needs” enabled a shift towards promoting these same conventions, 
and this is particularly apparent in the case of notions of “achievement” and “self-
realisation”. The above fieldnote, therefore, demonstrates the enactment of being bound 
up in humanistic ideals, even when even when we are actively and consciously 
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acknowledging the “self” as posthuman. Rose (1998: 33) explores the conception of the 
human as ‘selves with autonomy, choice, and self-responsibility, equipped with a 
psychology aspiring to self-fulfilment, actually or potentially running their lives as a 
kind of enterprise of themselves’ (see also Foucault 2008). Whilst the entangled intra-
action with Etyme demonstrates a lack of autonomy it nevertheless still aspires to self-
fulfilment. 
 In lacking autonomy through the avatar-gamer subjectivity, the notion of 
independence is replaced with intra-dependence. As Hayles (1999: 3-4) states: 
 
the presumption that there is an agency, desire, or will belonging to the self and 
clearly distinguished from the “wills of others” is undercut in the posthuman, for 
the posthuman’s collective heterogeneous quality implies a distributed cognition 
located in disparate parts that may be in only tenuous communication with one 
another. […] If “human essence is freedom from the wills of others,” the 
posthuman is “post” not because it is necessarily unfree but because there is no a 
priori way to identify a self-will that can be clearly distinguished from an other-
will. 
 
Agency, desire and will are therefore distributed to such a degree that there is no clear 
way to determine a single specific place or person that they emerge from. As I explored 
in the previous chapter, the desires of the avatar and the desires and of the gamer are 
intra-active and emergent: only through their entanglement can the game be played as 
both entities are reliant on one another. Hayles (1999: 288) continues by explaining that 
conscious agency is not, and has never been, in control, and that notions of “control” at 
all do not align with posthuman understanding of processes as emergent. “Mastery” is 
therefore merely a story that we construct to explain chaotic dynamics. 
 The reliance on the avatar as part of this emergence is apparent in the following 




I’m about level 67 now, and whilst back when I first started playing as Etyme I 
presumed that being somewhere up this high would mean I had more of a grasp 
of the game, I don’t actually feel like that is the case. In fact, in some regard I 
feel that whilst my avatar has improved her gameplay (she has better armour, 
deals out more damage, and has more spells and attacks to draw from) I feel I 
am sadly letting our tag-team down. I haven’t learned yet how to put her to the 
best uses. Of course this she and me is both “I”, which means I must also take 
credit for Etyme’s successes, and she for my failures. I still feel like I am playing 
the game mechanically, and that the wider world of the game remains elusive to 
me. 
 
The above section has therefore shown that notions of motivation are indeed 
subject to “external” influence, and are also bound with “external” achievement in that 
they do not always originate with, or end at, the “self” as a singular subject. But it has 
also demonstrated that such notions of external and internal are confused as it is not 
possible to draw clear lines around either, or to pinpoint where motivations begin (or 
end). Accordingly, we should understand our motivations and achievements instead as 
emergent within a particular set of circumstances and entanglements. As we strive to 
better ourselves we are moved by those forces, influences, and environments that both 
surround and create us. Our “motivations” emerge from within these intra-actions, 
provoking reaction. The fulfilment and realisation of our desires is also entangled – this 
fulfilment is not only a project of ‘the universal subject, stable, unified, totalized, 
individualized, interiorized’ (Rose 1998: 169) but is distributed. In this case it is the 
avatar-gamer entanglement that becomes the locus for our achievements. Without 
Etyme I could not progress, without the game structure there would be no “motivators”, 
and without me the action could not unfold. However, beyond merely troubling the 





Attention and boredom 
It could be argued that the notion of motive presupposes the self-governing 
“responsibility” of the human subject, which links us to Foucauldian notions of 
governmentality and “the good citizen”. Yin Yap et al.’s (2010) analysis of the “good 
citizen” is applied to refugee’s seeking “self-betterment” through volunteering. As they 
explain, the notion of citizenship focusses specifically on individuals as active and 
responsible subjects and constructs this as the desirable norm (Yin Yap et al. 2010: 
161). Our predominant concern is therefore our own enactment of these ideals in order 
to embody and maintain the status of the “good citizen”; to ‘strive for personal 
fulfilment […] to find meaning in existence by shaping its life through acts of choice’ 
(Rose 1998: 151). Consequently, a focus on motivation and achievement demonstrates 
our desire to participate responsibly and actively in a community, to strive for 
fulfilment and find meaning in our existence. Within gaming there is a focus on 
progression, and we can see how being a “good” gamer is akin to being a “good 
citizen” including notions of entrepreneurialism and innovation. Ashton (2011: 309), 
for example, explains how the ‘the logic of perpetual innovation is well entrenched 
within digital gaming culture’. Posthumanising these motivational factors above in 
order to account for the multiple influences and the entangled emergence of such 
desires nevertheless enacts a focus on these same humanistic goals, or “regulative 
ideals”: ‘ideals concerning our existence as individuals inhabited by an inner 
psychology that animates and explains our conduct and strives for self-realization, self-
esteem, and self-fulfilment in everyday life’ (Rose 1998: 3). 
My proposal is that in humanistic understandings of subjectivity we are 
predisposed to highlight and accentuate certain actions and affects above others. 
Accordingly, an alternative way of “posthumanising” our subjective experiences would 
be to not only explore them as entangled, but to account for much more complex webs 
of affective feeling, beyond those that are seen as “desirable” in the “good citizen”. 
The experience of gaming is highly affective and emotionally engaging, as this 
thesis has demonstrated. However, beyond these visceral encounters it is important to 
note that the game can actually be unpleasant to experience. There has formerly been a 
focus on gaming as a “fun” activity which only delivers pleasure and feels like leisure. 
Whilst more recent critiques have explored aspects of the labour of play, or “playbour” 
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(e.g. Goggin 2011; Yee 2006; Tai and Hu 2017) there is still not a predominant focus 
on the emotional labour involved. However, gaming can be exhausting, and can incite 
feelings of anxiety, concern, unworthiness, ineptitude, guilt, frustration and panic54. 
This therefore positions involvement in a MMORPG such as World of Warcraft as 
something which is often beyond that of “play”, through the emotional digital labour 
that is required/given. This argument then complicates the idea put forward by Graffam 
(2012: 132), that ‘[i]n essence, taking the form of an avatar allows people to interact in 
new and novel ways that push the boundaries they encounter in real life and to derive a 
sense of enjoyment and fulfilment in ways that may be denied them in the real world’ 
(my emphasis) by destabilising the notion that pleasure and enjoyment are the primary 
affects of engaging in avatar-life. As Filiciak (2003: 99) states: ‘the game is not always 
easy or pleasant’. Taylor (2006: 70) also points out: ‘[s]uggesting that games are always 
simply about “fun” […] is likely to gloss over more analytically productive 
psychological, social, and structural components of games’. 
Using my fieldnotes to show the feelings of frustration, boredom, or disinterest 
at times associated with gaming therefore seeks to both demonstrate the complexity of 
the gaming experience but also to account for the complexity of all subjectivity. We are 
not merely motivated aspirational creatures of the good life, but are also entwined and 
entangled with mundane, or even what might be traditionally seen as “undesirable”, 
affects. To critique the focus on “positive” affects (such as motivation) over “negative” 
affects (such as boredom)  
 
draws our attention to all those multitudinous programs, proposals, and policies 
that have attempted to shape the conduct of individuals – not just to control, 
subdue, discipline, normalize, or reform them, but also to make them more 
intelligent, wise, happy, virtuous, healthy, productive, docile, enterprising, 
fulfilled, self-esteeming, empowered, or whatever (Rose 1998: 12). 
 
																																																						
54 It should, of course, be noted that these feelings that I experience should be read in context – my own 
motivation and experiences in-game cannot be extracted from the PhD process – I am gaming for a PhD, 
in itself an experience that can induce many of these feelings of anxiety too. 
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A focus on mundane or “undesirable” feelings also demonstrates an uptake of the 
posthuman – our experiences are no longer defined through humanistic notions of 
motivation as individual or even entangled, but our subjectivities also emerge in 
accordance with our boredom and indifference. Furthermore, such a focus demonstrates 
a middle ground between the utopian and dystopian views of online engagement, to not 
fetishise the digital and the posthuman but to normalise it through highlighting the very 
“human” feelings encountered there, taking up Braidotti’s (2013: 90) call ‘for resistance 
to both the fatal attraction of nostalgia and the fantasy of transhumanist and other 
techno-utopias’.  
Along these lines, I argue that a posthuman view of subjectivity needs to 
account for moments of, for example, frustration, boredom, or disinterest in as much 
depth and with as much engagement as the liberal human subject attributed to 
“rationality”, “reason”, and “responsibility”. In gaming this is demonstrated by a variety 
of experiences. For example, it is not uncommon for me to have periods of time when I 
am multitasking: 
 
When you enter a new area there is a sort of magical sparkle noise to tell you 
that you have discovered somewhere new. How do you define a “magical 
sparkle” in noise form? A sort of tinkling, I guess. It’s interesting because I’m 
never particularly bothered by that noise, I’m pretty focused on what I’m doing 
or where I’m going, so it doesn’t bother me. But at this particular moment in 
time I am flying to a new location to seek out the correct area to carry out an 
objective for a quest. I need to lay a quest item between two large stacks of 
bones and draw spirits near in order to see them off. I’m still a short distance 
away and I’m flying on, my finger on the button; but I’m turned away, looking 
at something on my iPad and not concentrating at all on the landscape or 
surroundings in World of Warcraft. There are various interesting implications 
in this – the fact that real life habits follow you in to World of Warcraft is 
something I marvel at a little. In RL if I were to be on a journey and knew I had 
a minute to my destination I might idly take out my mobile phone, have a quick 
scan through twitter, check my email, etc. and here in World of Warcraft that 
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habit seems to have followed me! Travelling time = potential moment of 
procrastination time.  
 
As this fieldnote explains, like in “Real Life” I fill the idle moments in-game with 
another activity – fiddling about with another technological device and without my full 
attention on the game. We could conceive of this in posthuman terms in several ways. 
On the one hand, this demonstrates my continual entanglement with entities beyond the 
avatar and gameworld – as I have previously explained, the posthuman entanglement is 
not merely a co-construction between avatar and gamer, but is enmeshed within other 
environments and emerging through other intra-actions too. This fieldnote therefore 
demonstrates not only my own constant always-connectedness but how my habitual 
response to a moment of “down-time” is to reach out and connect elsewhere (see also 
Gregg 2015: 189), and so this networked habit happens even within a network. 
However, more than this, a focus on multitasking disrupts subjectivity as a responsible, 
motivated, attentive citizen. In accounting for our other engagements we can place a 
(posthuman) emphasis on these multi-layered experiences as constantly helping to 
shape our subjectivity. 
There have also been instances where I have attempted to game whilst, for 
example, having the television on in the background, or having to answer the phone in 
the middle of playing in a dungeon and causing an in-game error due to this. Whilst 
these moments have in no way contributed to the “best” gaming experiences (they do 
not represent what some would argue as total “immersion” in the game and they display 
distraction rather than engagement), they are nevertheless experiences and demonstrate 
how the subjectivity shifts in response to a multiplicity of affects and entanglements, 
and is not always acting in accordance with expectations. This also links back to 
Barad’s (2007: x) assertion that posthuman subjectivity is not just about binary co-
production. As much as I have focussed on the avatar-gamer relationship in this thesis, 
this relationship cannot be meaningfully separated from its environment. It also 
demonstrates our multiplicity of beings. I am not only intra-acting with the game and 
the avatar, but also with a multitude of different technologies, scenarios, and others. In 
being more than just our “selves”, ‘[t]he posthuman subject rests on the affirmation of 
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this kind of multiplicity and the relational connection with an ‘outside’ that is cosmic 
and infinite’ (Braidotti 2013: 138). Our “distractions” are one example of this, whilst 
there are many others as this multiplicity and relationality is part of being. 
As well as the game being a part of our life, and becoming part of our self-
narrative, the game is also experienced in the same way as life – sometimes through 
moments of focus, sometimes through positive feelings and sometimes negative, 
sometimes in a drifting engagement, and at other times through boredom and 
frustration: 
 
I become frustrated by a task which requires me to keep a constant eye on the 
mobs which are insisting on killing animals which I need for the task which I am 
doing. I am trying to let the animals respawn in the area so that I can harvest 
what I need from them, however the vicious mobs in the area are too busy 
attacking the animals and killing them for me to be able to do my job. I have to 
juggle completing the quest with culling the offending mobs who are interfering 
with it. What is interesting is the way in which this empathic exasperation 
mirrors exactly the experience. It is not just annoying because I find it annoying, 
it is annoying because it is interfering with the quest I have been given, and 
from any perspective that is frustrating. It is time consuming and for some 
reason I bore of it quickly today. There are times, when relative boredom or 
inactivity that is required from a particular quest can be quite soothing, 
engaging in an automatic response, in flow with the game. However, there are 
other times when it just doesn’t suit my mood, and isn’t what I want to do. 
 
Thus a myriad of emotions and affects, including moments of frustration and boredom, 
constitute the experience of gaming, constructing a subjectivity which is at once 
distributed, engaged, embodied, emotional, affected, and mundane. The attitude and 
actions of the enterprising self, which ‘adopts self-betterment as its goal, and acts in 
accordance with this goal’ (Yin Yap et al. 2010: 164), is seen as the “legitimate” and 
“valid” way to feel and act. However, this is contrasted against the self as frustrated, 
exasperated, or bored (as displayed in the above fieldnote) which is not seen as 
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desirable. We can see the strive for self-betterment specifically with regard to the 
affects we pay attention to in videogames, as Ash (2013: 28) argues that ‘attuning 
oneself to the game involves a self-management of the affective and emotional state of 
being of the user in an attempt to minimize negative affects such as frustration and 
vulnerability’. It is a focus on, and attunement to, the more positive affects of the game 
that creates captivated and attentive subjects – who we could consider to be the “good 
gamers” that make games a commercial success (Ash 2013: 28). 
 What is interesting about Yin Yap et al.’s (2010: 165) analysis of the good 
citizen is the assertion that, in their study, ‘constructing volunteering as a means of self-
improvement, a hierarchy […] was invoked’. This is, of course, exactly in accordance 
with our everyday understanding of the subject as citizen. As Braidotti (2013: 35) 
explains, subjectivity ‘involves complex and continuous negotiations with dominant 
norms and values and hence also multiple forms of accountability’ – we understand that 
we have a responsibility to act in accordance with certain goals and to be seen acting 
outside of this is negative, and we are accordingly moved down in the hierarchy of 
importance. 
 
This construction of the ‘good’ norm, compared with the ‘bad’, shapes how we 
think about citizenship and what constitutes a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ citizen. Such 
norms create and reinforce in our minds, standards of desirable behaviour within 
society. We incorporate these ideals of good and bad citizenship into our own 
behaviour, thereby positioning ourselves in relation to these discourses. (Yin 
Yap et al. 2010: 161) 
 
If posthumanism means disrupting hierarchies of self and other, man and woman, 
human and machine, as Braidotti (2013: 89) posits, I suggest we should extend this to a 
disruption of further “structural differences” of “good” vs. “bad”. This would occur not 
only in terms of good/bad citizenship, but also in terms of actions, feelings, and affects. 
This seems a particularly relevant process for the posthuman condition to call into 
question, given how those notions are themselves only culturally and historically 
contingent. From this perspective being bored or unmotivated is seen not as a 
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consequence of individual “failing” and should not be juxtaposed against the 
“idealistic” subject as attentive. In this space, how might this enable us to consider such 
affects differently? 
According to Rose (1998: 154), ‘[t]he enterprising self will make an enterprise 
of its life, seek to maximize its own human capital, project itself a future, and seek to 
shape itself in order to become that which it wishes to be. The enterprising self is thus 
both an active self and a calculating self, a self that calculates about itself and that acts 
upon itself in order to better itself’. We can see how working on ourselves and treating 
the “self” as a project has become part of labour practices – recent publications such as 
Aesthetic Labour (Elias et al. 2017) or Digital Labor: The Internet as Playground and 
Factory (Scholz 2013) have demonstrated the ways in which both beauty politics and 
social media can be linked to neoliberal expectations. These expectations and 
perceptions assert that in order to do a job well we need to always “look the part” – 
which is in itself another form of labour. Whilst Rose (1998: 154) complicates the 
enterprising self by demonstrating the multiple ways in which notions of autonomy and 
individualisation have been used as forms of governmentality; my argument is that they 
have been used to shape and form ideals of a neoliberal, human subject that bear 
interrogating in a posthuman view.  
Rather than viewing ourselves as autonomous and responsible for our own 
experiences, affects, motivations, and achievements, a posthuman view would account 
for these affects and achievements as distributed, and therefore only enabled through 
certain specificities of intra-action. This, I suggest, would point towards expanding a 
notion of posthuman ethics, especially in the current political climate where capitalism 
dominates. Even whilst right-wing political parties claim they are “for the people” and 
appeal to the general populous, they are adopting approaches that privilege those whose 
achievements fit a pre-determined ideal. Meanwhile, those who are not seen as self-
regulating, self-motivated, or self-achieving are written out of benefit structures. An apt 
example of this would be the actions of President Trump of the United States of 
America who, in his inauguration speech, claimed ‘the forgotten men and women of our 
country will be forgotten no longer’ (BBC News 2017). However, within months of 
being in office, President Trump made a series of policy proposals that would be 
particularly damaging to the poor, including, for example, calls to repeal extensive parts 
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of the 2010 Affordable Care Act that provides health insurance to 20 million people 
(CNBC 2017). Proposals such as these demonstrate a disparaging and deprecating 
attitude towards those who are not able to provide for themselves, reinforcing the 
humanistic ideal that we are all masters of our own destinies, and those who are not 
achieving just aren’t trying hard enough. 
A distributed and emergent approach to achievement would instead mean, rather 
than congratulating ourselves for our achievements and judging others for their “lack” 
thereof, we instead begin to consider our “selves” as part of the entanglement that 
allows the emergence of the “success” (or “failure”) of others. As Pepperell (2003: 172) 
states, if we do not see ourselves as separate from others in ways traditionally posed by 
humanist subjectivity, this can alter our treatment of others, and this relates to both 
human and non-human others. If we are all entangled then we must accept much more 
responsibility in the shaping of others, and be much more appreciative of the role of 
others in our shaping of our “self”, as again these binaries become indistinct. Rather 
than a notion of “what goes around comes around” this is instead a suggestion that 
“what goes around is”: it doesn’t just “come around”, it enables the emergence of other 
potentialities and agencies. As such we should become much more reflexive our actions 
to ensure that “what goes around” is supportive rather than restrictive, and this is 
therefore indicative of a posthuman ethic that emerges from our acknowledgement of 
our reliance on, and intra-connection with, human and non-human others (see also 
Braidotti 2013: 49).  
A posthuman ethic becomes a way of living that focuses on our present as the 
development of our future: ‘the future, and whatever benefits it may bring, is not 
something that just happens to us – we create it by our conduct in the present’ 
(Pepperell 2003:172). In my theory of posthuman subjectivity, I extend this to notions 
of motivation and achievement. If we see ourselves as implicated in the emergence of 
an others’ possibilities and potentialities, we might approach each other differently. Our 
“achievements” are never solely our own: they are entangled with, intra-dependent on, 
and emergent from the contexts and environments in which we operate. If we operate in 
unsupportive, unethical atmospheres with no opportunities, our achievements will be a 
reflection of that. Accordingly, rather than judging an “individual” on the record of 
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their achievements, we must assess their entanglements55. Ultimately this leads to a 
fundamental shift in our understandings of many of the structures that shape our 
behaviour, as in this entangled version of achievement the whole notion of meritocracy, 
capitalism, and neoliberalism are identified as being based on fallacies of the individual. 
These structures are therefore no longer supported, and a new, posthuman approach to 
our work and societies can emerge that is distributed, collaborative, entangled, and 
collective.  
 To account for our actions and affects as distributed, entangled, and intra-active 
therefore displaces the focus on ‘individualization’ (Rose 1998: 5). As Rose (1998: 
170) explains, humans have traditionally been addressed and represented as a particular 
type that is: 
 
suffused with an individualized subjectivity, motivated by anxieties and 
aspirations concerning their self-fulfilment, committed to finding their true 
identities and maximizing their authentic expression in their life-styles. The 
images of freedom and autonomy that inspire our political thinking equally 
operate in terms of an image of each human being as the unified psychological 
focus of his or her biography, as the locus of legitimate rights and demands, as 
an actor seeking to ‘enterprise’ his or her life and self through acts of choice. 
 
In this view, there is no room to see either success or boredom as a specific set of intra-
actions that have enabled an emergent agency. Instead, each of our achievements – or 
lack thereof – is a personal responsibility, and failing. 
 When our processes of self-regulation and self-monitoring find us lacking this 
often leads us to experience feelings of self-depreciation when we perceive such 
personal failings. However, many of our experiences of “failure” are specifically 
dependent on the environments that have orchestrated them. Futility is an interesting 
																																																						
55 The PhD process is an apt example of this – whilst it is my aim with this thesis to achieve the title of 
“Doctor Wilde”, without the support of the many people and institutions (to name but a few influential 
factors) that have been a part of my life there is no way that that would have even been a possibility. My 
own doctoral progression is therefore entangled, and not simply “mine”. 
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example of this. As a personal feeling of our efforts being fruitless, futility is often seen 
as a negative, emotional response to a scenario. Those who have experienced, and dared 
to share, feelings of pointlessness will be familiar with the phrases “cheer up”, “try 
harder”, or “just get on with it”. These reactions demonstrate the very negative 
interpretation of feeling helpless or hopeless, and often responses to these moods again 
locate the responsibility for feeling within the self (see Rose 1998: 156-160). This 
demonstrates the idea of ‘the ‘autonomization’ and ‘responsibilization’ of the self, the 
instilling of a reflexive hermeneutics which will afford self-knowledge and self-
mastery’ (Rose 1998: 157). This imposes a humanistic belief in becoming whole 
through self-realisation and mastery of one’s own goals, mind-sets, achievements and 
emotional states (Rose 1998: 157). In this view we are in charge of our own happiness – 
and it is our responsibility to enact it (see Ahmed 2010 for further critique of the duty of 
happiness). 
However, when we consider how feelings of futility play out we notice that they 
are rarely about the “self”. Consider the following examples from my fieldnotes 
demonstrating frustration and futility in the game when I can’t get to where I want to 
go. Although a “trivial” example the principles are the same – I want to keep 
progressing and achieving but there is an obstacle in my path and I am unable to move 
past this. In the following example I am stuck in a dungeon in-game, and cannot work 
out how to get back to my normal location in the game and continue with my quests. 
 
Log back in and cannot believe that I am back at the start of this stupid dungeon 
with none of the objectives completed! Last time I logged out before I found the 
exit and so I have to do it all again 
 
Two days later… 
 
Once again as I couldn’t find the exit I am back at the beginning with the bosses 
still to defeat. I’m just not interested though, I’m thoroughly perplexed about 
how the hell I get out of this place and spend the whole time trying to find the 
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way out and looking up maps, exits, chats online all trying to get out but still 
can’t figure it out and have to log off 
 
The day after that… 
 
I’m genuinely beginning to feel concerned. I have a heavy feeling in my heart 
and a twist of unease in my stomach contemplating my body trapped in this 
space. I wander the same tunnels I have been for what feels like forever, trying 
to take a more methodical approach and pay attention to where one set of 
tunnels leads. I search again online for maps out, and chats about how to leave 
the tunnels, only to rediscover the same chats and the same maps that I have 
already looked at. There is a way of putting a ticket in if you are completely 
stuck in World of Warcraft – glitches like this do happen where people are 
completely unable to move or get out of their current location. I’m beginning to 
wonder if I am in one of those scenarios, and that being stuck in this place is a 
glitch in the machine not a glitch in my gaming. But I’m not confident of that. 
Despite having been playing World of Warcraft for over a year now I wouldn’t 
dream of having enough faith in my own ability to actually trust my judgement 
on this. I’m pretty sure that this is just me missing something, but whatever it is 
I’m missing I have been missing for days now! 
 
Eventually, I managed to get out of the dungeon and resume gameplay. In contrast to 
the above experiences that clearly demonstrate my annoyance, moving into boredom, 
moving into concern, the next fieldnote from the following day doesn’t explain how I 
got out, which is interesting in itself, as it demonstrates that the futility was more 
noteworthy than the experience of freedom. 
 Nevertheless, the above fieldnotes clearly demonstrate the ways in which my 
affective responses are entirely intra-dependent on a range of factors beyond the “self”. 
The environment, the circumstance, the situation I find myself in – all of these 
contribute to my feelings of frustration and futility. If we focus on the above scenario 
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we can see that I completed the dungeon several times, I logged in and out of the game, 
several days passed during which I kept trying to get out. I looked things up online, I 
explored the area, I considered whether it was a glitch in the machine – my frustration 
seems, frankly, well deserved! However, as Rose (1998:159) states: ‘grief, frustration, 
disappointment, and death pose dangers to the regime of the autonomous self, for they 
strike at the very images of sovereignty, self-possession, omnipotent powers, secular 
fulfilment, and joy through life-style to which it is welded’. I would therefore suggest 
that such feelings and affects have been written out of the conception of the liberal 
human subject precisely because they destabilise the individualised, rational subject we 
are “meant” to be. We are taught not to focus on such affects – they are excluded from 
the notion of self as ‘coherent, bounded, individualized, intentional, the locus of 
thought, action, and belief, the origin of its own actions, the beneficiary of a unique 
biography’ (Rose 1998: 3). Accordingly, a posthuman subject must put these feelings 
“back into the picture” in order to acknowledge what posthuman experience is. 
 
Development, memory and nostalgia  
Memory and development are two other aspects of psychology that have led to a 
promotion of understanding our selves in a way that adheres to a linear lifecycle. One of 
the most intriguing and compelling aspects of my experience in World of Warcraft has 
been my tendency to engage in nostalgic practices when in the game. Being driven to 
go back to places where I had started out in the game is, again, somewhat inexplicable. 
Why go back? What waits for me there? It’s a practice that, according to the ludic and 
narrative of the game, has no purpose or reasoning: 
 
I’m going back to where my journey began, for no particular reason other than 
a sense of nostalgia driving me on. I also want to meet others just starting on 
their journey and revisit foes who once almost defeated me, almost as though I 





What is interesting about this is that, as Hui (2011: 65) explains: ‘[n]ostalgia is often 
understood as an inability to go back, a sickness from being unable to return. Though 
temporally this may be the case, as the past cannot be revisited, affects such as nostalgia 
are linked to material spaces, and can have enduring relationships with space’. The act 
of my travelling back through the game space, through World of Warcraft, to actually 
revisit the (immaterial) space where I first appeared as an avatar in-game extends this 
idea of nostalgia being linked to a material space into an immaterial place. Hui (2011: 
68) makes a distinction between material space and immaterial place: place ‘as an 
immaterial entity arising from the placing, ordering, and representing of material 
objects […] place results from the process of interacting in material surroundings’. 
Whilst in World of Warcraft there is no materiality to the space, it is nevertheless 
possible for the avatar-gamer to revisit different areas in the game as though they were 
spaces. However, when going back to those areas with Etyme, my sense of it as a 
“place” was somehow unreachable as my feelings towards the space and my actions 
there had changed. Where it was formerly a place of learning and advancing, the 
engagement with it as a much higher-level avatar meant that there was an “inability to 
go back”: experiencing it a second time with Etyme was not like the first time. Even if I 
were to create a new avatar to start again from scratch the interaction would still be 
changed from that first time, thereby not fulfilling the nostalgic yearning for what is an 
irrecoverable feeling, moment or state based in the past. 
It is also as though in the progression of the game, in the completion of quests 
and the levelling of my character, I look back on where I started as though the game 
experience were a lifecycle of sorts: 
 
It’s really interesting looking back through my notes from a year ago and 
noticing how even then I was revisiting places I had previously been and 
completing the quests that I had missed there first time round. Considering this 
is something I have recently been doing, again, months on, I’m intrigued by the 
idea of nostalgia in games and the circling cycling lifecycle of the avatar. 
Looking back through my notes is like a journal of a growing person, feelings of 
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wanting to grow up, feelings of loneliness, feelings of not belonging, feelings of 
coming into my own and becoming my own person... 
 
It is intriguing to think of this idea of nostalgia as being directly linked to that of a 
lifecycle, and this draws on a very humanist discourse of development and growth. 
Routledge et al. (2011: 638) ‘examined the possibility that one source of meaning in life 
emanates from the human capacity to think in terms of time and thus to engage in 
nostalgic reflection on the past’. It is a possibility that enables us to begin to 
conceptualise the way in which the feeling of nostalgia was experienced in-game with 
reflection on a former state of being. 
This is echoed in the periods in game of loneliness and not belonging which 
seemed almost like an adolescent stage of gaming, and the fact of this re-occurrence 
with nostalgia at different points throughout the game is interesting too: 
 
I miss the purpose behind the “lower level” quests as I now feel like I am in 
World of Warcraft adolescence. I have grown beyond where lower level quests 
usually reach (maybe level 20? I am now 27) so have been playing some 
dungeons – a few days ago did two dungeons with the same group which was 
good to actually have an experience of that – sticking together beyond one 
“scene”. However, it soon fell apart and people started to leave the group. The 
adolescence-like feeling is because I have outgrown the smaller quests but do 
not quite understand the bigger quests. I understand some of the dungeons and 
the battlegrounds but I’m sure there is something I am missing. I’m not far from 
level 30 so I wonder if when I reach that some new doors will open? As it is I 
have been accepting some lower levels quests which still yield high XP 
(experience points) to give me some motivation, some sense of purpose! It is odd 
that in the cities you cannot move (metaphorically speaking) for people but in 
the wilderness there is no one. A level 21 player challenged me to a duel but 
was immune to all of my attacks, and beat me easily which was somewhat 
embarrassing, so I just got on my Hawkstrider and ran off. Not long after I 
wished I had stayed to see if they were up for a chat or a quest! I definitely think 
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I need to find a new guild to join but I don’t know how to differentiate between 
good and bad, or where I belong or will find what I am looking for. This is even 
more like adolescence – trying to find which group to fit in. Who shall I 
become? A raider, a socialite? Like trying to define yourself as grunge, goth, 
townie, emo. 
 
The desire for development that we can see above is part of the normative, deeply 
humanist framings of subjectivity: striving to achieve more, develop more skills, and 
gain more knowledge. However, from a posthuman perspective, we can reconsider 
these notions of development in order to acknowledge their humanistic roots, and 
account for their deep entanglements, as I explore below. 
One of the ways in which we can begin to pull apart these feelings of nostalgia, 
the lifecycle, the journey and the striving and acquisition of new skills is by considering 
how the growth and development of a subject shapes subjectivity, and that the ability to 
reflect back on our past is, too, crucial to a “human” experience of life, and how we 
make sense of our “selves”. The occurrence of nostalgia shows how the experience in 
game echoes how we experience and understand our life as being linked implicitly to a 
sense of linearity, through our childlike behaviour at first (e.g. not understanding how to 
work the game, getting the controls wrong, and not understanding the game mechanics 
until we have learned how to navigate the “world”) but also through those feelings of 
growing, changing, and then reflecting back on what was. 
Routledge et al. (2011: 639) suggest that ‘nostalgia may provide a way to 
conjure up evidence that their lives have indeed been meaningful. It may be, in a sense, 
the self-focused emotional process through which people recollect experiences that 
weave a meaningful narrative around their lives’. The avatar is intrinsically linked to 
this process. It would have been much quicker for me to revisit the early areas where I 
started out in World of Warcraft by creating a new character starting in that area. But it 
was specifically Etyme and I going back that was key to the desire: seeing how far we 
had come, what we had achieved, how we had grown and developed and changed. This 
action brought up memories of our having been there before, quantifying and justifying 
our “life” through our past experiences. 
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These notions of the lifecycle and linearity are essential to consider as they are 
actually specific enactments of our understandings of subjectivity – ‘the past can also 
be a vital resource on which one might draw to maintain and enhance a sense of 
meaning’ (Routledge et al. 2011: 650). As the above sections demonstrate, we are 
taught to focus on progression and achievement. As Rose (1998: 22) explains: 
 
human beings have come to understand and relate to themselves as 
‘psychological’ beings, to interrogate and narrate themselves in terms of a 
psychological ‘inner life’ that holds the secrets of their identity, which they are 
to discover and fulfil, which is the standard against which the living of an 
‘authentic’ life is to be judged. 
 
In the same way that the above section on Motivation and Achievement could be 
understood as posthumanising those deeply humanistic aspects of “selfhood” and 
psychology in multiple ways, so too can we read multiple posthuman analyses of 
memory and nostalgia. The feelings that are discussed in my fieldnotes both 
compliment and complicate this idea. On the one hand, my fieldnotes demonstrate this 
narration of self-as-linear, the desire to fulfil myself and progress. However, on the 
other hand, the notion of nostalgia complicates the focus on progress. 
The idea of childhood, adolescence and growing up demonstrates a narrative of 
“Storying a Self” (Rose 1998: 173-182)56. As Polkinghorne (1991: 136) has suggested, 
‘individuals construct private and personal stories linking diverse events of their lives 
into unified and understandable wholes. These are stories about the self. They are the 
basis of personal identity and self-understanding and they provide answers to the 
question, “Who am I?”’. As such, in the fieldnotes I am narrating my “life” in ways that 
create a specific subject position of the avatar-gamer as posthuman subjectivity. 
However, this demonstrates another of the ways in which we still attempt to make sense 
of our (posthuman) subjectivities in humanistic ways. Although the fieldnotes still 
demonstrate the shift in “I” that speaks to an entangled state rather than a particular 
																																																						
56 See also Burman (2008) for her deconstruction of the psychology of child development. 
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localised, focussed, or individual “I”, the notion of these entangled experiences as linear 
is linked to very specific understandings of “self” as I explore further below. Etyme’s 
and my story is structured through the influence of narrative to account for our 
experiences in a historically and culturally developed sense-making practice (Rose 
1998: 175-6; Polkinghorne 1991). As Rose (1998: 175-176) states: ‘people come to 
know themselves as persons of a particular type through an act of mutual recognition 
[…] In explicitly or implicitly organizing their relations to themselves and others in 
terms of such narratives, a self is, as it were, “storied forth”, the individual choosing 
among the different narrative forms to which he or she has been exposed’. Polkinghorne 
(1991: 137) has explained this narrativising process as one which makes individual 
units of action meaningful, through their significance in relation to the “wholeness” of 
the story of our lives. Stories therefore structure our experiences, producing a particular 
sequence and sense of development (Polkinghorne 1991: 138-139). Whilst my 
autoethnographic approach shows this to a certain degree (see Chapter 3: Embracing 
Methodological Contradictions), what these extracts demonstrate is not only a particular 
enactment of a (posthuman) subjectivity, but the influence of the desire for 
understanding the self as linear, progressive, growing, and meaningful. Thus the 
posthuman subject is once again constrained by humanistic ideals, but still serves to 
displace them through distribution rather than individuality, heteronomy rather than 
autonomy, and affectivity rather than rationality. 
Another reading of nostalgia might complicate humanistic linearity and 
development still further. As Seaman (2005: 22) explains: ‘[m]emory provides many 
associations that link back to each of the differing sensual qualities registered at the 
time of the initial experience i.e. a smell can trigger a strong memory of an alternate 
place and time’ and this is useful in terms of accounting for a posthuman understanding 
of self, subject, and object. Memory itself is a demonstration of entangled experience. 
Rather than a coherent story for a rational self, we experience our reflections as 
constantly enmeshed within different feelings, affects, environments, and 
understandings of both “self” and situation. Pepperell (2016: 332) has explored this in 
posthuman terms by asserting that ‘mind and the memories associated with it are not 
solely attributable to the brain, let alone any ‘circuit’ within the brain. Mental events are 
distributed through the brain, body and the world, across space and time’. This therefore 
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further demonstrates our entangled and enmeshed selves. Even our memories, which 
contribute so much to our understanding of “self”, are not our own, and are intra-
dependent on a variety of contributing factors. 
Nostalgia then is an affect that eludes humanistic separation – by focussing on 
our past we are “neglecting” our future – an unforgiveable act! If, as Polkinghorne 
(1991: 144-145) suggests, ‘[t]o experience life as a meaningful whole, one must 
maintain and preserve the self against internal dissolution into its component parts’ and 
that ‘[t]he primary process of narrative configuration is identification of beginning and 
ending events’, nostalgia troubles this temporal figuration by not seeing an event as 
finite. This enacts a dissolution of linearity: looking back is not only an act of 
remembering but an act of reconfiguring, and in that way works as a practice of viewing 
the “self” as emergent. A focus on yearnings such as nostalgia troubles the humanistic 
goal for self-regulation as these feelings instead emphasise regulation through the 
“other”. 
Polkinghorne (1991: 150) has written of the despair that can follow the 
dissolution of self-narrative. However, again, this is much more to do with our 
humanistic desire for a “meaningful” life. As Pepperell (2016: 331) states, ‘we 
misunderstand what it is to be a human if we confine humanity to any specific object or 
process’. Practices of governmentality have often led to anxiety and depression through 
their demonstration of our “inadequacy” (see, for example, Nafus 2016). Notions of 
linear progression and development are likely to do the same when they become 
measures for individualistic “success” and “progression”. Instead, by engaging with 
events and memories as posthuman entanglements those events and memories should 
be freed from humanistic constraints to attribute meaning for the self, so they can 
instead demonstrate how ‘[m]ental events are distributed through the brain, body and 
the world, across space and time’ (Pepperell 2016: 332).  
The distribution of the self makes memory both more pivotal in posthuman 
subjectivity – as a demonstration of our intra-connectedness – but also more 
problematic, as our engagement with memory and self-narrative must become more 
reflexive and critical lest we slip back into understanding the self as master of our own 
successes. Polkinghorne (1991: 149) has stated that ‘[w]hen the operating plot begins to 
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disintegrate, one’s identity loses its unity’. Rather than cause for concern, my theory of 
posthuman subjectivity would embrace this as a liberation from constrictive bounds of 
unity. Reconstructing our posthuman “life story” therefore becomes a process of 
acknowledging the external much more than the internal, and allows further possibility 
and openness towards multiple ways of being, freed from expectations of coherency 
and linearity. Rather than creating a new plot that links together ‘previously disparate 
events into a new whole’ in order to provide ‘the reintegration and renewal of self’ 
(Polkinghorne 1991: 151), my version of posthuman subjectivity would circumvent the 
former focus on plot and unitary subjectivity in favour of multiplicity. This aligns with 
Braidotti’s (2013: 49) work, and affirms the posthuman as a subject ‘that works across 
differences and is also internally differentiated’. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have demonstrated some of the ways in which we might begin to 
broaden our conception of posthuman subjectivity by exploring what motivates us, what 
feelings have gone unaccounted for, as well as by suggesting that embracing our 
entangled affects might move us towards a more ethical understanding of our “selves” 
and “others”. 
Posthumanising subjectivity in this way entails accounting for the myriad of our 
entangled experiences that have previously gone unaccounted in liberal humanist 
concepts of the self, and reading them not as “negative” experiences, but as entangled, 
affective experiences influenced by a variety of intra-acting components. Rather than 
berating ourselves for being bored, we might learn to embrace it and consider: what 
happens within the boredom, where is it emerging from, how can we account for it, and 
what other entities within our intra-actions are also bored. Rather than striving for 
linearity we might instead account more freely for the complex understandings of time, 
memory, and experience, to more actively engage in the process of remembering and 
melancholy. Within a culture where experience is something that must be hurried past, 
we might spend more time focused on and exploring it, in order to consider more 
openly how we are shaped by that which has gone before. 
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Rethinking the “human” is about more than just rethinking “who” the human is, 
what rights they have, and how they interact (or intra-act) with their environments. It 
should also be about considering what it means to live in these entangled ways and, 
crucially, how it feels. I have stated before that we have not yet escaped the overthrows 
of our humanist history to move away from a conception of the “I”, and that instead we 
must critique and critically extend this “I” to examine in detail what is meant by it (see 
Chapter 3: Embracing Methodological Contradictions). We must therefore do the same 
for all of our practices, experiences and affects, in order to adopt a posthuman approach 
to conceiving what this entity of the “I” does and is. It is, not only in what we name it, 
but also in the ways that we account for it. As Rose (1998: 3) explains, he feels an 
‘unease about the values accorded to the self and its identity in our contemporary form 
of life, a sense that while our culture of the self accords humans all sorts of capacities 
and endows all sorts of rights and privileges, it also divides, imposes burdens, and 
thrives upon the anxieties and disappointments generated by its own promises’. Is this 
not exactly what we see elsewhere in the liberal human subject? Not only have women, 
ethnic minorities, disabled people, and LGBTQ+ people traditionally been written out 
of a culture that privileges the white, able-bodied, property-owning male with the right 
to vote. We also ‘feel obliged to posit ourselves as subjects with a certain desiring 
ontology, a will to be’ (Rose 1998: 188). Yet feelings and affects that do not fit with 
this obligation have also been written out too, seen as shameful – and therefore anyone 
experiencing them has been deemed subordinate too. The reach of the liberal human 
subject has spread wide, and in order for posthuman subjectivity to readdress what it 
means to be “human”, it must account for affects and emotions too. This means not 
only accounting for our feelings as entangled, but accounting for our emphasis and 
celebration of certain feelings over others. 
This is a complex ethical task. As Rose (1998: 167) writes: ‘[t]o claim that 
values are more technical than philosophical is not to denounce all values, but it is, 
perhaps, to suggest the limits of philosophy as the basis for a critical understanding of 
ethics’. Am I suggesting that posthumans should be bored, nostalgic, inactive creatures? 
No. What I am suggesting is that in rethinking the human we should acknowledge that 
we always have been bored, nostalgic, inactive creatures, as much as we have ever been 
motivated, progressive, active ones. Boredom, for example, is not simply opposed to 
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attention, but is part of what makes attention possible, they are entangled, as are 
“success” and “failure”. In re-establishing a notion of posthuman “self”, this is therefore 
our opportunity to write such affects back into being, to account for ourselves as 
complex, embodied, entangled creatures subject to a range of experiences, each of 
which has their place in the world and our intra-action with it. 
Rather than merely a critique of the psychological subject, this chapter has 
shown how the posthuman subject can become a more empathic and ethical creature 
through the acceptance of its multiplicity. As Braidotti (2013: 100) identifies, the 
‘humbling experience of not-Oneness’ can create spaces to explore a range of 
productive questions. In the context of this thesis those questions have been: why must 
acting have a pilot and a master? and what happens if we disrupt these notions and 
focus on what acting can show us within its intra-action as a demonstration of the 
performance of posthumanism?; why should empathy involve self/other 
differentiation?; what happens if we extend our use of posthumanism into this “ability”, 
seeing it as evidence of our constant connection to the world, and embracing our 
responsiveness?; why should subject formation only focus on rational, reasonable and 
positive feelings from a place of autonomy?; what happens if we bring boredom, 
frustration, nostalgia, and the mundane back into the picture?; how does accounting for 
these feelings lend a different significance to our experiences, and adjust our own view 
of our intra-action in the world? This thesis has hoped to go some way towards 
answering these questions, and showcasing posthuman subjectivity as intra-active, 




Chapter 8: A Contingent Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
It is my argument that, given the problems with the traditional notion of the “human”, 
posthumanism is a realm of critical enquiry that can help us to explore our subjectivity 
in ways that acknowledge and accommodate how we are influenced by, and comprised 
of, what were previously considered “external” forces. This thesis has therefore 
investigated different aspects of posthuman subjectivity through a specific, 
technologically situated model. 
 
Summarising the thesis 
I began this thesis by proposing the posthuman gamer. I have used the MMORPG 
avatar-gamer as one example of the embodiment of posthuman subjectivity in order to 
explore new ways of understanding our “selves” as entwined entities. The MMORPG 
avatar-gamer has been a useful case to consider how we experience a posthuman 
subjectivity as an engagement with technology, and I have shown how even in these 
complex entanglements of human and machine we cannot make the distinction between 
“self” and “other” clearly. When the “other” is a technological, digital being inside a 
machine, we are not separate from our intra-action with one another. Whilst technology 
is not a necessary proviso of the posthuman condition or subjectivity, this is an 
increasingly accessible example that can show the intra-action of multiple entities. I 
have drawn on various theories of posthumanism to argue that the avatar-gamer is an 
amalgamation of material and informational entities (as per Hayles 1999) and that the 
“human” and “machine” in this entanglement are not ontologically distinct. Instead, the 
specific individualities of “human” and “avatar” are only defined in relation to one 
another, dependent on what each enables the other to do. This draws on Barad’s (2007) 
notion of relational ontology, where the distinct traits of each entity are only articulated 
through a discursive meaning-making that separates self from other. However, the 
reliance on the “other” to quantify the “self” enacts their entanglement further. The 
“me”, “she”, “we” fluctuation in fieldnotes has been an apt demonstration of this. 
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Writing about the self and my experiences as I play the game and connect with 
my avatar in this research project could be considered problematic given that posthuman 
acknowledgement that self/my/I is a flawed conception and the proposal that we should 
be turning away from anthropocentrism. However, in Chapter 3: Embracing 
Methodological Contradictions, I read the “I” of the autoethnography through the lens 
of posthumanism – accepting that this “I” is made up of a multitude of different 
components and that the self is ‘always relational, always defined by its 
interconnections with others’ (Blackman 2008: 117). To some degree the “I” I employ 
throughout the thesis aims to destabilise anthropocentrism through its emphasis on the 
avatar as an integral entity in the posthuman subjectivity.  
Using the avatar-gamer posthuman subjectivity as a case study, I began by 
complicating the notion of the posthuman subject through the methodological 
implications of a posthuman “I”. If we are not ontologically distinct, what right do we 
have to speak from the position of an “I”? This is undoubtedly a complex and arguably 
contradictory approach. Nevertheless, I have argued that as posthuman as we might be, 
we are still deeply entrenched in humanistic sense-making practices. Throughout the 
thesis, I aim to destabilise these, rethinking, and posthumanising them. However, I do 
not think their use is completely at an end. Whilst we can, and should, critically re-
examine taken for granted assumptions about the “human”, I do not believe this 
necessarily means we have to radically depart from everything we have ever known. In 
this way I draw on recent suggestions that ‘rethinking might therefore involve the 
remembering of certain theories of the self […] which – ‘with some refurbishment’ – 
remain ‘fit for purpose’, as well as generating new theoretical lenses through which to 
look at digital relationalities’ (Ferreday 2013: 54). For example, the “I” is used as an 
indication that as entangled as we are, we are still embodied, and part of our 
entanglement is still within a humanistic practice of sense-making. This needs to be 
disrupted to consider what the “I” is, but we can refurbish, reconceptualise and redefine 
without ultimately removing these notions from our vocabulary. More than just a 
methodology, this demonstrates the first aspect of the contribution this thesis has shown 
– that of how to “posthumanise” certain concepts. 
Therefore, the process of “posthumanising” that I have used throughout the 
thesis allows us to recycle and “update” certain humanist concepts, retaining their 
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usage, but adjusting the critical and conceptual underpinnings that influence how we 
understand and interpret the self. The posthuman “I” is the first example of this. To 
radically depart from any self-referential practices seems to be, frankly, both unlikely 
and ultimately unhelpful. As Blackman (2012) has stated, we have the ability to live 
singularity even in the face of our multiplicity, and I do not necessarily view this as a 
negative – as long as we acknowledge that multiplicity.  
Some more radical posthumanists might argue that this only serves to re-
establish the “I” as a locus of control and humanist accountability. However, I believe 
that using the “I” whilst understanding and recognising our entanglements, the 
distribution of our agency and the emergence of self as being contingent on “others”, 
becomes a critically reflexive practice. This means using the “I” as an unstable, shifting 
and emergent entity. Butler (2005: 41-42) argues that approaches such as this would 
allow 
 
an ethics based on our shared, invariable, and partial blindness about ourselves. 
The recognition that one is, at every turn, not quite the same as how one presents 
oneself in the available discourse might imply, in turn, a certain patience with 
others that would suspend the demand that they be self-same at every moment. 
Suspending the demand for self-identity or, more particularly, for complete 
coherence seems to me to counter a certain ethical violence, which demands that 
we manifest and maintain self-identity at all times and require that others do the 
same. 
 
I would argue that this recognition of, and patience for, the multiple “selves” we each 
embody aligns with further aspects of a posthuman ethic that I have suggested, that 
include an acknowledgement of our selves and our actions as always entangled and 
never individually “owned”. 
 Having proposed the posthuman gamer, and justified the posthuman “I”, I then 
went on to use a posthumanised autoethnographic methodology to explore the avatar-
gamer subjectivity in a variety of ways. This has been something of a journey through 
different fields, that broadened the scope of the research at each level. I have 
demonstrated how our activities (such as acting) our social, affective intra-actions (such 
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as empathy) and our own understandings of self (through psychological subject 
formation) can also be posthumanised.  
Initially, I drew on my background in performance and acting to examine my 
fieldnotes, considering acting theory as one way to analyse the subjectivity between 
avatar and gamer. However, as I stated in Chapter 5, much of the acting theory that I 
drew on was situated in a heavily humanistic understanding of self. Using the work of 
theatre practitioners Stanislavsky and Chekhov, I demonstrated how these theories 
explored the actor-character relationship in ways that seemed at times to suggest that the 
actor was consciously in control of their decisions and exerted a certain power over 
their performance of a character.  
Nevertheless, I saw potential in their work to “posthumanise” their techniques – 
considering the actor not as a master in control of their character, but the relationship 
between character and actor as a further example of distributed agency and posthuman 
subjectivity. Exploring aspects such as given circumstances, the “magic if” and 
involvement in the story, I developed a posthumanised version of acting theory. This 
viewed the agency between character and actor as equal and emergent, and proposed 
performance as an embodiment of the entangled webs of actor, character, director, script 
etc. and as a relational ontology (Barad 2007) where each contributes to the 
construction of the other. This chapter focussed on a more text-based analysis of the 
gameplay, considering aspects such as character choice and appearance, the background 
narrative of each avatar, and the incorporation of this information into the emergent 
posthuman subjectivity. 
As I demonstrated at the beginning of Chapter 6, the actor in the theatre utilises 
certain aspects of empathy in order to understand and perform their character. I, 
therefore, broadened the scope of my initial claims by moving the analysis away from 
the specificities of performance as a particular practice or profession. Shifting my focus 
from text-based engagements to more affective experiences I analysed fieldnotes 
through the use of empathy, which allowed a further insight into how posthuman 
subjectivities emerge from the intra-action between entities. Again, I problematised 
some of the more “humanistic” notions of empathy such as the suggestion of a rational, 
stable, autonomous individual who takes part in “other”-oriented perspectives and must 
avoid a loss of self (see, for example, Coplan 2011). This clear cut definition between 
 
214 
self and other is problematic to the experience of empathy in gaming, as in gameplay 
the avatar is often not experienced in such definite and simple terms. Quite clearly the 
avatar is not entirely “self” – yet it is not entirely “other” either. To account for this 
complexity, I provided a posthuman understanding of empathy that understands that 
“humans” are always in fusion with “others”. Posthuman subjectivity offers a way to 
conceptualise this, as the “boundaries” between self and other are refuted, and instead 
subjectivity is seen as ‘emergent rather than given, distributed rather than located solely 
in consciousness, emerging from and integrated into a chaotic world rather than 
occupying a position of mastery and control removed from it’ (Hayles 1999: 291). 
Rather than viewing empathy as solely a “looking out” but instead considering it as an 
“incorporating in” this intra-subjective experience creates the posthuman subject as 
actions are taken and scenarios are acted out. 
From text-based and affective intra-actions that demonstrate the emergence of 
posthuman subjectivity in a specific context, I then moved to consider how this 
posthuman subjectivity negotiates our actual sense of “self”. I have explored fieldnotes 
that show how I am still affected in humanistic ways even in an environment that I have 
purposefully entered to explore posthumanism. This shows how strongly embedded 
these humanistic understandings of selfhood are. Drawing on psychological 
understandings of self-development, linked to notions of motivation, achievement, 
attention and memory, I consider how these occur through the avatar-gamer 
entanglement. Challenging these facets of “self” as taken-for-granted assumptions about 
what we “should” be and how we “should” behave, I have then considered the potential 
to posthumanise these also.  
This final theme broadened the scope of this research further, in order to 
provoke debate on what a posthuman understanding of “self” might look like, beyond 
acknowledging the intra-dependence on the “other”. I suggested that in focussing on 
ourselves as projects and claiming our achievements as our “own” we are still 
demonstrating humanistic tendencies – even when we consider ourselves posthuman. I 
proposed that a posthuman subject should also problematise these progressive stances, 
and instead aim to more openly acknowledge and incorporate the messier aspects of 
subjectivity. This practice is twofold. Firstly, it involves accounting for the ways in 
which our “achievements” and “developments” are themselves entwined and enmeshed 
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with the circumstances, environments, and “others” around us. Secondly, it requires a 
shift to acknowledge that the motivated “self” is entangled with boredom, that our 
reliance on memory to construct and develop the self is complicated by feelings of 
nostalgia, which in turn demonstrates the non-linear (post)human experience. This 
proposal opens up a new space for posthuman ethics to develop. This involves 
distancing ourselves from problematic practices of self-governmentality and the good 
citizen, by moving towards a more open and relational understanding of these affects 
being mutually constituted by that which is around us. It also acknowledges these 
progressive desires and actions as being inherently bound up in feelings that were 
previously considered less “positive” or aspirational. 
 
Contributions to knowledge 
The significance of this research project is therefore multiple, and I see the three main 
contributions as follows. First of all, I have identified an everyday example of 
posthuman subjectivity and, through an in-depth empirical account, have demonstrated 
one of the ways in which we might begin to understand ourselves as posthuman. 
Gaming demonstrates a clear and everyday application of posthuman theory, therefore 
making theory useful and relevant through demonstrating its application through a 
popular way of engaging with the media. It is important that we explore the relationship 
between the body and the screen, between human and machine, because these 
relationships are becoming more prolific and we need to understand how they create 
subjectivities. This research will, therefore, contribute to the field of game studies as it 
has conceptualised and developed a new way of understanding the avatar-gamer subject 
through posthumanism. Furthermore, this may have wider application for those 
researching and exploring digital cultures in other areas, as this model of the posthuman 
subject could be transposed into other environments. 
Secondly, I have used traditionally “humanist” concepts and “posthumanised” 
them to make sense of this emergent version of subjectivity. Through both my 
methodology and through the themes covered, I have used commonplace practices, 
affects, and understandings of self, thus demonstrating how being posthuman feels very 
human. In order to explore the posthuman as something that is accessible, useful, 
relevant and neither a utopian dream nor a dystopian nightmare I have not attempted to 
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detract from our very “human” nature, or the ways in which we usually live, explain, 
negotiate and narrate our lives. Instead, I have articulated a space in between the 
utopian and dystopian versions of posthumanism by establishing that posthuman 
subjectivity is as complex a subjectivity as any other we embody.  
Thirdly, the methodological implications of a posthuman autoethnography have 
negotiated the provocations and potentials of using the “I” in an entangled way. The use 
of a posthuman “I” has conceptualised and delivered a difficult methodology that 
emerges from an understanding of the tensions between these positions, but 
nevertheless justifies the posthuman “I” as contingent, contradictory, and multiple. This 
provides a posthuman subject that is both radical but accessible – radical in its 
multiplicity, in the incorporation of different subject positions, and in the negotiation of 
an entanglement – but accessible in a narrative form and through the use of the “I” – 
that historic fallacy of selfhood that we nevertheless rely on to make sense of our 
experiences. 
Each of the themes also demonstrates an original contribution to their specific 
field, and therefore may be of use individually to scholars within actor training, the 
study of empathy, and psychological understandings of selfhood and subjectivity. 
However, more than that, they are a significant and original contribution to posthuman 
studies. Together, they have shown just some of the ways in which we can see how 
posthuman subjectivity emerges. By “posthumanising” as a diffractive re-reading of 
taken-for-granted humanistic assumptions, I have shown a framework through which 
further themes and understandings of self might also be updated. I have therefore 
presented the ways in which posthuman subjectivity can be understood through much of 
what we already do – if we simply learn to read these activities, affects and actions in 
different ways. 
I have drawn on a variety of fields that have developed relatively recently, from 
posthumanism, to game studies, to affective methodologies. There are therefore many 
potential avenues for the future development of this research. Posthumanism and the 
posthumanities are evolving fields, and demonstrate a significant shift in our 
understandings of our place in the world, and in what we are. The model I have 
proposed in this thesis can be applied in a variety of other contexts, to not only claim 
other subjectivities and entanglements as posthuman, but to then critically explore the 
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specificities of how they emerge. Posthumanism is a way of doing this that can account 
for “new” subjectivities whilst also explaining the old. Posthuman subjectivities have 
always been, and therefore as much as the theories relate to the present and future, they 
can also be applied to the past. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, by updating our concepts, rather than just “being” posthuman, “doing” 
posthumanism is therefore about what we focus on and how we understand different 
things as important. We can begin to promote and live a more posthumanly ethical life 
by complicating these, and arguing for a wider emphasis on not only our “selves” but 
also our “actions” as entangled. For example, by focussing on the self as multiple, and 
accepting we are not singular (as evidenced in this thesis through acting and empathy), 
and paying attention to the idea that some affects, actions and qualities being perceived 
as “good” while others may be seen as “undesirable” is a particular construction that 
needs re-interrogation (as discussed in Chapter 7: Emergent Subject Positions). As well 
as post-liberal, post-stable, and post-anthropocentric we should also be post-
progression, post-linearity, and perhaps even post-good citizens. This denotes an 
approach that is aligned with a posthuman ethic, as it requires not only a breakdown of 
the boundaries between self and other, but also a breakdown between success and 
failure, or good and bad, in ways that force a more (posthumanly) empathetic 
understanding of our actions as entwined. This negates the role of judgement and 
discrimination, with both human and non-human others, and moves towards societies 
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Appendix 1: Empathy at Play (draft version) 
 
Empathy at play: Embodying posthuman subjectivities in gaming. 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we address the need for a posthuman account in the relationship between the avatar and 
player. We draw on a particular line of thought in posthumanist theory that suggests a constantly 
permeable, fluid and extended subjectivity, which blurs the boundaries between human and non-human. 
In doing so, we propose a posthuman concept of empathy in gameplay, and we apply this concept to data 
from the first author’s 18-month ethnographic fieldnotes of gameplay in the MMORPG World of 
Warcraft. Exploring this data through our analytic of posthuman empathy, we demonstrate the 
interdependence of the avatar-player relationship. We show how empathy allows us to understand this 
relationship as constantly negotiated, producing visceral reactions in the interconnected avatar-player 
subject, as well as moments of co-produced in-game action that require ‘affective matching’ between 
subjective and embodied experiences. We argue that this account of the avatar-player relationship extends 
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In theatre empathy could be considered between two sets of people. There is an empathic relationship 
between the actor and the character and also between the audience and the characters. The actor must 
empathise with the character in order to deliver their experiences and emotions in the most believable way 
possible. This corresponds to the meaning of empathy as ‘entering the private perceptual world of the other 
and becoming thoroughly at home in it. […] It means temporarily living in his/her life’i and this is precisely 
the job of the actor who ‘passes from the plane of actual reality into the plane of another life’.ii 
For the audience empathising with the character involves experiencing ‘vicariously what the characters 
in the action seem to be feeling’iii, deriving pleasure from the spectacle before them. Therefore the main 
differential between the empathy of the actor and the empathy of the audience would appear to be the 
embodiment and enactment of the role through the actor’s performance. 
In many ways, gaming can be considered similar to theatre. Steve Dixon discusses the correspondences 
between the two, including aspects of time, narrative, characters and emotional responses.iv In this paper I 
explore these emotional responses further, and consider the shared quality of the empathic connection with 
character. For the gamer the divide between audience and actor is conflated; they become both vessel and 
viewer. I will therefore seek to explore the empathic connection between gamer and character in relation to 
the actor/character and audience/characters in theatre, and discuss the ways in which this manifests itself 
in the lived experience of MMORPG gaming. I will consider responses to narrative in gameplay as well as 
embodied, affective responses to the experience of the avatar. 
 
Key Words: Empathy, gaming, MMORPG, theatre, acting, embodiment, affect, lived experience. 
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Warcraft. Through my autoethnographic reflections, I document the emotional, affective, 
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and gamer. As Braidotti suggests, ‘the relationship between the human and the technological other 
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What is the purpose of the  project? The research illustrates one way that 
posthuman subjectivity occurs as an 
entangled and fluid embodiment between 
human and machine. In this regard the 
research hopes to use theory to help us 
make sense of the everyday  and 
“mundane” practice of gaming. It will 
therefore identify an example of a 
posthuman subjectivity, demonstrating the 
everyday application of theory through its 
use in a popular way of engaging with the 
media. Furthermore the research will 
consider the ways in which being 
"posthuman" feels very "human" thus 
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utopian and dystopian versions of 
posthumanism by arguing that this 
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situation thereby making theory useful and 
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It will explore the relationship between the 
body and the screen/machine in creating 
that new subjectivity, demonstrating how 
being  posthuman feels  very human. 
 
 
In this way the research hopes to  
articulate a space in between the utopian 
and dystopian versions of posthumanism, 
as it is as complex a subjectivity as any 
other  we embody. 
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concerned with generating  theories, 
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works on the assumption that you the 
researcher believe the world to be 
‘indefinable,  interpreted,  shifting in 
meaning based on who, when and why 
anyone carries out and adds the meaning’ 
(Wisker 2009: 66). 
 
 
In this research paradigm and for my own 
research project the focus is on 
understanding the relationship between 
avatar and gamer to explore posthuman 
subjectivity, which is more usefully 
understood through interpretation of 
qualitative data to attempt to ‘understand 
meanings, interpretations  and/or  to look 
at, describe and understand experience, 
ideas, beliefs  and values  – intangibles 
such as  these’ (Wisker 2008: 74-75). 
 
 
As a consequence of this I will aim for  
depth over breadth in my data sample in 
order  to  facilitate  in-depth  understanding 
of the experience of the phenomena being 
studied (Ruane  2005: 12). 
 
 
I will be using autoethnography as my 
method with its own methodological 
constructs. 
Outline the principal methods you will   use My chosen method is autoethnography. I 
use the self to study lived experience as I 
suggest that it has strong potential for 
allowing subjective insight  into the 
research project and  question and 
because I believe it is the most accurate 
way to explore the medium of gaming 
experientially. It is my belief that by using 
my own experiences and writing about 
those I am able to do my best to ensure 
that the writing portrays an account of the 
experience that resonates in some way  
and limits the distortion of interpretation. A 
first-person method, or an 
autoethnography, might be preferential as 
‘[m]y own life experiences are immediately 
accessible to me in a way that no one 
else's are’ (van Manen 1990: 54). I have 
“immersed” myself in the  MMORPG World 
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Question Yes No 
1 Does your study involve collecting or use of human tissues or fluids? 
(e.g. collecting urine, saliva,  blood or use of cell lines,  'dead'  blood) 
	 X 
If  YES,  please give details 	
2 If your study involves blood samples or body fluids (e.g. urine, saliva) 
have you clearly stated in your application that appropriate guidelines 
are to be followed (e.g. The British Association of Sport and Exercise 
Science Physiological Testing Guidelines (2007) or equivalent)  and  
that they are in line with the level of  risk? 
	 	
If  NO, please explain  why not 	
3 If  your  study involves  human tissue other  than blood and saliva, have 
you clearly stated in your application that appropriate guidelines are to be 
followed (e.g. The Human Tissues Act, or equivalent) and that they are in 
line with level of risk? 
	 	
If  NO, please explain  why not 	
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Question Yes No 
1 Does any part of the project require data collection off campus? 
(e.g. work in the field or  community) 
	 X 
If YES: 
You must consider the potential hazards 
from off campus activities (e.g. working 
alone, time of data collection, unfamiliar or 
hazardous locations, using equipment, the 
terrain, violence or aggression from 
others). Outline the  precautions  that will 
be taken to manage these risks, AS A 
MINIMUM   this  must detail  how 
researchers would summon assistance in 
an emergency when working  off campus. 
For complex or high risk projects you may 
wish to complete and upload a separate 
risk assessment 
	
2 Does any part of the project involve the researcher travelling outside 
the UK  (or to very remote UK locations)? 
	 	
If YES: 
Please give details of where, when and  
how you will be travelling. For travel to   
high risk places you may wish to complete 
and  upload  a separate risk assessment 
	
3 Are  all travellers aware of  contact numbers for emergency assitance 
when away (e.g. local emergency assistance, ambulance/local 
hospital/police,  insurance helpline  [+44 (0) 2071 737797]  and CU's 
24/7 emergency line [+44 (0) 2476  888555])? 
	 	
4 Are there any travel warnings in place advising against all, or essential 
only travel  to the destination? 
NOTE: Before travel to countries with 'against all travel', or 'essential 
only' travel warnings, staff must check with Finance to ensure 
insurance coverage is not affected. Undergraduate projects in high  
risk destinations will  not be approved 
	 	
5 Are there increased risks to health and safety related to  the 
destination? e.g. cultural differences, civil unrest, climate, crime, 
health  outbreaks/concerns, and  travel arrangements? 
	 	
If  YES, please specify 	
6 Do all travelling  members of the research team have  adequate travel 
insurance? 
	 	
7 Please confirm all travelling researchers have been advised to seek 
medical advice regarding vaccinations, medical conditions etc, from 
their GP 
	 	
 
